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On May 25, 1995, the Supreme Court of Canada released a tril-
ogy of decisions' interpreting the section 15 equality guarantee of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.2 The decisions appeared to
be a dramatic departure for our highest court; it was a bad day for
equality seekers.
Prior to the trilogy, the widely accepted view was that the Su-
preme Court of Canada had rejected the similarly situated test in
1. See Thibaudeau v. Canada [1995] 2 S.C.R. 627; Egan v. Canada [1995] 2 S.C.R.
513; Miron v. Trudel [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418, discussed infra Parr IV.
2. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, Sched-
ule B of the Canada Act (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter Charter].
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favour of a substantive approach to equality.3 The first decisions under
section 15, Andrews and Turpin,' were hailed as great achievements in
equality jurisprudence. According to the Canadian Supreme Court,
discrimination was to be evaluated by situating the equality rights
claimant in the larger social and political context.5 Section 15 was
meant to prevent and remedy the continuing inequality of historically
disadvantaged groups, promoting a society that respects the equal dig-
nity of all.6 David Lepofsky summarized the promise of the first
equality decisions under the Charter.
When the Andrews/Turpin analogous grounds test is juxta-
posed with the Court's potent definition of equality, section
15 becomes an unprecedented promise of equality to the
disadvantaged in Canada. It is extricated from the bog of ra-
tionality review cases which pervaded the lower courts and
American courts. It avoids the prospect that the section 1
test would have to be seriously diluted, to the detriment of
women and the minorities, in order to save for government a
reasonable latitude for legitimate legislation and governance.
Andrews/Turpin also dismissed a U.S.-style "levels of scru-
tiny" view of equality rights, which would have led some to
enjoy more equality than others, and which places courts in
the unacceptable position of judging for themselves whose
claims to equality among those recognized in section 15 are
more important. It thus frees Canada from the jurispruden-
7tial quicksand in which the U.S. is now struggling to cope.
As we reach the first decade of litigation under section 15, the
unprecedented promise of Canada's equality jurisprudence is already
in jeopardy. In the 1995 trilogy, the Supreme Court of Canada split
3. See discussion infra Part II.F; see also McKinney v. University of Guelph [1990] 3
S.C.R. 229, 229 ("I do not believe [the similarly situated test] survived Andrews.");
R v. Turpin [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1296, 1332 ("[The similarly situated similarly treated
test [was] dearly rejected by this Court inAndrews.").
4. Andrews v. Law Soc'y of B. C. [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143; Turpin [1989] 1 S.C.1. 1296,
discussed infra Parts II.D-E.
5. P, v. Swain [1991] 1 S.C.R. 933, 992; Turpin [1989] 1 S.C.R at 1331-32 (Wilson,
J.).
6. Eldridge v. British Columbia (Att'y Gen.) [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624, 667; see also Andrews
[1989] 1 S.C.R. at 175.
7. M. David Lepofsky, The Canadian JudicialApproach to Equality Rights: Freedom Ride
orRolleroaster?, 1 NJ.C.L. 315, 321 (1992) [hereinafter Lepofsky, Rollercoaster].
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4-4-1 on the appropriate test for discrimination. Justices La Forest,
Gonthier, Major, and Chief Justice Lamer adopted a relevance test,
which is merely the similarly situated test with a new name. These
Justices became preoccupied with "biological realities," the "purity" of
marriage, maintaining tradition, and deference to legislative will .
Justices McLachlin, Sopinka, Cory, and Iacobucci appeared to have
narrowed and individualized their view of equality; their notion of
discrimination emphasized "irrational" distinctions. Only Justice
L'Heureux-Dub6 seemed committed to providing substantive equality
for victims of cn aon. So, in preparing the factum for our
Supreme Court of Canada equality case, M. v. H.," we decided to go
back and review the major section 15 cases.
Re-reading Hess, McKinney, Weatherall, and Symes," it became
clear that the Court's first equality case under the Charter, Andrews,
13
had not completely eliminated the lure of formal equality thinking
and the related appeals to history, biology, morality, tradition, and
democracy. The trilogy simply highlights long-standing problems.
Although there have been a series of unanimous equality decisions
since the trilogy, the Court has yet to resolve the underlying split.
This brings us to a crucial moment in Canadian equality juris-
prudence. The long-awaited decision in M. v. H. is likely to force the
Court to reexamine its division over section 15. Like the trilogy cases,
M. v. H. addresses equality in the family context, and requires the
Court to consider the effects of differential treatment from the per-
spective of an unpopular minority. The case will truly test the Court's
commitment to substantive equality.
At this critical juncture in equality jurisprudence, our paper ad-
vocates a return to first principles, to an evaluation of the meaning
and purposes of equality." At the outset, we summarize the competing
8. See discussion infra Part IV.D.
9. See, e.g., Miron v. Trudel [1995] 2 S.C.&. 418, 484-85.
10. See discussion infra Part IV.A.3.
11. M. v. H. [1996] 132 D.L.R. (4th) 538 (Epstein, J.), affd. [19961 142 D.L.R. (4th) 1
(Charron, J., & Doherty, J., concurring, Finlayson, J., dissenting).
12. R. v. Hess [1990] 2 S.C.tR 906; McKinney v. University of Guelph [1990] 3 S.C.&
229; Weatherall v. Canada (Att'y. Gen.) [1993] 2 S.C.R. 872 [also known as Con-
wayv. Canada]; Symes v. Canada (M.N.R.) [1993] 4 S.C.R. 695.
13. Andrews v. Law Soc'y of B.C. [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143.
14. This paper proceeds'from a position of engagement with law as one strategy for social
change. There are innumerable critiques of attempts to use law as a vehicle to pursue
equality rights. See MICHAEL MANDEL, THE CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS
AND THE LEGALIZAmTION OF, POLICS IN CANADA (199.4); CAROL SMART, FEMINISM
1999]
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concepts of formal and substantive equality and discuss the relation-
ship between equality and other values. We argue that there should be
no insecurity about the Court's role in reviewing legislative decisions,
since democracy and equality are aspects of the same ideal. We iden-
tify "biology," "morality," and "tradition" as threats to constitutional
integrity, which attempt to return the Court to the similarly situated
test. In our view, "biological realities" are socially constructed mecha-
nisms of power; it is the role of the equality guarantee to challenge
these realities. There is no place for prejudicial views in equality rights
reasoning. The governing morality should be that expressed by the
Charter. Tradition is no justification for discrimination, since dis-
crimination is itself traditional. A substantive approach to equality
involves challenging biological essentialism, the dominance of sectar-
ian morality, and the reification of tradition.
The balance of the paper discusses a selection of important cases
under section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. It
traces the development of equality jurisprudence from the introduc-
tion of section 15 to early approaches in Andrews, Hess, Weatherall,
Symes, and McKinney.'" This review illustrates the persistence of for-
mal equality analysis and the threats of biology, morality, and
tradition to the realization of substantive equality. The May 25, 1995,
trilogy of Egan, Miron, and Thibaudeau is critiqued in detail."G Fi-
nally, we turn to more recent jurisprudence 17 and offer a brief
discussion of M. v. H. "
AND THE POWER OF LAW (1989); Judy Fudge, The Effect of Entrenching a Bill of
Rights Upon Political Discourse, 17 INT'L. J. Soc. L. 445, 448 (1989); Peter Gabel,
The Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousness and the Pact of the Withdrawn Selves, 62
Tx. L. REv. 1563 (1984); Peter Gabel & Paul Harris, Building Power and Breaking
Images: Critical Legal Theory and the Practice of Law, 11 N.Y.U. Ray. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 369 (1982); Harry J. Glasbeek & Michael Mandel, The Legalisation of Poli-
tics in Advanced Capitalism: The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 2
Socrtusr SruD./EruDms SocrAmsTs 84, 87-88 (1984); Michael Mandel, Marxism
and the Rule of Law, 35 U.N.B.L.J. 7 (1986); Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62
Tax. L. Ray. 1363 (1984). But see Richard Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar: Does Criti-
cal Legal Studies Have What Minorities Want?, 22 HasvARD C.R-C.L. L. Rav. 301
(1987); Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructuring Ideals from Decon-
structed Rights, 22 HtAv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 401 (1987); Robert A. Williams, Jr.,
Taking Rights Aggressively: The Perils and Promise of Critical Legal Theoryfor Peoples of
Color, 5 LAW & INEQ. 103 (1987).
15. See infra Parts II.D.-III.G.
16. See infra Part IV.
17. See infra Part V.
18. See infra Parts VI.B-VII.
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At times, we dissect cases in painstaking detail. We considered
editing the discussion, but decided to err on the side of over-
inclusiveness, since we ourselves had learned so much in the study.
I. ESSENTIAL CONCEPTS
A. Giving Meaning to the Concept ofEquality
In Andrews,19 the first Supreme Court of Canada decision under
section 15, Justice McIntyre stated that equality "is an elusive concept
... which may be attained or discerned by comparison with the con-
dition of others in the social and political setting in which the
question arises."20 The notion of equality is accordingly not strictly
individualistic in nature, but must be determined by examining group
disadvantage. The main consideration is the impact of the law on the
individual or the group concerned.
This inquiry into the broader social and political context, with a
primary focus on the negative impact on the group concerned, is the
essential element which distinguishes the Court's approach from a
formal equality analysis. A formal approach to equality focuses on
sameness of treatment where individuals are similarly situated. The
underlying rationale of human rights provisions is that people are "all
the same inside," because each person has access to the same Reason
and Truth. History reflects a tradition of incrementally coming to the
realization of our essential similarity, grounded in certain universal
and basic moral principles and overcoming our superficial differences.
Each individual should receive the same treatment at law because all
persons should succeed or fail on the basis of their personal merit and
capacities. While there are certain essential biological differences,
these either make no difference because "we are all the same inside" or
must be taken into account by "special treatment" in certain cases.
Given the profound changes to society in eliminating discrimination,
the current modes of social organization are basically fair. Courts are
impartial arbitrators, which apply the law of non-discrimination so as
to preclude irrational categorizations which overlook the essential
similarity of all human beings. However, courts are not meant to
19. Andrewsv. Law Soc'y of B.C. [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143.
20. Andrews [1989] 1 S.C.Rat 164.
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address any pre-existing disadvantages arising outside of law, which
are created by broader social structures. That role is for the democratic
body of the legislature.
An alternative to the formal approach just described is under-
standing that all persons are created by and through the exercise of
power, and so their identities are products of power. Under this ap-
proach, Reason and Truth are not universal, absolute concepts, but
merely reflect the experience of those who have the power to define
reality for others, thereby silencing actual and potential alternate vi-
sions and realities. Similarly, there are no essential biological
differences. Rather, our perception of "difference" is socially con-
structed. Courts participate in reinforcing and actively creating
meanings and identities; they are necessarily political, and superbly so,
since they may perpetuate power behind a veil of rationalizations,
such as "reasonableness," "precedent," "justice," and "impartiality."
Judges, lawye'rs, legislation, common law, and court structure all re-
flect the overwhelming white, middle-class, Christian, heterosexual,
able-bodied, male interest, and experience 21-all of which entail
blissful ignorance of huge realms of being. Outside of this narrow vi-
sion, the current modes of social organization are basically unfair.
They correspond to the interests of the same group who make up the
Bench, the heads of Industry, and the heads of Government. The fa-
cilitation and elevation of these dominant interests, the very notions
of Reason and Truth, depend on the continued subjugation of the
Other.22 Tradition is the history of this subordination; dominant mo-
rality becomes the justification for domination by the few. '
For the Other, equality is not about being "basically the same in-
side" as current rights holders. The problem is not a historical failure
21. "[lIt would be ironic and, in large measure, self-defeating to the purposes of s. 15 to
assess the absence or presence of discriminatory impact according to the standard of
the 'reasonable, secular, able-bodied, white male.'" Egan v. Canada [1995] 2 S.C.R.
513, 546 (L'Heureux-Dubd, J., dissenting); see also Symes v. Canada [1993] 4 S.C.R.
695, 798 (L'Heureux-Dub, J., dissenting)("[W]hen only one sex is involved in de-
fining the ideas, rules, and values in a particular domain, that one-sided standpoint
comes to be seen as natural, obvious and general.").
22. The concept of the "Other" originated with Simone de Beauvoir, who explains how
woman is constituted as object, the Other to man's "Absolute." See SIMONE DE
BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX xvi (H.M. Parshley ed. & trans., Alfred A. Knopf
1964)(1949). Enlightenment thought is structured by such fundamental dichoto-
mies: rational/irrational, subject/object, culture/nature, man/woman. The first




to recognize essential similarity. Rather, there is a need for recognition
of plurality and heterogeneity that will challenge the notion of the
universal. Recognizing the value of diversity, the difference that differ-
ence makes, would require dramatic changes to current ways of being,
thinking, and living. This approach would not merely provide limited
inclusion to those who "fit" within the current social structure, but
would create whole new social conversations and communities.
Substantive equality requires changing the material conditions,
the substance, of people's lives. It necessitates an examination of the
concrete effects of government action, and demands that rights claims
be examined within a broader social and political context. The current
order is one of systemic inequality, which imposes a positive duty on
the state to achieve equality, not just to make sure legislation achieves
a minimum threshold of narrowly-conceived non-discrimination.
Given these conflicting visions between formal and substantive
equality, the Supreme Court of Canada has vacillated in its approach
to the equality guarantee. On the one hand, it has recognized that
formal equality has been used as a tool to deny human rights protec-
tions simply by defining persons as outside the protected class.23
Indeed, the Court has emphasized the necessity of considering the
broader context and the effect of the impugned provision on the con-
21C
cerned group.24 It has recognized that the equality guarantee "expresses
a commitment ... to the equal worth and human dignity of all per-
sons ... [and] instantiates a desire to rectify and prevent
discrimination- against particular groups 'suffering social, political and
legal disadvantage in our society.' ,
25
At the same time, however, the Court fails to give full expression
to a substantive approach to equality, perhaps because inequality is
often invisible to it. If section 15 of the Charter is to mean anything,
it requires a fundamental re-evaluation of "basic" tenets, a re-
configuration of judicial perception to centre on the experiences26 of
the groups whom the equality guarantee was meant to protect.
23. SeeAndrews [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 164-67.
24. SeeR. v. Turpin [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1296, 1331-32.
25. Andrews [19891 1 S.C.R. at 175 (citation omitted).
26. For a helpful discussion of the multiplicity and particularity of experience, and the
ability to centre on the experience of another, without the need for comparison and
without adopting that framework as one's own, see Elsa Barkley Brown, Afti-
can-American Women's Quilting: A Framework for Conceptualizing and Teaching
Afican-American Women's History, 14 SIGNS 921 (1989).
1999]
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
Although the Court claims to have rejected the similarly situated
test, it must focus on the broader social and political context, not the
'context' of social norms or biology, in order to detect systemic ine-
quality. The Court needs to examine the effect of government action
on the lives of the people that the action touches. A substantive ap-
proach to equality will challenge the judiciary to study inequality, to
observe its perpetuation through the effects of government action, and
to provide a concrete remedy that will materially affect relations of
power.
At the time of this writing, the Supreme Court's most recent
equality decisions hold significant promise in this regard.27 The Court
seems to have returned to a more substantive, generous, and purposive
interpretation of section 15, aimed at ameliorating the condition of
disadvantaged groups. Eldridge defined the purposes of section 15 in a
two-fold manner:2' as a commitment "to the equal worth and human
dignity of all persons," 2 and as a means "to rectify and prevent dis-
crimination against particular groups 'suffering social, political and
legal disadvantage in our society." 3 In our view, it is crucial that
these two purposes be considered simultaneously. A focus on dignity
alone might otherwise individualize discrimination, but in conjunc-
tion with an examination of contextual group disadvantage, it
provides real assistance in identifying discrimination and promoting
equality.
B. The Relationship Between Equality and Other Values
The Court has often had difficulty articulating the relationship
between substantive equality and other values. Abdicating its role as a
guardian of minority rights, the Court has been hesitant and deferen-
tial in response to popular appeals to democracy, tradition, and
27. See, in particular, our discussion of Eldridge and Viend, in/ra Parts V.D-E.
28. See Eldridge v. British Columbia (Att'y Gen.) [1997] 3 S.C.R 624, 667; see also
discussion infra Part V.D.
29. Eldridge [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 667. Justice McIntyre remarked that section 15(1)
"entails the promotion of a society in which all are secure in the knowledge that they
are recognized at law as human beings equally deserving of concern, respect and con-
sideration."Andrews [1989] 1 S.C.R at 171.
30. Eldridge [1997] 3 S.C.tR at 667 (citing R. v. Turpin [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1296, 1333);
see also Beverley McLachlin, The Evolution of Equality, 54 ADVOCATE 559, 564
(1996)(discussing recent Supreme Court approaches to equality in Canada).
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morality. In a regression to the equality jurisprudence under the Bill of
Rights, a significant number of the Justices have introduced consid-
erations of relevance, as a justificatory factor, under section 15. 31
While any notion of legislative deference undermines the Charter's
effectiveness, it is particularly troublesome to inject deference into the
equality guarantee. To illustrate this point, we consider the interplay
between democracy and equality.
1. Equality and Democracy
All of the great social struggles of this era have involved, to some
degree, a tension between the role of the Court and notions of democ-
racy. The achievements of equal status for women, desegregation, and
religious freedom have all been accompanied by breakthroughs in the
courts, despite criticism that the judiciary should not interfere with
the legislative function of fashioning social policy. Such criticisms
stem from a misconception about the democratic ideal, rooted in the
majoritarian premise. The issue must be reconsidered if we are to truly
understand the connection between equality and democracy:
[Tihe majoritarian premise has had a potent-if often un-
noticed-grip on the imagination of ... constitutional
scholars and lawyers. Only that diagnosis explains the near
unanimous view ... that judicial review compromises de-
mocracy, sb that the central question of constitutional theory
must be whether and when that compromise is justified....
So a complex issue of political morality-the validity of the
majoritarian premise-is in fact at the heart of the long constitutional
argument. The argument will remain confused until that issue is
identified and addressed.32
31. See our discussion of Miron and Egan, infra Parts IVA-B, and our critique, infra
Part IV.D.
32. RONALD DwomuN, FREEDOM'S LAw. THE MORAL READING O THE AMERICAN CON-
STITUTION 18 (1996) [hereinafter DwoRmN, FREEDOM'S LAW].
1999]
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a. The Majoritarian Premise
Ronald Dworkin rejects the majoritarian premise and emphasizes
that democracy and equality are "aspects of the same ideal, [and] not,
as is often supposed, rivals."33 According to Dworkin, the "main rea-
son" that most people want decisions about rights to be made by
legislators stems from their view that democracy is compromised by
judicial review. 4 From this perspective, "[t]he reason [for legislative
decision making] is one of fairness. Democracy supposes equality of
political power, and if genuine political decisions are taken from the
legislature and given to courts, then the political power of individual
citizens, who elect legislators but not judges, is weakened, which is
unfair."
35
Dworkin notes that "if all political power were transferred to
judges, democracy and equality of political power would be de-
stroyed."36 He emphasizes, however, that we are not talking about all
political decisions, only political decisions relating to rights. He con-
tinues:
It is no doubt true, as a very general description, that in a
democracy power is in the hands of the people. But it is all
too plain that no democracy provides genuine equality of
political power. Many citizens are for one reason or another
disenfranchised entirely...
33. DWORKIN, FREEDoM's LAW, supra note 32, at 29. Dworkin's most extensive discus-
sion of the issue is in A MATrER OF PRINCIPLE 24-28 (1985) [hereinafter DWORKIN,
A MArER OF PRINCIPLE]. In A MATrR OF PRINCIPLE, Dworkin discusses his argu-
ment that judges can and should make political judgments, including political
judgments about rights, without lessening the public's respect for the law. DWORKIN,
A MATrER OF PRINCIPLE, supra, at 25-26. This will be possible if lawyers, judges,
and all citizens embrace the idea that judicial decisions about rights "are consistent
with democracy and recommended by an attractive conception of the rule of law."
DWORKIN, A MATrER OF PRINCIPLE, supra, at 26. As an example, he notes that the
"Warren Court achieved almost miraculous compliance with extremely unpopular
decisions when popular understanding of the Court's role still insisted on historical
rather than political interpretation of the Constitution.... Popular opinion, in this
case, has followed the Court." DwoIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, supra, at 26.
34. DWORKIN, A MAT=ER OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 33, at 26-27.
35. DWORKIN, A MAT=ER OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 33, at 27.
36. DWORKN, A MATteR OF PMNCIPLE, supra note 33, at 27.
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... If courts take the protection of individual rights as
their special responsibility, then minorities will gain in po-
litical power to the extent that access to the courts is in fact
available to them, and to the extent to which the courts' de-
cisions about their rights are in fact sound. The gain to
minorities, under these conditions, would be greatest under
a system of judicial review of legislative decisions ... [T]here
is no reason to think, in the abstract, that the transfer of de-
cisions about rights from the legislatures to courts will retard
the democratic ideal of equality of political power. It may
well advance that ideal. 7
John Ely, in his acclaimed work Democracy and Distrust, argues
that majoritarian neglect compels a rights conception of democracy."
As the Supreme Court of Canada has noted, there are "groups in soci-
ety to whose needs and wishes elected officials have no apparent
interest in attending."39
To achieve an effective democracy, there must be an overriding
respect for equality and human dignity. "[P]olitical authority will, at
some point, be exercised oppressively; that is, it will be exercised to
impose very serious burdens on groups of people when there is no ra-
tional justification for doing so."40
Given the pervasiveness of discrimination, an attitude of judicial
deference will undermine democratic values. As Martha Jackman sug-
gests:
[I]f the Charter is to fulfill its initial promise-not only to
protect individual rights, but to promote a more truly demo-
cratic society-the courts must be more attuned to the
Charter's democracy-related objectives. In other words, gov-
ernment decisions which violate individual rights should not
automatically be assumed to be legitimate and defensible in
democratic terms. At the same time, individual rights should
not be perceived simply as barriers surrounding individuals,
37. DwoRMN, A MATrER OF PaIrNclP, supra note 33, at 27-28.
38. JOHN HART ELY, DmocRAcy AN DISmuST: A THEORY OF JuDIcAL REVIEW
(1980).
39. Andrews v. Law Soc'y of B.C. [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, 152 (quoting ELY, supra note
38, at 151).
40. John D. Whyte, On Not Standing for Notwithstanding, 28 ALTA. L. REv. 347, 355
(1990).
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protecting them from government and from community,
but rather as affirmative mechanisms for ensuring that indi-
viduals can participate fully in Canadian society and its
democratic institutions.41
In his most recent book, Freedom's Law, Dworkin summarizes his
conclusion as follows:"
The constitutional conception of democracy, in short,
takes the following attitude to majoritarian government.
Democracy means government subject to conditions-we
might call these "democratic" conditions-of equal status for
all citizens. When majoritarian institutions provide and re-
spect the democratic conditions, then the verdicts of these
institutions should be accepted by everyone for that reason.
But when they do not, or when their provision or respect is
defective, there can be no objection, in the name of democ-
racy, to other procedures that protect and respect them
better. 2
b. The Charter's Promise of Democracy and Equality
Of course, it might be argued that there is no need to consider
American philosophy of law, since Canadian equality rights have quite
a different history. The Charter's equality guarantee recognizes the
connection between democracy and equality in our political morality.
However, our rights jurisprudence still falls prey to courts' feelings of
insecurity and illegitimacy, founded in deference to "democracy.""
41. Martha Jackman, Protecting Rights and Promoting Democracy: Judicial Review Under
Section 1 of the Charter, 34 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 661, 663 (1996); see also Morton J.
Horwitz, Foreword: the Constitution of Change: Legal Fundamentality Without Funda-
mentalism, 107 HARv. L. Ray. 30, 63 (1993) ("Democracy and judicial review are
not concepts diametrically opposed. Judicial review can potentially enhance democ-
racy. The supposed conflict between majority rule and minority rights can be
reconciled by a greater social inclusiveness and empowerment of minorities. This is
an extension of democratic values. Some degree of political inclusiveness is a necessary
precondition for a healthy and well-functioning democracy.").
42. DwoRmN, FREDoM's LAw, supra note 32, at 17.
43.. The insecurity may also be "borrowed" from U.S. jurisprudence. Canada should not
emulate the American deferential attitude towards the government for at least two
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Canadian judges and academics have recognized from time to
time that democracy and equality are aspects of the same ideal.4 As
the late Honorable Justice Sopinka said in his last address:
Courts do more than resolve disputes. They help to protect
the constitution and the fundamental values embodied in
it-rule of law, fundamental justice, equality, and the pres-
ervation of the democratic process.... [The halls of
Parliament] are filled with people who would love to be able
to determine the outcome of legal disputes. Indeed, such
people, especially if they represent a majority, would prefer
that all disputes be political, rather than legal, because poli-
tics lets the powerful win. Only the law allows the weak to
win against the strong."
Several other decisions have emphasized the idea that courts must
be active and vigilant in the protection of minority rights. 6 However,
reasons. Firstly, we operate within a constitutional democracy, or "responsible gov-
ernment," rather than the U.S. model of "separation of powers." Secondly, our
section 15 is more potent than the Equal Protection Clause of the American Four-
teenth Amendment, which is restricted to purposeful discrimination alone, and our
equality jurisprudence since Andrews has avoided the "levels of scrutiny" assessment
that undermines the fluidity of rights. Compare Vifllage of Arlington Heights v. Met-
ropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), and Personnel Adm'r. v. Feeney,
442 U.S. 256 (1979), with Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission) v. Tay-
lor, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 892. See also Lepofsky, supra note 7, at 321 (discussing
Canadian judicial deference to Parliament). Paradoxically, even one of the most ada-
mant proponents of legislative deference, Justice Scalia, said, "I am not so naive (nor
do I think our forebears were) as to be unaware that judges in a real sense 'make'
law." James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 549 (1991).
44. SeeJackman, supra note 41, at 663; see also Martha Jackman, Rights and Participation:
The Use of the Charter to Supervise the Regulatory Process, 4 CAN. J. ADMIN. L. & PRAc.
23 (1990).
45. Justice John Sopinka, Address at the Ukrainian-Canadian Conference on Judicial
Independence and Accountability, (October 2 1997). An excerpt appeared in John
Sopinka, Sopinka. On Telling the Majoriy It Is Wrong, THE [ToRoNTO] GLOBE AND
MAIL, Nov. 28, 1997, at A21 [hereinafter Sopinka's Address]. The point is echoed by
Miron v. Trudel [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418, 495 (McLachlan, J.) ("In the course of the past
century, free and democratic societies throughout the world have recognized that the
elimination of such discrimination is essential, not only to achieving the kind of soci-
ety to which we aspire, but to democracy itself."). See also, Hill v. Church of
Scientology [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130, 1175 (Cory, J.)("Democracy has always recog-
nized and cherished the fundamental importance of the individual.").
46. See Beauregard v. Canada [1986] 2 S.C.R. 56, 72 (Dickson, C.J.); Edward Books &
Art Ltd. v. R. (sub nom. R. v. Videoflicks Ltd.) [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713, 794-95 (La
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we fear that the courts' willingness to be aggressively proactive is pro-
portionate to the perceived popularity of any particular decision. As
the decisions discussed in this paper illustrate, the Court often defers
to legislative decisions rather than challenge public opinion or long-
standing social policy. As Professor Hogg reminds us, the protection
of judicial review is vital in a constitutional democracy: "If the state
could count on the courts to ratify all legislative and executive actions,
even if unauthorized by law, the individual would have no protection
against tyranny.
4 7
c. The Democratic Origins of the Charter
In response to increasing judicial and popular misconceptions
about the relationship of democracy and equality, Supreme Court
Justices have occasionally reminded us of the history of the Charter."
In 1985, Justice Lamer (as he then was) wrote:
Forest, J.); Operation Dismantle Inc. v. P. [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441, 472 (Wilson, J.,
concurring).
47. PETERW. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 168 (3d ed. 1992).
48. In Sopinka's Address, supra note 45, at 10, he constructed an interesting analogy to
explain judicial activism and its democratic origins:
A Ulysses metaphor helps us to understand the relationship between the
judiciary and the legislature in a system that constitutionalizes rights. Leg-
islature is like Ulysses. The Sirens are short-term expediency or the passion
of the moment or a quick and effective but brutal solution to a complex
social problem. By enacting a Charter, the legislature, like Ulysses, tells the
courts, like his men: "In future, in response to unusual circumstances, we
may become irrational and irresponsible. We may not pay sufficient atten-
tion to what we are doing. We will pass laws that do harm to society or to
individuals in society. And we will do so without any proper justification.
It will seem to us to be the right thing to do-it may even seem unavoid-
able. But now, in this moment of calm reflection, we order you to strike
down these laws when they come before you. At the time you do this, we
will be angry with you. We will thrash about, and yell at you for daring to
question our orders-our laws. But we want you, when this happens, to ig-
nore our pleas and the threat of our displeasure. We want you to be
independent and to do what is right-that is, to be faithful to this first and
most important command."
Douglas Elliott makes a similar point in his paper, Sexual Orientation and the
Charter. Canada at the Crossroads, Presented to the Canadian Bar Association Na-
tional Conference (Ottawa, August 26, 1997); "[The legislature] wanted the courts to
act as watchdogs, to curb the impulse to pander to popular prejudice by restricting
the rights of unpopular minorities."
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It ought not to be forgotten that the historic decision to en-
trench the Charter in our Constitution was taken not by the
courts but by the elected representatives of the people of
Canada. It was those representatives who extended the scope
of constitutional adjudication and entrusted the courts with
this new and onerous responsibility. Adjudication under the
Charter must be approached free of any lingering doubts as
to its legitimacy."0
Years later, in a speech to the Empire Club, Chief Justice Lamer
was even more aggressive in articulating this view and added:
As for the suggestion that judges intrude into the legislative
sphere, the truth is that many of the toughest issues we have
had to deal with have been left to us by the democratic proc-
ess. The legislature can duck them. We can't. Think of
abortion, euthanasia, same-sex benefits to name a few. Our
job is to decide the cases properly before us to the best of our
abilities. We can't say we are too busy with other things or
that the issue is too politically sensitive to set up a royal
commission. We do our duty and decide."
d. The Democracy Argument Exposed
The preceding discussion leaves no doubt that the role of the ju-
diciary in reviewing legislative decisions is crucial to equality and
constitutional democracy. We have argued that equality is required to
preserve the essential meaning of democracy. Morton Horwitz sug-
gests that hostility to change and a desire for neutrality are
49. British Columbia Motor Vehicle Act Reference [1985] 2 S.C.Rt 486, 497; see also
John D. Whyte, Charter Rights Without Remedies, Paper presented to the Canadian
Bar Association-Ontario, 1997, Institute of Continuing Legal Education, Lesbian
and Gay Issues and Rights Program (January 31, 1997) at 9; William Black & Lynn
Smith, The Equality Rights, in THE CANADIAN CHARTER oF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS
14-40, (Gdrald A. Beaudois & Errol Mendes eds., 3d ed. 1996).
50. Chief Justice Antonio Lamer, Address to the Empire Club of Canada (April 1995).
This was quoted with approval by Justice Epstein in M. v. H. [1996] 132 D.L.R.
(4th) 538, 564 (Epstein, J.), affd [1996] 142 D.L.R. (4th) 1.
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components of deference; these correlate with a substantively conser-
vative approach to constitutional law.51
Fear of change manifests itself in content neutrality as a re-
action to "subjectivity" and "discretion." In turn, content
neutrality reinforces resistance to change by creating reified
and abstract conceptions that are out of touch with life. As a
consequence, the legitimating promise of content neutrality
is revealed to be misleading.
5 2
At a minimum, the "democracy" arguments against judicial activism
should not be raised with regard to equality. Justice Abella, whose
comments on human rights issues continue to be fresh and substan-
tive, makes this point nicely: "The Charter is about human rights, not
about judicial versus legislative roles, nor about judicial activism ver-
sus restraint, nor about the politicization of the judiciary."" Both
governments and courts have heavy responsibilities under the Charter.
2. Equality and Tradition
Along with "democracy," legal and religious "traditions" are used
to justify discrimination. This approach was openly successful"4 in
1995 when four out of nine justices of the Court held that they would
not question traditions related to "fundamental values" until there is a
dramatic and clear change in public opinion."
This reliance on tradition as a bar to equality is itself a long-
standing tradition. 6 In the Supreme Court of Canada's decision to
51. See Horwitz, supra note 41, at 100.
52. Horwitz, supra note 41, at 99-100.
53. Rosalie Silberman Abella, Public Policy and the Judicial Role, in THE CANADIAN AND
AMERICAN CONSTITrTIONS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 167, 177 (Marion C.
MeKenna ed., 1993).
54. See, for example, the minority section 15 judgments in Miron v. Trudel [1995] 2
S.C.Rt 418 and Egan v. Canada [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513, discussed infra Parts IVA-B.
55. See Egan [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 464 (Gonthier, J., dissenting) ("Barring evidence of a
change in these values by a clear consensus that there should be a constitutional con-
straint on the powers of the state to legislate in relation to marriage, the matter must
remain within the scope of legitimate legislative action.").
56. See, e.g., Symes v. Canada (M.N.R.) [1993] 4 S.C.R. 695; Rodriguez v. British Co-
lumbia (Att'y Gen.) [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519; Egan [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 516 (Sopinka, J.,
concurring); R. v. Hess [1990] 2 S.C.R. 906, 908 (McLachlan, J., dissenting);
McKinney v. University of Guelph [1990] 3 S.C.R. 229.
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deny women status as "persons" in Edwards v. Canada (Att'y Gen.),7
the Court was guided by the absence of clear legislative intent to sig-
nal a departure from the common law." Accordingly, women were
found ineligible to be called to the Senate. In contrast, the Privy
Council, which granted the appeal, noted that women had historically
been excluded from public office, but stated:
The fact that no woman had served or has claimed to serve
[in public office] is not of great weight when it is remem-
bered that custom would have prevented the claim being
made or the point being contested. Customs are apt to de-
velop into traditions which are stronger than law and remain
unchallenged long after the reason for them has disappeared.
The appeal to history therefore in this particular matter is
not conclusive."
Tradition, and hence traditional values, are contrary to the no-
tion of substantive equality. A tradition-based focus, then, completely
disregards the mandate of section 15 (1), the "unremitting protection"
of minorities who have been traditionally disadvantaged at the hands
of the majority.60 As Douglas Elliott wrote:
[I]t has been traditional values ... which have left us our
rich legacy of discrimination. Tradition was used to defend
slavery. Tradition was used to justify denying African
Americans citizenship rights. Tradition was used to justify
miscegenation prohibitions. Tradition was used to justify
denying equality for women. Discrimination is traditional.
To say a particular discriminatory law reflects tradition is to
state the obvious and forgo [sic] the analysis.
61
57. Reference as to the Meaning of the Word "Persons" in Section 24 of the British
North America Act, 1867 [1928] S.C.R. 276.
58. Reference as to the Meaning of the Word "Persons" [1928] S.C.R. at 282-83 (noting
that "[an] outstanding factol or circumstance[ of importance bearing upon the pres-
ent reference [was that] ... by the common law of England (as also, speaking
generally, by the civil and canon law ... ) women were'under a legal incapacity to
hold public office").
59. Edwards v. Canada (Att'y Gen.) [1930] A.C. 124, 134.
60. Hunter v. Southam Inc. [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145.
61. Elliott, supra note 48, at 27-28.
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3. Equality and Biology
"Natural biological differences" are another persistent rationali-
zation for discrimination. Often accompanied by appeals to tradition
and morality, biological arguments long prevented access by women
and people of colour to the franchise, professions, and well-paid em-
ployment. When the United States Supreme Court refused to grant
Myra Bradwell a license to practice law, Justices Bradley, Swayne, and
Field explicitly rejected her arguments under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, writing:
[T]he civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recog-
nized a wide difference in the respective spheres and
destinies of man and woman .... The natural and proper
timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evi-
dently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life. The
constitution of the family organization, which is founded in
the divine ordinance, as well as the nature of things, indi-
cates the domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to
the domain and functions of womanhood. 2
Far from being matters of historical interest, "biological realities"
are still frequently used as outright justifications for inequality. The
determinism of a biological approach circumvents legal and moral
arguments; it precludes change. By accepting a. "natural" division be-
tween women and men, "we naturalize history, we assume that men
and women have always existed and will always exist. Not only do we
naturalize history, but also consequently we naturalize the social phe-
nomena which express our oppression, making change impossible."
63
Substantive equality demands a recognition that so-called
"essential biological differences," like sex and race, are socially con-
structed, not "natural," and are historically and culturally specific, not
universal. The discourses that create "sex" are a major structural sup-
port for patriarchy and heterosexism; those that create "race" buttress
62. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872)(Bradley, J., concurring).
63. Monique Wittig, One is Not Born a Woman, in FEMINIST FRAMEWORKS 148, 149
(Alison Jaggar & Paula Rothenberg eds., 2d ed. 1984).
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racism." Accordingly, the. language of "biological realities" is not de-
scriptive, but prescriptive; it enforces relations of inequality.
4. Equality and Morality
Justifications for discrimination have frequently been grounded
in religious rhetoric, thinly disguised as "universal standards of mo-
rality." In 1995, Supreme Court of Canada Justices cited a 19th
century case to describe the "purity" of the institution of marriage,
and to justify its failure to recognize the interdependency of unmar-
ried cohabitees. 61 "[R]espect for women, and a sense of decorum" were
used to explain the failure to recognize women as "persons."66 Clearly,
it undermines the interests of substantive equality for the Court to
dictate standards of morality premised on disparaging particular
groups.' As the Court itself has recognized, "to impose a certain stan-
dard of public and sexual morality, solely because it reflects the
conventions of a given community, is inimical to the exercise and en-
joyment of individual freedoms, which form the basis of our social
contract."68
History and sectarian views, then, provide no answers in and of
themselves, except perhaps as proof of the need to ameliorate the
situation of disadvantaged groups. The underlying morality that
should guide the Court's discussion of equality issues is found in the
64. See, e.g., JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE (1990); MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE His-
TORY OF SExUALnT (Robert Hurley trans., Vintage Books 1980) (1976); CRius
WEEDON, FEMINIST PRACTICE AND PosTsTRUCTuALisT THEORY (1987); Jayne
Chong-Soon Lee, Navigating the Topology of Race, in CRmcAL RACE THEORY
(Kimberle Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995); Wittig, supra note 63, at 148.
65. Miron v. Trudel [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418, 448 (citing Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190,
211 (1888)).
66. In Edwards, the Court states:
[Bly the common law of England... women were under a legal incapacity
to hold public office, referable to the fact... that in this country in mod-
ern times, chiefly out of respect to women, and a sense of decorum, and
not for their want of intellect, or their being for any other such reason unfit
to take part in the government of the country, they have been excused
from taking any share in this department of public affairs.
Edwards v. Canada (Att'y Gen.) [1928] S.C.R. 276, 283 (citing Chorlton v. Lings,
L.R. 4 C.P. 374 at 392).
67. See Richard Nordahl, Ronald Dworkin and the Defence of Homosexual Rights 8:1 CAN.
J. LAw & JuR. 19, 24 (1995).
68. tR v. Butler [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452, 492.
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Charter itself.69 As Laurence Tribe writes, "[t]he Constitution serves
both as a blueprint for government operations and as an authoritative
statement of the nation's most important and enduring values."
70
C. Conclusion: The Importance ofEssential Concepts
We hope that this discussion of the essential concepts of equality
will illuminate our section 15 case commentaries. It is only by re-
turning to such basic principles that we will be able to move the law
towards realization of the Charter's promises. The more we stray from
the basics, the more we risk becoming caught up in the grips of me-
chanical jurisprudence. Professor Horwitz provides the following
criticism of the American jurisprudence:
There is no recognition that the world is rapidly changing
and that the Court's understanding of the role of law may be
growing dangerously out of touch with American society. In-
stead, most of this Court's opinions are surrounded by a
thick undergrowth of technicality. With three or four
4Cprong" tests everywhere and for everything; with an almost
medieval earnestness about classification and categorization;
with a theological attachment to the determinate power of
various "levels of scrutiny"; with amazingly fine distinctions
that produce multiple opinions designated in Parts, sub-
parts, and sub-sub-parts, this is a Court whose Justices ap-
pear caught in the throes of various methodological
obsessions.7'
While this criticism may not be as applicable to the Supreme
Court of Canada, the reality is that substantive equality will never be
achieved unless we re-examine the concepts behind our tests and sub-
tests. The "fundamental falseness and perversity of the similarly
situate[d] test"7 continues to jeopardize our equality jurisprudence.
69. See Butler [1992] 1 S.C.R at 492 (citing D. Dyzenhaus, Obscenity and the Charter:
Autonomy and Equality (1991), 1 C.R (4th) at 367 ("Moral disapprobation is recog-
nized as an appropriate response when it has its basis in the Charter values.")).
70. LAURENCE TIUBE, CONSmTITTONAL CHOiCES 26 (1985).
71. Horwitz, supra note 41, at 98-99.
72. GWEN BRODSKY AND SHEIAGH DAY, CANADIAN CHARTER EQUALTY RIGHTS FOR
WOMEN: ONE STEP FORWARD OR Two STEi'S BACK? 160 (1989).
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[T]he test does not help the court get at the truth. It does
not encourage the court to ask whether there is a problem of
long standing disadvantage or prejudice inherent in the cir-
cumstances. It does not lead the court to explore the full
social dimensions of the case, or even to grapple fully with
the facts. Rather, it encourages the court to concentrate on
superficial comparisons with other classes.73
As the discussions of equality decisions in the balance of this Ar-
ticle indicate, misplaced notions of equality, democracy, deference,
morality, biology, history, context, and relevance have threatened to
choke the life out of section 15. We who study, argue, and believe in
equality must fashion our own ways to intervene.
II. DEFINING DISCIUMINATION
The language of the Charter was introduced to ensure that the
courts would move away from the merely formal approach to equality
that had been applied under the Canadian Bill of Rights. Despite the
early promise of Andrews and Turpin, subsequent decisions failed to
consistently apply a substantive equality analysis. The 1995 "equality"
trilogy of Egan, Miron, and Thibaudeau brought this long-standing
problem to the forefront, as misplaced notions of equality, democracy,
deference, morality, biology, history, context, and relevance threat-
ened to gut the equality guarantee of meaning. In order to understand
the persistence and problems of a formal approach to equality in the
section 15 jurisprudence, we return to the very beginning, back to the
reason section 15 was included in the Charter.
A. Bill of Rights
The Canadian Bill of Rights was introduced in 1960 to protect
civil liberties against infringement by the federal government. Its
equality provision states:
1. It is hereby recognized and declared that in Canada
there have existed and shall continue to exist without
73. BRODSKY & DAY, supra note 72, at 160-61.
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discrimination by reason of race, national origin, colour,
religion or sex, the following human rights and funda-
mental freedoms, namely...
(b) the right of the individual to equality before the law
and the protection of the law... 74
The Bill of Rights was essentially a failure.75 Many cases adopted a
"frozen rights" approach, whereby only rights already in existence
when the legislation was introduced were covered by the Bill.6 Fur-
ther, the section was held only to protect "equality before the law,"
that is, equal process of law.' The Supreme Court of Canada held
that legislation "[d] ealing with a particular class of people is valid if it
is enacted for the purpose of achieving a valid federal objective.
7
1
This meant that citizens bore the burden of proving how their rights
were adversely affected and that only minimal judicial scrutiny was
required.79 The conclusion was that courts should be exceedingly def-
erential to the will of Parliament in assessing the compatibility of
federal laws with the Bill ofRights.80
Most important, the Bill's definition of discrimination was inef-
fective, as illustrated by the decision in Bliss v. Attorney General.8' In
that case, a pregnant worker challenged her exclusion from unem-
ployment benefits as a violation of her right to equality before the law.
The court held that any inequality in the plaintiffs case had been cre-
ated by nature, not by legislation. 2 There was differential treatment,
74. 1990, S.C. 1960, c. 44.
75. See C. Lynn Smith, Judicial Interpretation of Equality Rights Under the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms: Some Clear and Present Dangers [1988] 23 U.B.C. L.
REv. 65, 71; Black & Smith, supra-note 49, at 14-15; Lepofsky, Rollercoaster, supra
note 7, at 321.
76. See . v. Burnshine [1975] 1 S.C.R. 693; DALE GmsoN, THE LAW OF THE CHArER,
EQUALITY RIGHTS 24 (1990) [hereinafter LAW OF THE CHARTER].
77. Attorney Gen. v. Lavell [1973] 38 D.L.R. (3d) 481 (S.C.C.).
78. Bliss v. Attorney Gen. [1978] 92 D.L.R. (3d) 417, 425 (S.C.C.)(citing Prata v. Min-
ister of Manpower and Immigration [1975] 52 DLR (3d) 383, at 387 (SCG)).
79. See Prata [1975] 52 D.L.R. (3d) at 387. In Burnshine, Justice Mardand said, "[I]n
order to succeed... it would be necessary for the respondent, at least, to satisf this
Court that... Parliament was not seeking to achieve a valid federal objective."
Burnshine [1975] 1 S.C.R. at 694-95 (emphasis added).
80. See LAW ov 'HE CH-RTER~a, supra note 76, at 25; Lepofsky, Rollercoaster, supra note 7,
at 321.
81. Bliss [1978] 92 D.L.R. (3d) at 417 (S.C.C.) overruled by Brooks v. Canada Safeway
Ltd. [1989] 4 W.W.R. 198, 212 (S.C.C.).
82. See Bliss [1978] 92 D.L.R (3d) at 422.
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not on the basis of sex, but on the basis of pregnancy. 3 Since all preg-
nant persons were treated alike, there was no discrimination."
Bliss sparked outrage among feminists and libertarians, who be-
gan to petition for a constitutionally entrenched charter of rights with
stronger equality guarantees. At the same time, then Prime Minister
Trudeau decided to proceed with a charter of rights and freedoms.
Feminists were able to ensure that the Charter guaranteed "the equal
benefit of the law," not just equal process of law, and moreover that
the section was entitled "Equality Rights," not "Non-Discrimination
Rights," reflecting the need for a broad and purposive interpretation.85
In fact, section 15 was written almost completely in accordance with
the recommendations of the Canadian Advisory Council on the Status
of Women (CACSW). s6
B. The Introduction ofSection 15 of the Charter
The Charter's equality guarantees were expressly designed to over-
come the difficulties that had plagued the Canadian Bill of Rights.1
7
Section 15 of the Charter was adopted as follows:
(1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and
has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of
the law without discrimination and, in particular, with-
out discrimination based on race, national or ethnic
83. See Bliss [1978] 92 D.L.R. (3d) at 422 (citing Bliss v. Attorney Gen. of Can. [1978]
77 D.L.R. (3d) 609, 613 (F.L.) (Pratte, J.).
84. See Bliss [1978] 92 D.L.R. (3d) at 422.
85. See generally, Lelsie A. Pal & F. L. Morton, Bliss v. Attorney General of Canada:
From Legal Defeat to Political Victory, 24 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 141 (1986); see also,
Chaviva Housek, Women and The Constitutional Process, in AND No ONE CHEERED
280, 283 (Keith Banting & Richard Simeon eds., 1983); PENNY KoME, THE TAXING
OF TWENTY-EIGHT: WOMEN CHALLENGE THE CONSTITUTION 34-37 (1983).
86. See Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women (CACSW), Women, Human
Rights and the Constitution: Submission to the Special Joint Committee on the Constitu-
tion (November 18, 1980) at 4; Canada, Special Joint Committee of the Senate of
the House of Commons on the Constitution of Canada, Minutes of Proceedings and
Evidence, vol. 9 at 59 (November 20, 1980). The section 15 wording recommended
by the CACSW brief was: "(1) Every person shall have equal rights in law including
the right to equality before the laws and to the equal protection and benefit of the
law." CACSW, supra, at 13.
87. See Smith, supra note 75, at 74; see also Black & Smith, supra note 49, at 14-15.
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origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical
disability.
(2) Subsection (1) does not preclude, any law, program or
activity that has as its object the amelioration of condi-
tions of disadvantaged individuals or groups including
those that are disadvantaged because of race, national or
ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or
physical disability."
In accordance with section 32(2) of the Charter, section 15 did
not come into force until April, 1985, in order to give governments
three years to bring statutes in line with the equality guarantees."
Like all rights and freedoms under the Charter, section 15 is sub-
ject to section 1, which states: "The Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only
to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably
justified in a free and democratic society." 0
C. Early Approaches to Section 15(1)
When section 15 was introduced, commentators and courts ad-
vanced three approaches to interpreting the meaning of equality.9' The
first, described by Canadian constitutional scholar Peter Hogg, would
88. Charter, supra note 2. This paper does not address section 15(2) of the Charter. Fur-
ther, many important equality decisions under section 15(1) are not discussed, as we
felt that if the Artide were any longer, it would be a book. Generally, the courts are
accessible to the most privileged groups, and we recognize that the cases discussed do
not reflect the prevalence and variety of systemic inequality in Canada, particularly
the discrimination against the poor and people of colour.
89. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Free-
doms), § 32(2). See Pal & Morton, supra note 85, at 157-58 on the "legislative
audits."
90. Charter, supra note 2. The proper approach to section 1 was articulated in 11L v.
Oakes [1986] 26 D.L.R. (4th) 200, 201 (stating that a party seeking to uphold a
limit on a right or freedom guaranteed by the Charter must show, on a balance of
probabilities, that the objective of limiting the right is pressing and substantial, and
that the means chosen are reasonable and demonstrably justified. The measures
adopted must be rationally connected to the objective, impair the right as little as
possible, and there must be proportionality between the effects of limiting the right
and the objective).
91. SeeAndrews v. Law Soc'y of B.C. [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, 178; see also Black & Smith,
supra note 49, at 14-15.
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have treated every distinction drawn by law as discrimination under
section 15.92 The distinction would then be considered under section
I of the Charter. Professor Hogg wrote:
I conclude that section 15 should be interpreted as providing
for the universal application of every law. When a law draws
a distinction between individuals, on any ground, that dis-
tinction is sufficient to constitute a breach of section 15, and
to move the constitutional issue to section 1. The test of va-
lidity is that stipulated by section 1, namely, whether the law
comes within the phrase 'such reasonable limits prescribed
by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and demo-
cratic society.' "
According to this view, section 15 was expressed in unqualified
terms, so the word "discrimination" should not be read as introducing
a qualification in the section itself. Instead, section 1 would supply the
standard of justification for any abridgment of the right.
The second approach proposed was that there should be no dis-
crimination where those who are similarly situated are similarly
treated.94 This is the essence of formal equality: " [LIegislative distinc-
tions must be relevant to the purposes of the law.... [E] quality is
violated where a law distinguishes between two classes that are simi-
larly situated with respect to the purpose of the law. In this view,
formal equality is a demand for legislative rationality (if not reason-
ableness). '9
A more sophisticated articulation of the formal equality approach
was applied by Justice McLachlin for the British Columbia Court of
Appeal in Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia.! She considered
the reasonableness and fairness of the impugned legislation under sec-
tion 15(1), examining both its purposes and its effect on the person
92. PETERW. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 800-01 (2d ed. 1985).
93. HOGG, supra note 92, at 800-01 (citations omitted).
94. See Marc Gold, Comment, Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, 34 McGIu.
LJ. 1063 (1989).
95. Gold, supra note 94, at 1065-66.
96. Andrews v. Law Soc'y of B.C. [1986] 27 D.L.R. (4th) 600 [hereinafter Andrews
(B.C.CA.)]; see also Re McDonald and the Queen [1985] 51 O.R (2d) 745 (C-A.)
(applying the same test asAndrews (B.C.CA)); Century 21 Ramos Realty Inc. v. The
Queen [1987] 58 O.R. (2d) 737 (CA.); R. v. RL. [1986] 14 O.A.C. 318 (C.A.);
Bregman v. A.G. [1986] 18 O.A.C. 82 (CA.).
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concerned. Justice McLachlin framed the issue as "[wIhether a fair-
minded person, weighing the purposes of legislation against its effects
on the individuals adversely affected, and giving due weight to the
right of the Legislature to pass laws for the good of all, would con-
clude that the legislative means adopted are unreasonable or unfair."97
This approach leaves little room for the application of section 1,
although Justice McLachlin said that the latter would still apply to
permit discrimination in extraordinary circumstances, in times of
emergency, war, or other crises.98
A third approach, the "enumerated or analogous grounds"
method, was designed to prevent discrimination based on the grounds
enumerated under section 15 and those analogous to them.9 The fol-
lowing excerpt from Smith, Kline & French illustrates the approach:
As far as the text of section 15 itself is concerned, one may
look to whether or not there is "discrimination," in the pejo-
rative sense of that word, and as to whether the categories are
based upon the grounds enumerated or grounds analogous
to them. The inquiry, in effect, concentrates upon the per-
sonal characteristics of those who claim to have been
unequally treated. Questions of stereotyping, of historical
disadvantagement, in a word, of prejudice, are the focus and
there may even be a recognition that for some people equal-
ity has a different meaning than for others.'"
This approach would limit discrimination under the Charter to
those distinctions which involve prejudice or disadvantage. These
three approaches were outlined and discussed in the first Supreme
Court of Canada decision on the meaning of section 15, Andrews v.
Law Society of British Columbia.
D. Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia'o
The first case under section 15 of the Charter was a victory for a
white, male professional, and was, ironically, a great victory for disad-
97. Andrews (B.C.C.A.) [1986] 27 D.L.R. at 610.
98. SeeAndrews (B.C.CA.) [1986 27 D.L.1. at 610.
99. Smith, Kline & French Lab. v. Canada [1987] 2 F.C. 359.
100. Smith [1987] 2 F.C. at 367-69.
101. Andrews [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 143.
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vantaged minorities as well, due to its articulation of the concept of
equality. Andrews was a British citizen, residing in British Columbia,
whose application for a lawyer's practicing certificate was denied on
the grounds that he was not a Canadian citizen, as required under the
Barristers and Solicitors Act. He was successful under section 15 of the
Charter, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the impugned provi-
sion discriminated against non-citizens.
1. The Meaning of Equality
Justice McIntyre, speaking for the majority on section 15,102 re-
jected the Hogg approach, because it went directly from finding a
distinction to a determination of its validity under section 1, denying
any role for section 15(1). '03 Justice McIntyre also criticized the ap-
proach adopted by Justice McLachlin, noting that defining
discrimination under section 15(i) as an unjustifiable or unreasonable
distinction would leave virtually no role for section 1.204
The Court held that the third or "enumerated and analogous
grounds" approach most closely accorded with the purposes of section
15.20' However, it was not enough to focus only on the alleged ground
of discrimination and decide whether or not it was an enumerated or
analogous ground. The effect of the impugned distinction or classifi-
cation on the complainant also had to be considered.
0 6
Equality is an elusive concept that may only be discerned by a
comparison with the condition of others in the social and political
setting in which the question arises:'07
102. Justices Dickson, Lamer, Wilson, and L'Heureux-Dub6 concurred with Justice
McIntyre as to the wak in which section 15(1) of the Charter should be interpreted
and applied and the way in which section 15(1) and section 1 of the Charter interact.
Justice La Forest stated that he did not need to enter into an extensive examination of
the law regarding the meaning of section 15(1) because, insofar as it was relevant, he
was in substantial agreement with the views of Justice McIntyre. Andrews [1989] 1
S.C.R at 193. He did add that he restricted "discrimination [in] the sense in which
my colleague has defined it, i.e., on the basis of 'irrelevant personal differences' such
as those listed in section 15 and, traditionally, in human rights legislation." Andrews
[1989] 1 S.C.tL at 193. Note also that Justice Wilson wrote additional reasons that
received the support of Justice Dickson and Justice L'Heureux-Dub&
103. Andrews [1989] 1 S.C.R at 181.
104. Andrews [1989] 1 S.C.Rat 181-88.
105. Andrews [1989] 1 S.C.Rat 181.
106. SeeAndrews [1989] 1 S.C.Rat 182.
107. SeeAndrews [1989] 1 S.C.Rat 164.
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In simple terms, then, it may be said that a law which treats
all identically and which provides equality of treatment be-
tween "A" and "B" might well cause inequality for "C",
depending on differences in personal characteristics and
situations. To approach the ideal of full equality before and
under the law-and in human affairs an approach is all that
can be expected-the main consideration must be the impact
of the law on the individual or the group concerned. Recog-
nizing that there will always be an infinite variety of personal
characteristics, capacities, entitlements and merits among
those subject to a law, there must be accorded, as nearly as
may be possible, an equality of benefit and protection and
no more of the restrictions, penalties or burdens imposed
upon one than another. In other words, the admittedly un-
attainable ideal should be that a law expressed to bind all
should not because of irrelevant personal differences have a
more burdensome or less beneficial impact on one than an-
other. l 8
2. Similarly Situated Test Rejected
Justice McIntyre noted that the "similarly situated" test had been
widely adopted and had been applied by Justice McLachlin at the
Court of Appeal. Nevertheless, he characterized the test as a restate-
ment of the principle of formal equality, and as such, "seriously
deficient in that it excludes any consideration of the nature of the
law."'0 9 He pointed out that a literal application of the similarly situ-
ated test would justify the Nuremberg laws of Adolf Hitler, the
formalistic "separate but equal" doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson,"0 and
the results of Bliss."' He agreed with Justice Kerans in Mahe v. Alberta
(Government), who, in criticizing the similarly situated test, noted
that:
the test accepts an idea of equality which is almost mechani-
cal, with no scope for considering the reason for the
108. Andrews [1989] 1 S.C.R at 165.
109. Andrews [1989] 1 S.C.Rat 166-68.
110. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
111. Bliss v.Attorney Gen. [1978] 92 D.L.R. 3d 417, 425.
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distinction. In consequence, subtleties are found to justify a
finding of dissimilarity which reduces the test to a categori-
zation game. Moreover, the test is not helpful. After all,
most laws are enacted for the specific purpose of offering a
benefit or imposing a burden on some persons and not on
others. The test catches every conceivable difference in legal
112
treatment.
Justice McIntyre concluded that the similarly situated test could
not be accepted as a fixed rule or formula for the resolution of equal-
ity questions arising under the Charter."' Instead, the content of the
law, its purpose, and its impact both upon those to whom it applies,
and whom it excludes, should be considered."' Such an approach
would advance the purpose of section 15 by promoting "a society in
which all are secure in the knowledge that they are recognized at law
as human beings equally deserving of concern, respect and considera-
tion.""1
5
3. Meaning of Discrimination
Section 15(1) was not meant to address all differential treatment.
The section would only be engaged by those inequalities which lead to
"discrimination."'1 6 Justice McIntyre defined "discrimination" as:
a distinction, whether intentional or not but based on
grounds relating to personal characteristics of the individual
or group, which has the effect of imposing burdens,
obligations, or disadvantages on such individual or group not
imposed upon others, or which withholds or limits access to
opportunities, benefits, and advantages available to other
members of society. Distinctions based on personal
characteristics attributed to an individual solely on the basis of
association with a group will rarely escape the charge of
112. Mahe v. Alberta (Government) [1989] 54 Alta. L.R. (2d) 212 at 244.
113. SeeAndrews [1989] 1 S.C.R_ at 168.
114. SeeAndrews [1989] 1 S.C.R at 168.
115. Andrews [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 168.
116. SeeAndrews [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 182.
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discrimination, while those based on an individual's merits
and capacities will rarely be so classed.
117
Both the enumerated grounds themselves and other possible
grounds of discrimination recognized under section 15(1) were to be
interpreted in a broad and generous manner, reflecting the fact that
they are constitutional provisions intended to provide a "continuing
framework for the legitimate exercise of governmental power" and, at
the same time, for "the unremitting protection" of equality rights. "'
In addition, Justice McIntyre indicated that discrimination under the
Charter would be of the same nature and in descriptive terms would
fit the concept of discrimination developed under the human rights
119acts.
Accordingly, the words "without discrimination" limited imper-
missible distinctions to those which involved prejudice or
disadvantage within the context of the enumerated grounds and those
analogous to them. 2 ' The central consideration was the effect of the
impugned distinction or classification on the complainant.'
2'
4. Relationship between Section 15 and Section 1
Discrimination was to be considered under section 15(1) and
"any justification, any consideration of the reasonableness of the en-
actment; indeed, any consideration of factors which could justify the
discrimination and support the constitutionality of the impugned en-
actment would take place under section 1."22 These justificatory
factors had to be analytically distinct, given the shifting burden of
proof. The citizen would have to establish that his or her Charter right
had been infringed and the state would have to justify the infringe-
ment.
117. Andrews [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 174.
118. Andrews [1989] 1 S.C.R at 175 (citing Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R.
145, 155).
119. Andrews [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 176.
120. Andrews [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 181.
121. SeeAndrews [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 182.
122. Andrews [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 182.
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5. Summary of Test
In short, Justice McIntyre established the following test for an
analysis under section 15:
(1) The rights claimant is not receiving equal treatment
before and under the law or the law has a differential
impact on him or her in the protection or benefit ac-
corded by law, and
(2) [TIhe legislative impact of the law is discriminatory.
This involves a finding with respect to the effect of the
law on the complainant, within the context of the enu-
merated grounds and those analogous to them. Any
justification takes place under section 1.
2
6. Justice McIntyre's Application to the Facts of Andrews
Justice McIntyre concluded that section 42 of the Barristers and
Solicitors Act had drawn a legislative distinction between citizens and
non-citizens with respect to the practice of law by imposing a burden
in the form of delays in licensing permanent residents who had ac-
quired all or some of their legal training abroad. 124A rule which barred
an entire class of persons from certain forms of employment, solely on
the grounds of a lack of citizenship status and without consideration
of educational and professional qualifications or the other attributes of
individuals in the group, infringed section 15.125
Non-citizens, lawfully permanent residents of Canada, were a
good example of a "discrete and insular minority" who came within
the protection of section 15. Justice La Forest added that citizenship
was a personal characteristic sharing many similarities with those
listed in section 15.226 Furthermore, citizenship was typically not
within the control of the individual. It was, at least temporarily, a
characteristic of personhood not alterable by conscious action and, in
some cases, not alterable without unacceptable costs. 27
123. Andrews [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 182.
124. SeeAndrews [19891 1 S.C.R. at 182-183.
125. SeeAndrews [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 183.
126. Andrews [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 195.
127. SeeAndrews [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 195.
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Justice La Forest allowed that citizenship might, in some circum-
stances, be properly used as a defining characteristic for certain types
of legitimate governmental objectives.' 28 Nonetheless, it was, in gen-
eral, irrelevant to the legitimate work of government in all but a
limited number of areas. 129 Although granting benefits on the basis of
citizenship might be acceptable in a free and democratic society, such
legislation would require justification under section 1 because there
was discrimination under section 15.130
7. Justice Wilson's "Group Disadvantage" Additional Reasons
Justice Wilson emphasized group disadvantage and found that
the differential treatment imposed a burden.' 3' A rule barring an entire
class of persons from a form of employment solely because they were
non-citizens violated the equality rights of the class; it discriminated
on the basis of a personal characteristic. According to Justice Wilson,
non-citizens were a "'discrete and insular minority,' ,,13 who lacked
political power and were "vulnerable to having their interests over-
looked and their rights to equal concern and respect violated."' 3 They
were "among 'those groups in society [to] whose needs and wishes
elected officials have no apparent interest in attending."u Justice
Wilson further stated that the determination of whether a group is a
"discrete and insular minority" was to be made in the context, not of
the challenged law, but in the context of the group's location in the
larger social, political, and legal fabric of society.135 She wrote that
"[w]hile legislatures must inevitably draw distinctions among the gov-
erned, such distinctions should not bring about or reinforce the
disadvantage of certain groups and individuals by denying them the
rights freely accorded to others." 6
128. SeeAndrews [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 196.
129. SeeAndrews [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 196.
130. SeeAndrews [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 197.
131. eeAndrews [1989] 1 S.C.tR at 151 (Wilson, J., concurring).
132. Andrews [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 152 (Wilson, J., concurring)(quoting United States v.
Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938)).
133. Andrews [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 152 (Wilson, J., concurring).
134. Andrews [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 152 (Wilson, J., concurring) (quoting ELY, supra note
38, at 151).
135. Andrews [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 152.
136. Andrews [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 152.
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E. R. v. Turpin 37
The issue in R. v. Turpin,138 another section 15 case decided the
same year, was the constitutionality of Criminal Code provisions
which permitted accused persons in Alberta, but not in the rest of the
country, to elect a bench trial rather than trial by jury on a murder
charge. In a unanimous decision written by Justice Wilson, the Court
concluded that there was no discrimination. 9
The Court of Appeal below had applied a formal equality analy-
sis,140 finding that there were a class of individuals who were treated
differently, even though they were similarly situated to accused per-
sons charged with the same offences in the rest of Canada. However,
the appeals court held that this difference in treatment was not dis-
criminatory because the disadvantage was not "invidious," "unfair," or
"irrational," there being many such variations in criminal procedure
among the provinces.1
4 1
Justice Wilson rejected this approach:
The argument that s[ection] 15 is not violated because
departures from its principles have been widely condoned in
the past and that the consequences of finding a violation
would be novel and disturbing is not, in my respectful view,
an acceptable approach to the interpretation of Charter
provisions. Moreover, the Court of Appeal's test of whether
a distinction is "unreasonable," "invidious," "unfair" or
"irrational" imports limitations into s[ection] 15 which are
not there. It is inconsistent with the proper approach to
s[ection] 15 described by McIntyre J. in Andrews. The
equality rights must be given their full content divorced
from justificatory factors properly considered under s[ection]
1. Balancing legislative purposes against the effects of
legislation within the rights sections themselves is
fundamentally at odds with this Court's approach to the
interpretation of Charter rights.... [T]he Ontario Court of
137. RL v. Turpin [19891 1 S.C.R. 1296.
138. Turpin [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1296.
139. Turpin [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 1332-34.
140. R. v. Turpin [1987] 22 O.A.C. 261, 262-72, 36 C.C.C. (3d) 289, 296-304 (Ont.
Ct. App.).
141. Turpin [1987] 22 O.A.C. at 270.
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Appeal's approach places an unfair burden on the Charter
claimant to prove that a law is unreasonable and ... it
invites a less onerous balancing of the interests of the state
against those who suffer violations of s[ection] 15 than
would be allowed under s[ection] 1 of the Charter.
4 2
1. A "Contextual" Approach to Discrimination
Justice Wilson concluded that the appellants had been denied at
least one of the equality rights listed in section 15 of the Charter, but
noted that differential treatment "without discrimination" was per-
mitted under section 15."' This necessitated an inquiry as to whether
there was differential treatment on the basis of an enumerated or
analogous ground of discrimination. A determination that a group
was subject to an analogous ground of discrimination was "'not to be
made only in the context of the law which is subject to challenge but
rather in the context of the place of the group in the entire social, po-
litical and legal fabric of our society."'"4 Without a contextualized
approach, Justice Wilson warned that the section 15 analysis would
become a mechanical and sterile categorization process conducted en-
tirely within the four corners of the challenged legislation. This would
likely "result in the same kind of circularity which characterized the




In Turpin, there was no disadvantage that existed "independent
of the particular legal distinction being challenged."" 6 Different trial
options for murder defendants in Alberta versus those in other prov-
inces did not trigger section 15, because its purpose was to remedy or
prevent discrimination against groups suffering social, political, and
142. Turpin [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 1328 (citations omitted),
143. Turpin [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 1330.
144. Turpin [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 1332 (quoting Andrews v. Law Soc'y of B.C. [1989] 1
S.C.R. 143, 152).
145. Turpin [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 1332.
146. Turpin [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 1332.
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legal disadvantage in society. A search for discrimination markers such
as stereotyping, historical disadvantage, or vulnerability to political
and social prejudice would be fruitless since the comparison was be-
tween those accused of section 427 offences in the rest of Canada and
those accused of the same offences in Alberta. To recognize the ap-
pellant's claims under section 15 of the Charter would "'overshoot the
actual purpose of the right or freedom in question.""
47
Justice Wilson noted that a person's province of residence or
place of trial might, in some circumstances, constitute a personal
characteristic of the individual or group for purposes of finding dis-
crimination.' However, in this case, residents outside Alberta,
charged with section 427 offences, did not constitute a disadvantaged
group in Canadian society within the contemplation of section 15.
There was no discrimination and thus no need to consider the provi-
sion under section 1.149
F. Commentary: Interpretations ofAndrews and Turpin
1. Similarly Situated Test Explained
The similarly situated test had been the favoured analysis of
American courts"O as well as both trial and appeal courts in Canada.'51However, it was generally accepted that Andrews and Turpin rejected
147. Turpin [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 1333 (quoting R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd. [1985] 1
S.C.R. 295, 344).
148. See Turpin [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 1333.
149. See Turpin [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 1333.
150. For a discussion of the difficulties with the similarly situated test in American equality
jurisprudence, see Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Rqlections On
Culture, Courts, and Feminism, 7 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 175 (1982); Wendy W.
Williams, American Equality Jurisprudence, in EQuALrry AND JUDIcIAL NEuTRALrrY
115 (Sheila L. Martin & Kathleen E. Mahoney eds., 1987); see also Rostker v. Gold-
berg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977); Schlesinger v.
Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
151. See Century 21 Ramos Realty Inc. v. The Queen [1987] 58 O.R. (2d) 737; R. v.
Ertel [1987] 35 C.C.C. (3d) 398 (Ont. CA.), leave refd [1987], 24 O.A.C. 320
(S.C.C.); Wilson v. British Columbia (Med. Serv. Comm.) [1988] 53 D.L.R. (4th)
171 (CA). For an extensive critical examination of the application of the "treat likes
alike" definition of equality in Canadian courts, see BRODSKY & DAY, supra note 72,
at 147-64.
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the principle of formal equality and its "similarly situated test''2 as
"seriously deficient,"" 3 and "not ... a realistic test for a violation of
equality rights."' 5 4 Whether rejection of the formal equality test would
actually assist in achieving equality was more controversial.'
Some critics suggested that the Court had misunderstood the
similarly situated test and that there was still support for a formal
equality analysis within Justice McIntyre's judgment." 6 Marc Gold
commented:
[Tihe Court does not say that the principle of formal equal-
ity has no role to play in any case whatsoever, only that it
would be wrong to attempt to resolve all issues "within such
a fixed and limited formula:." Second, notwithstanding the
152. See McKinney v. University of Guelph [1990] 3 S.C.RL 229, 234 (Dickson, CJ., La
Forest & Gonthier, JJ.) ("The similarly situated test has not survived Andrews.");
Turpin [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 1332 (Wilson, J.) ("[T]he similarly situated similarly
treated test [was] clearly rejected by this Court in Andrews.").
153. Andrews v. Law Soc'y of B.C. [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, 166.
154. Andrews [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 167.
155. See Anne F. Bayefsky, A Case Comment on the First Three Equality Rights Cases Under
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: Andrews, Workers' Compensation Refer-
ence, and Turpin, 1 Sup. CT. L. REv. 503 (1990); William Black and Lynn Smith,
Note, Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, 68 CAN. B'a. Ray. 591
(1989) [hereinafter Black & Smith, Note]. There were some commentators who ap-
plauded the Court's approach. See Dale Gibson, Analogous Grounds of Discrimination
Under the Canadian Charter: Too Much Ado About Next to Nothing, 29 ALTA. L.RLv.
772 (1991) [hereinafter Too Much Ado]; Dale Gibson, Equality for Some, 40 U. NEw
BRUNSWICK L.J. 2 (1991)[hereinafter Equalityfor Some]; Gold, supra note 94. See
also, e.g., Diana Majury, Equality and Discrimination According to the Supreme Court
of Canada, 4 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 407 (1990-91); Colleen Sheppard, Recognition of
the Disadvantaging of Women: The Promise ofAndrews v. Law Society of British Co-
lumbia, 35 McGiLL LJ. 206 (1990).
156. See Catholic Children's Aid Soc'y v. S.(T.) [1989] 69 O.R. (2d) 189, 205-06
(Tarnapolksy, J.); LAw OF THE CHARTER, supra note 76, at 73; Bayefsky, supra note
155, at 505-07; Black & Smith, Note, supra note 155, at 599-601; Too Much Ado,
supra note 155; Equality for Some, supra note 155; Gold, supra note 94; see also Lisa
Philipps and Margot Young, Sex, Tax and the Charter: A Review of Thibaudeau v.
Canada, 2 Rav. oF CONST. STUD. 221, 262 (1995) (suggesting that equality is neces-
sarily comparative and that the similarly situated test was never rejected, but was
rather shifted in form to consider the impact of the impugned provision on the con-
textualized individual).
FOUNDATIONS FOR (15)1
harshness of its criticisms, the Court does not reject the un-
derlying premise of this principle. 57
Gold outlined two conceptions of formal equality. The first ex-
amines categories as set out in the law itself and asks only if those
identified by law as "similarly situated" are treated similarly.58 For
example, legislation defines "spouse" as two persons. of the opposite
sex who cohabit. All those of the opposite sex who cohabit are treated
similarly. Thus, according to Gold's first test, there is no discrimina-
tion if same-sex cohabitors are treated differently.
The second test forms the basis of equal protection jurisprudence
in the United States and has been most influentially advocated by Jo-
seph Tussman and Jacobus tenBroek."' Under this approach, the
similarly situated test asks whether legislative distinctions are relevant
to the law's purpose.
Tussman and tenBroek characterize the first conception of formal
equality, which defines as similarly situated all persons who possess
the classifying trait, as a complete misapplication of formal equality.
They note that "[a]ll members of any class are similarly situated in this
respect and consequently, any classification whatsoever would be rea-
sonable by this test."'6 The result of such an approach is, they suggest,
"the easy dismissal of the equal protection issue on the grounds that
the law applies equally to all to whom it applies."' 6'
Critics noted that Justice McIntyre directed his critique at the
difficulties inherent in the circular form of the similarly situated test,
but retained the language of comparison, relevance, and merit that
157. Gold, supra note 94, at 1065 (citation omitted). Note that Gold's belief in the per-
sistence of a formal approach to equality was specifically disapproved of by Justice
Wilson in McKinney, [1990] 3 S.C.R. at 391 ("Unhappily, the parties involved in
these appeals as well as some of the academics who have commented upon the An-
drews decision have continued to resort to that test.").
158. Most trace the origin of this version of the similarly situated test to Aristotle's state-
ment that "things that are alike should be treated alike, while things that are unalike
should be treated unalike in proportion to their unalikeness" in THE NIcomAcHFAN
ETHics, Book V.3, at 1131a6 (D. Ross trans., 1925). However, reading an alternate
translation, and the whole of Book V, suggests that this sentence was taken out of
context. Aristotle was writing about corrective justice. See NICOMACHEAN ETics,
Book V, at 118 (Martin Ostwald trans., Macmillan Publishing Company, 1986).
159. Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L.
Ray. 341, 346 (1949).
160. Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 159, at 345.
161. Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 159, at 345.
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reflect a formal view of equality. 62 Justice McIntyre stated that equal-
ity is "a comparative concept."'6' The equality ideal was that a law of
general application should not "because of irrelevant personal differ-
ences" have a more onerous or less advantageous effect on one than on
another.'" Further, Justice McIntyre suggested that distinctions
"based on an individual's meriti and capacit[y]" will rarely be consid-
ered discriminatory.
65
These comments indicate that Justice McIntyre maintained at
least some of the formal equality language, if not its underlying con-
cepts.
2. Did Justice McIntyre Adopt the Tussman and tenBroek
Relevance Test?
Accordingly, critics argued that Justice McIntyre had addressed
his critique of the similarly situated test only to its obviously circular
form, and not to the Tussman and tenBroek purpose-driven test.'
This led some commentators to suggest that the Court had adopted a
relevance standard of discrimination. 67 Dale Gibson wrote:
The "similarly situated" label is not the only one by which
this essential judicial task could be designated. Both McIn-
tyre J. and La Forest J. described inequality in terms of
detrimental differential treatment based on "irrelevant per-
sonal differences." This was perhaps an invitation to
substitute a "relevance" test for the long-standing but occa-
sionally misapplied "similarly situated" standard.
6 1
162. See BRODSKY & DAY, supra note 72, at 205-12.
163. Andrews v. Law Soc'y of B.C. [1989] 1 S.C.RI 143, 164.
164. Andrews [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 165 (Mcdntyre, J., dissenting in part).
165. Andrews [1989] 1 S.C.tR at 174-75 (McIntyre, J., dissenting in part).
166. See BRODSKY & DAY, supra note 72, at 209; LAw OF aHE CHARTER, supra note 76, at
73-75; David M. Beatty, The Canadian Conception of Equality, 46 U. TORONTO LJ.
349, 351-55 (1991); Gold, supra note 94, at 1065-66; Sheppard, supra note 155, at
218-22.
167. See David W. Elliott, Comment on Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia and
Section 15(1) of the Charter: The Emperor's New Clothes?, 35 McGILL LJ. 235, 237-
38, 241 (1989); Dale Gibson, Canadian Equality Jurisprudence: Year One, in
EQUALITy AND JUDIcIAL NEuTrA=rH 128 (Sheila L. Martin & Kathleen E. Mahoney
eds., 1987).
168. LAw OF THE CHARTER, supra note 76, at 74 (footnote omitted).
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According to David Elliott, the test adopted by the Court as a
whole might be outlined as follows:
(i) determine the legislative purpose; (ii) look for those who
are similarly situated to the complainant in the broad sense
of being in the same social and political setting (and not
simply subject to the same law or within the same group)
which is relevant to the legislative purpose; (iii)determine if
the claimant is affected differently as a result of an irrelevant
personal difference; and (iv) determine if this different effect
amounts to a relative disadvantage for the complainant. 69
Elliot concluded that, if this analysis was correct, the Court was
"in the confusing position of rejecting the similarly situated test but
retaining much of its comparative framework."' 70
3. A Substantive Equality Analysis
Many factors, however, support the Court's insistence that
Andrews rejected the similarly situated test in any form. Justice
Mclntyre expressly rejected the "reasonable classification" approach
adopted by Justice McLachlin in the Court of Appeal. Relevance was
not listed as a determinative element under section 15 and was not
mentioned in the unanimous judgment of the Court in Turpin.1
7
1
There was no relevance test for discrimination in the human rights
context, with which section 15 jurisprudence was supposed to be
aligned.'7 Furthermore, Justice McIntyre never stated that an equality
rights claimant must prove that a distinction was "irrelevant" to the
169. Elliott, supra note 167, at 238.
170. Elliott, supra note 167, at 238 (footnote omitted).
171. As Laura Fraser suggests, JusticeMcIntyre did not require irrelevance to support a
finding of discrimination. Laura Fraser, Rights Without Meaning: Failing to Give Effect
to the Purpose of Section 15(1), 6 DALHousm J. LUca. SruD. 347, 356-57 (1997). If
Justice McIntyre had intended such emphasis to be placed on relevance, "such a
limitation to an individual's equality rights would have been discussed in greater de-
tail as the section 15(1) test was developed." Fraser, supra, at 356. For instance, in
Andrews, Justice McIntyre specifically outlined certain factors which must be consid-
ered when resolving equality questions under the Charter. The factor of irrelevance is
notably absent. See Andrews v. Law Soc'y of B.C. [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, 168
(McIntyre, J., dissenting in part).
172. SeeAndrews [1989] 1 S.C.t. at 175 (McIntyre, J., dissenting in part).
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functional values of the legislation. To the contrary, he stated clearly
that there was no place for a reasonableness analysis, except under
section 1.173
Following Andrews and Turpin, discrimination was to be given a
broad interpretation emulating human rights jurisprudence, by situ-
ating the equality rights claimant in the larger social and political
context.7 4 A primary objective of section 15 would be to assist politi-
cally vulnerable groups in overcoming inequality, thereby promoting a
society that respects the equal dignity of all.
4. Foreshadowing the Miron/Egan Resurrection of Relevance
Equality seekers were clearly hopeful about the Andrews deci-
sion, 175 but most worried that the Court was not sufficiently clear in
rejecting the similarly situated test.'76 For example, Gwen Brodsky and
Shelagh Day noted that the discussion of disadvantage was underde-
veloped,"r and that the Court had rejected the similarly situated test
without a clear or thorough analysis. 78 They wrote: "[t]his deficiency
in the Court's analysis creates a real danger that the similarly situate
[sic] test and formal equality theory, though they appear to have been
repudiated here, will seep back into the jurisprudence because they
have not been properly examined and clearly rejected."
179
Over the years, these concerns about the Court's commitment to
a substantive equality analysis would be validated. In hindsight, they
173. Andrews [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 182 (McIntyre, J., dissenting in part).
174. SeeR. v. Swain [1991] 1 S.C.R. 933, 992; Rv. Turpin [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1296, 1331-
33.
175. The decision offered "clear encouragement to... disadvantaged groups by moving
towards a substantive view of equality." BRODSKY & DAY, supra note 72, at 205. An-
other source notes that "Andrews appears to have laid the groundwork for innovative
legal developments sensitive to the realities of the various inequalities women face."
Sheppard, supra note 155, at 234. Finally, "[t]here is the clear statement in Andrews
that equality does not mean treating likes alike and unalikes unalike. The rejection of
such a formulaic approach to equality opens the door to a more contextualized, ine-
quality-based understanding of equality." Majury, supra note 155, at 437.
176. See BRODSKY & DAY, supra note 72, at 209; Majury, supra note 155; Sheppard, supra
note 155.
177. BRODSCY & DAY, supra note 72, at 207.
178. BRODSKY & DAY, supra note 72, at 209.
179. BRODSKY & DAY, supra note 72, at 209; see also Majury, supra note 155, at 425-26,
437; Sheppard, supra note 155, at 218-19.
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foreshadow the dramatic reversal back to formal equality analysis that
we have seen during section 15's second decade.
III. DEALING WITH DISCUMINATION
The reversal back to the similarly situated test, and the reliance
on biology and tradition to justify discrimination that arises in Egan
and Miron, appear less dramatic after a critical reading of some deci-
sions from the first decade of equality jurisprudence. 8 '
A. R. v. Hess...
In Hess, the accused was charged under section 146(1) of the
Criminal Code which made it an offence for a man to have sexual in-
tercourse with a female under age 14 who was not his wife. 182 The
accused alleged that the offence violated section 15 of the Charter
since only men could be charged and only women could be complain-
ants.
Justice Wilson, for a majority,8 3 found that the provision was
contrary to the principles of fundamental justice because it did not
provide a due diligence defense."' Her comments with respect to sec-
tion 15(1) of the Charter are (thankfully) obiter dicta.
180. The decisions we discuss in this section of the paper are: k v. Hess [1990] 2 S.C.R.
906, McKinney v. University of Guelph [1990] 3 S.C.R 229, Weatherall v. Canada
(Atty Gen.) [1993] 2 S.C.R. 872, and Symes v. Canada [1993] 4 S.C.R. 695. We ar-
gue that the equality analysis in A v. Hess, a case about statutory rape, centered on
the concept of natural biological differences and supported deference to widely-held
moral standards. In McKinney v. University of Guelph, the Court assumed that age
and declining capacity were interrelated, focusing on the reasonableness of the dis-
tinction instead of considering the effect of mandatory retirement and the lack of
human rights protection. In upholding women's right to work in male penitentiaries,
the Court in Weatherall v. Canada relied on biological essentialism. Symes v. Canada
illustrates the Court's reluctance to recognize adverse impact discrimination. A ma-
jority of the Court failed to view the differential treatment from the perspective of
the equality seeker, as situated in the larger social and historical context.
181. Hess [19901 2 S.C.tR at 906.
182. Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch.C-34, § 3(6), (1970).
183. Justices Lamer, La Forest, and L'Heureux-Dubd concurring.
184. Hess [1990] S.C.R. at 927.
1999]
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER 6- LAW
1. Majority Section 15 Reasons of Justice Wilson
Justice Wilson suggested that section 15 was not obviously in-
fringed merely on the grounds that the offence could, as a matter of
fact, be committed only by men." 5 She stated that because women
could not commit a physical act that could be readily equated with
perietration by a male, the question of whether a female should be
punished for sex with a male under 14 years of age was a policy matter
best left to the legislature.16 It would, she asserted, place a discrimi-
natory burden on males only if there had been "no reason related to
sex for imposing such a burden."8 '
Justice Wilson noted that arguments based on "popular yet ill-
conceived notions about a given sex's strengths and weaknesses or
abilities and disabilities"' had often been used to justify discrimina-
tion."9 Nevertheless, Justice Wilson held that certain biological
"realities" could legitimately shape the definition of particular of-
fences. 90
With respect to alleged discrimination in the differential treat-
ment of complainants, Justice Wilson suggested that the legislature
chooses to punish a male who engages in intercourse with a girl under
14 differently from a male who engages in "sodomy" or "buggery,"
these being "distinctions aimed at biologically different acts that go to
the heart of society's morality and involve considerations of policy...
best left to the legislature." 9'
Justice Wilson went on to say that the Charter could not provide
relief if the Criminal Code failed to provide a statutory rape provision
anywhere in the Code for the benefit of young male victims. It would
not be appropriate for the court to use section 15(1) to create an of-
fence which the legislature had not chosen to create. There could be
sound policy reasons for protecting one group and not the other, and
these reasons might be based on the biological distinctions between
them. 192
185. Hess [1990] S.C.R_ at 928.
186. Hess [1990] S.C.RI at 930.
187. Hess [1990] S.C.R. at 928.
188. Hess [1990] S.C.R. at 929.
189. Hess [1990] S.C.R. at 928-29.
190. Hess [1990] S.C.R. at 929-31.
191. Hess [1990] S.C.R_ at 931.
192. Hess [1990] S.C.R. at 931-32.
[Vol. 6:261
FOUNDATIONS FOR (15)1
2. Minority Section 15 Reasons of Justice McLachlin
Justice McLachlin 93 came to a different conclusion with respect
to section 15. In her view, section 15 is violated by a distinction
drawn on the basis of an enumerated or analogous ground, where such
distinction results in a burden being placed on the complaining indi-
vidual or group.'94 The analysis then moves to section 1. So, having
established that men face a burden under section 146(1) not faced by
women, or that females enjoy a benefit not enjoyed by men, the ques-
tion of whether "the larger context" supports the burden or benefit
would be a matter for section 1 of the Charter.'95
a. Application to Disadvantaged Groups
Justice McLachlin acknowledged that Turpin could be read as re-
quiring a finding of disadvantage existing apart from and independent
of the particular legal distinction being challenged.196 This approach
suggests that a distinction working against men as compared with
women was not sex discrimination per section 15 because male plain-
tiffs could not claim membership in a "discrete and insular minority,"
nor show disadvantage apart from the provision they were challeng-
ing.9 7
Justice McLachlin, arguing that these arguments took the lan-
guage in Turpin further than was justified, pointed out that
[T]he Court must be taken to have had in mind section 28
of the Charter, which provides that notwithstanding any
other provisions, the rights and freedoms referred to in the
Charter are guaranteed equally to male and female persons.
The Court in Turpin... states that the search for independ-
ent disadvantage applies "in most but perhaps not all cases"
and says that finding a "discrete and insular minority" is
"merely one of the analytical tools which are of assistance."
193. Justices Sopinka and Gonthier concurring.
194. Hess [1990] S.C.R. at 942.
195. See Hess [1990] S.C.I. at 940.
196. Hess [1990] S.C.I. at 942.
197. See Hess [1990] S.C.R at 943.
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In my view, the essential requirements for discrimination
under section 15 remain as set forth in Andrews.198
Applying this test, Justice McLachlin found that the impugned
provision, in drawing distinctions on the enumerated ground of sex,
discriminated under section 15 of the Charter." "It burdens men as it
does not burden women. It offers protection to young females which
it does not offer to young males." 2°°
However, Justice McLachlin would have upheld the section as a
reasonable section 1 limit on equality rights, because of the important
objectives of "protect[ing] ... female children from the harms that
may result from premature sexual intercourse and pregnancy," and
protecting society from the impact of the social problems which sexual
intercourse with children may produce.2°' Justice McLachlin stated
that these were pressing and substantial objectives, to which the exclu-
sion was rationally connected, and the rights violation impaired
equality rights to a minimum degree. The only question was whether
the infringement of section 15 was justified, given the laudatory ob-
jectives of section 146(1).202
Justice McLachlin argued that:
Singling out.., males as the only offenders is justified given
the fact that only males can cause pregnancies.... The pro-
tection of female children to the exclusion of male children
may also be justified on the same ground; only females are
likely to become pregnant.... Moreover, while adult fe-
males may prey on males under the age of fourteen, the
gravamen of the problem of intercourse with young juveniles
involves intercourse by men with young girls.2°3
198. Hess [1990 S.C.R. at 943-44.
199. Hess [1990] S.C.R. at 944.
200. Hess [1990] S.C.R. at 944.
201. Hess [1990] S.C.R. at 948-49.
202. Hess [1990] S.C.R. at 949.
203. Hess [1990] S.C.R. at 957.
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3. Commentary: "Sex" and the Similarly Situated Test
Hess illustrates that no member of the court had a serious under-
standing of or commitment to the substantive equality promised by
Andrews and Turpin. All Justices reverted back to the similarly situ-
ated test, with different results, based on whether the "sameness" or
"difference" of men and women was considered. Justice Wilson fo-
cussed on the essential "difference" between men and women to
conclude that there was no discrimination. Justice McLachlin pre-
sumed "sameness" between men and women, so that all differential
treatment based on gender would have to be justified under section 1.
a. Purpose of Statute
Hess demonstrates that the result of the similarly situated test
transforms the purpose of the statute into the pivotal consideration of
section 15. Had the purpose of the law been defined as the protection
of children from sexual exploitation by adults, the exclusion of boys
from its protections would have violated section 15.'2° The formal
equality approach also places an onus on rights claimants to show that
they are not differently situated as a matter of fact from those who are
included by the impugned provision.
b. A Substantive Equality Analysis
A substantive equality analysis, following Andrews and Turpin,
would have considered the effect of the statutory rape provision to
determine whether it perpetuated pre-existing inequality or whether it
helped remedy past discrimination. Focussing on the larger social and
political context, the Court would have to ask the following questions:
Is the construction and development of sexuality the same for young
gay men as for heterosexual women? Because of the current dynamics
204. See also Lepofsky, Rollercoaster, supra note 7. Justice McLachlin articulates a number
of different statutory purposes under section 1. In initially defining the objective as
pressing and substantial, she found the purpose of the provision was not only the
protection of young girls from pregnancy, but also to protect children from prostitu-
tion and the emotional harm of sexual intercourse at a young age. Yet, she was still
willing to describe the "gravamen" of the offence as focused on the protection of
young women, to the exclusion of boys, in the proportionality analysis.
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of these differences, do we need to take into account sex, maturity,
and sexual orientation, rather than having a blanket age of consent?
Also, in view of the current construction of sexuality, do we need a
more complex analysis of consent in all circumstances, perhaps re-
quiring a shift in onus to prove consent, subject to a due diligence
defense?
c. Biology and Discrimination
Justice Wilson's comments on biological "realities" are extremely
problematic. For example, she asserts that a provision criminalizing
self-induced abortion could not be considered discriminatory, since it
is a biological fact that only women may experience pregnancy.
Criminalizing self-induced abortion would be constitutionally sus-
pect,25 however, for the same reason that a legislative provision
disentiding pregnant women from employee benefits was held to be
discriminatory in Brooks.26 Both provisions would perpetuate
women's disadvantaged position in society. As the Supreme Court
would later conclude in R. v. Morgentaler Daigle v. Tremblay,08 and
Winnipeg Child and Family Services (Northwest Area) v. G. (D.F.),
2 9
women cannot be equal members of society if they are denied control
over their own bodies.210
Justice Wilson makes a specious distinction between "popular yet
ill-conceived notions" and "biological realities."2 1 Women's intellec-
tual and social "incapacity" was once considered a biological reality.
Any consideration of biological realities invites a discriminatory ap-
proach that is absolutely contrary to the spirit of section 15.
The "identification" of "biological realities" is not merely a neu-
tral definition; it 6ontributes to the discourses which create difference.
The creation of difference is a means of domination. In other words,
205. See Black and Smith, supra note 49, at 14-43.
206. Brooks v. Canada Safeway Ltd. [1989] 4 W.W.R. 193, 217.
207. R. v. Morgentaler [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30.
208. Daigle v. Tremblay [1989] 2 S.C.R. 530.
209. Winnipeg Child and Family Servs. (Northwest Area) v. G. (D.F.) [1997] 3 S.C.R.
925.
210. See, e.g., Winnipeg Child and Family Servs. [1997] 3 S.C.tR at 959, ("[To make
orders protecting fetuses would radically impinge on the fundamental liberties of the
pregnant woman, both as to lifestyle choices and how and as to where she chooses to
live and be.").
211. . v. Hess [1990] 2 S.C.R 906, 928-29.
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"biological realities" are socially constructed as rationalization for the
established power structure, so that what we perceive to be natural and
essential differences are in fact historically and culturally rooted. Gen-
der is viewed as a natural differentiation, a "biological reality." This
"reality" has served historically to constrain women's possibilities, be-
cause difference is constructed not only as difference, but as a
hierarchy of domination. The revelation that gender is not natural or
real, but constructed, permits the recognition that possible modes of
being are much broader than we are currently able to imagine within
our limited, dualistic conceptualizations. The exercise of freedom lies
in articulating these alternative ways of being.
In conclusion, as Lisa Philipps and Margot Young suggest:
These manifestations of a biological or natural understand-
ing of sex inevitably fold the section 15 analysis back into
the similarly situated test. Somehow eclipsed is earlier juris-
prudential insistence that section 15 is not the place for
considerations of reasonableness or attempts at justification.
Conceptions of sex differentiation as invoking possibly natu-
ral and therefore legitimate distinctions foil attempts to
move beyond the similarly situated test. This slippage serves
as a strong reminder of the dangers the similarly situated test
represents to the progression of equality law. Such eagerness
to locate natural differences facilitates the unchallenged as-
sertion of traditional notions of sex difference in precisely
the context--equality law-where such notions are most ap-
propriately reexamined. 2 2
d. Morality
Justice Wilson also suggested that courts should not question
moral principles which are widely held within a community.213 She
claimed that the legislature is the proper forum in which to examine
and scrutinize the ethical norms of a society, and that courts must
simply ensure these norms are not informed by "ill-conceived no-
tions."2 4 Although this deference to majority will is antithetical to the
212. Philipps and Young, supra note 156, at 256.
213. See Hess [1990] 2 S.C.R. at 930-31.
214. Hess [1990] 2 S.C.R. at 931.
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equality guarantees, American and Canadian courts have been preoc-
cupied with injecting this kind of independent morality into equality
jurisprudence. 5 Insecurity related to the legitimacy of judicial review,
especially in matters- of public morality, has resulted in a failure to
address inequality.
The contradictions between the notion of equality and concepts
of biological realities, deference, and normative standards have been
discussed in detail in the Essential Concepts section of this Article.
We merely note at this point that the themes of biology, deference,
and morality emerged in Hess, and pose very real threats to the prom-
ise of section 15. The Court's reliance on such concepts, departing
from the ethics of the Charter, is an ominous sign of worse things to
come.
B. McKinney v. University of Guelph 216
In McKinney, a number of university professors and a librarian
challenged the universities' policies mandating retirement at age 65.217
Only those under 65 were protected against age discrimination in em-
ployment under the Ontario Human Rights Code .2 8 The claimants
argued that the Ontario Code and the mandatory retirement policies
discriminated on the basis of age.219
1. The La Forest Majority
For the majority,20 Justice La Forest held that the Human Rights
Code contravened section 15(1) of the Charter, but should be upheld
under section 1. The differential treatment clearly constituted dis-
crimination for the purposes of section 15 because "it deprives
215. See discussion infra Part I.B.4.
216. McKinneyv. University of Guelph [1990] 3 S.C.R. 229.
217. The respondent universities were The University of Guelph, Laurentian University,
York University, and The University of Toronto.
218. S.O. 1981, c.53, s.9(a).
219. MclGnney [1990] 3 S.C.R. at 231.
220. Chief Justice Dickson and Justice Gonthier concurred with the reasons of Justice La
Forest. Justice Sopinka stated in separate reasons that he agreed with the reasons of
Justice La Forest that the mandatory retirement policies and practices and Human
Rights Code provisions were not saved under section 1.
[Vol. 6:261
FOUNDATIONS FOR (15)1
[persons] of a benefit under the Code on the basis of age, a ground
specifically enumerated in the Charter."221
Justice La Forest suggested, however, that age was significantly
different from some of the other enumerated grounds.m There was
nothing inherent in most of the specified grounds of discrimination to
support any general correlation between those characteristics and
ability. In his view, however, "[t]here is a general relationship between
advancing age and declining ability.'' 2
The universities argued that section 15 required "proof of irra-
tionality, stereotypical assumptions and prejudice," and that "a
mandatory retirement policy is not based on irrelevant personal differ-
ences or stereotypical assumptions, but rather is motivated by
'administrative, institutional and socio-economic' considerations."224
Justice La Forest responded that such arguments were "irrelevant,
since as Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia made clear ... not
only does the Charter protect from direct or intentional discrimina-
tion, it also protects from adverse impact discrimination, which is
what is in issue here."
25
The universities argued that the similarly situated test was still the
governing test, as long as it was not applied rigidly.z6 Justice La For-
est, noting that the similarly situated test could be applied no other
way, relied on Andrews to dismiss the universities' argument that there
was no discrimination.227
Although the impugned section of the Ontario Human Rights
Code was found to violate section 15, Justice La Forest found that it
was demonstrably justified under section 1, balancing the conse-
quences for older workers with ramifications for the labour market
and pension benefits.m Mandatory retirement was a long-standing
feature of the labour market, about which the Legislature was faced
with competing socio-economic theories.2 9 The Government was
221. Mclinney [1990] 3 S.C.Rt at 290.
222. MclInney [1990] 3 S.C.R. at 297.
223. Mcainney [1990] 3 S.C.R. at 297.
224. Mc~Inney [1990] 3 S.C.R. at 279.
225. Mc6inney [1990] 3 S.C.R. at 279.
226. Mc~inney [1990] 3 S.C.R. at 279.
227. McKinney [1990] 3 S.C.R. at 279. This comment has interesting implications for
Justice La Forest's later return to formal equality analysis in Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2
S.C.R. 513, and Miron v. Trudel [1995] 2 S.C.R 418.
228. Mcldnney [1990] 3 S.C.R. at 302-03, 319-20.
229. SeeMcfInney [1990] 3 S.C.R. at 302, 309.
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therefore entitled to choose between them and to proceed cautiously
in making any change.20 Furthermore, mandatory retirement reflected
a private sector arrangement "only tangentially related to government
action .... 2' Justice La Forest concluded that, in general, "the courts
should not lightly use the Charter to second-guess legislative judgment
as to just how quickly it should proceed in moving forward towards
the ideal of equality.
" 2
2. Justices Wilson and L'Heureux-Dub6's Dissenting Opinions
In dissent, Justice Wilson joined in the criticism of the similarly
situated test, finding that it had no place in equality jurisprudence and
that the court had clearly rejected the analysis.233 Instead, according to
Justice Wilson, section 15 should be directed against stereotype and
prejudice; its purpose was to promote human dignity.23 It was not
necessarily discriminatory to draw distinctions on the basis of the
listed grounds. The list of grounds was merely intended to assist in
recognizing the existence of prejudice. "At the same time, however,
once a distinction on one of the enumerated grounds has been drawn,
one would be hard pressed to show that the distinction was not in fact
discriminatory."235
Justice Wilson posed two questions: 1) Is there prejudice in the
mandatory retirement schemes?, and 2) "Are academics being required
to retire at age 65 on the unarticulated premise that with age comes
increasing incompetence and decreasing intellectual capacity?" ' She
concluded that the answer to both questions was yes and that the
mandatory retirement policy infringed section 15.
Justices Wilson and L'Heureux-Dubd also held that the Ontario
Human Rights Code infringed section 15 of the Charter28 Justice Wil-
son noted that the section 9(a) allowed employers 'to freely engage in
all forms of age-based discrimination against persons over 65, who
230. SeeMcKinney [1990] 3 S.C.R1 at 309.
231. McIGnney [1990] 3 S.C.R. at 312
232. Mcainney [1990] 3 S.C.R. at 318.
233. Mcfinney [1990] 3 S.C.IR at 391.
234. Md~nney [1990] 3 S.C.R at 392-93.
235. McKinney [1990] 3 S.C.R. at 393.
236. MclGnney [1990] 3 S.C.R. at 393.
237. Mc~inney [1990] 3 S.C.R. at 393.
238. Mclinney [1990] 3 S.C.R. at 414.
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would be powerless to complain about discrimination in hiring, de-
motion, transfer, or remuneration.239
C. Commentary: Remembering McKinney
1. The Reasonableness of the Distinction
The most problematic aspect of the McKinney decision is its def-
erential approach to legislative decisions under section 1 of the
Charter.20 However, there are significant problems with the reasoning
under section 15 as well. Although he found discrimination in the
universities' policies, Justice La Forest remarked that age is correlated
with ability and a loss of capacity.24' This statement, relying on
stereotyped generalizations that have no place in an equality analysis,
diminishes the seriousness of age discrimination, and focuses on the
reasonableness of the distinction rather than its impact on the victim.
Whenever the reasonableness of the distinction shifts the focus away
from the context of the rights-holder, there is a real danger that the
stereotyped views and preferences will supersede the Charter's ethics.
2. Administrative, Institutional, and Socio-Economic
Purposes are Irrelevant
McKinney confirmed that the similarly situated test did not sur-
vive Andrews. According to Justice La Forest, establishing
discrimination should not require proof of irrationality or stereotypi-S " 242
cal assumptions. The mandatory retirement policy's relationship to
a legitimate "administrative, institutional and socio-economic" pur-
pose was irrelevant since the Charter protects from both direct or
intentional discrimination and adverse impact discrimination.
239. Mc~Inney [1990] 3 S.C.R. at 414.
240. The details of Justice La Forest's approach to section 1 in McKinney are beyond the
scope of this Article. However, the notion of deference and equality in a constitu-
tional democracy is addressed infra Part I, because the reasoning of section 1 in
Mcinney later parallels the reasoning of the minority under section 15 in the trilogy
of Thibaudeau v. Canada [1995] 2 S.C.L 627, Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R.
513, and Miron v. Trudel [1995] 2 S.C.Rt 418.
241. Mc~lnney [1990] 3 S.C.R. at 297.
242. McIlnney [1990] 3 S.C.R. at 279.
243. Mcginney [1990] 3 S.C.R. at 279.
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Justice La Forest incorrectly identified the direct age discrimina-
tion at issue as adverse effect discrimination.4 His point, however,
seems to be that the Charter protects not only when the discrimina-
tion is completely illogical, but also when there are "legitimate"
institutional considerations for differential treatment. The issue is
whether there is an adverse effect on a group suffering pre-existing
inequality. In that respect, Justice La Forest begins to incorporate the
substantive equality ideal.
D. Weatherall v. Canada (Attorney General)"
Weatherall involved a prison inmate who challenged the consti-
tutionality of female guards conducting frisk searches and patrolling
cells in male penitentiaries.2 46 The inmate alleged that this practice was
discriminatory because female prison inmates "were not subject to
cross-gender frisk searches and surveillance."
247
Justice La Forest, delivering the judgment of the court, doubted
that section 15(1) was violated, but stated that if it was, the violation
could be justified under section 1.248 The claim was founded on the
demand that likes be treated alike. The Court held, however, that
different treatment was sometimes necessary to promote equality.249
Justice La Forest stated that the historical, biological, and socio-
logical differences between men and women permitted differential
treatment.20 "[T]he historical trend of violence perpetrated by men
against women [was] not matched by a comparable trend [in] which
men are the victims and women the aggressors." 25' Further, he suggested
that "[b]iologically, a frisk search or surveillance of a man's chest area
conducted by a female guard does not implicate the same concerns as
the same practice by a male guard in relation to a female inmate."252 He
pointed also to women's disadvantaged position in society in relation
244. M~nney [1990] 3 S.C.R. at 279.
245. Weatherall v. Canada (Att'y Gen.) [1993] 2 S.C.R. 872.
246. Weatherall [1993] 2 S.C.R at 875.
247. Weatherall [1993] 2 S.C.R at 877.
248. Weatherall [1993] 2 S.C.R. at 877-78.
249. Weatherall [1993] 2 S.C.R at 877.
250. Weatherall [1993] 2 S.C.R. at 877.
251. Weatherall[1993] 2 S.C.R. at 877.
252. Weatherall [1993] 2 S.C.R. at 877.
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to men.253 Given these considerations, it was obvious that there was a
different, more threatening impact on women than men in being
searched by guards of the opposite sex.254 Justice La Forest ultimately
failed, however, to decide the section 15(1) issue, noting that, even if
there was a violation of section 15(1), the practices would be approved
by section 1 of the Charter.255
E. Commentary: Failing to Contextualize
1. Biological Differences
Once again, the Court failed to consistently apply a definition of
discrimination as that which furthers a group's pre-existing inequality
within the larger social and political context. Instead, it returned to
considerations of natural biological "differences.
256
Although the result in this case was unobjectionable, its analytic
approach was unsatisfactory. Justice Gonthier would later rely on
Weatherall and Hess to suggest that "distinctions drawn on the basis of
relevant biological differences between the sexes do not necessarily
constitute discrimination. 2 7 This misses the point. The issue is not
whether the distinction rests on biological differences, but whether the
law has the effect of imposing a real disadvantage in the social and
political context of the claim.
258
As Black and Smith suggest, Brooks, not Hess and Weatherall, rep-
resents the court's approach to sex-specific conditions. 259 They
highlight the~following passage of Justice McLachlin from Miron:
253. Weatherall [1993] 2 S.C.R. at 877.
254. See Weatherall [1993] 2 S.C.R. at 877.
255. Weatherall [1993] 2 S.C.R. at 878.
256. See Black and Smith, supra note 49, at 14-44.
257. Miron v. Trudel [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418, 439.
258. See Black and Smith, supra note 49, at 14-45 (citing Miron [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 490)
("In Miron, [Mclachlin J.] makes it clear that in her view, even with sex-specific
conditions, it will only be the exceptional case in which section 15 will not be vio-
lated by provision based on the enumerated ground of sex-the exception will be
cases such as Weatherall in which the social context is found to reveal no perpetua-
tion of disadvantage. This is in stark contrast with the approach of Gonthier J., which
suggests that the sheer "relevance" of biological differences will be enough to prevent
a finding that section 15 is violated.").
259. Black & Smith, supra note 49, at 14-44 to 14-45.
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Following the lesson of Brooks, I would respectfully suggest
that ... if we are not to undermine the.promise of equality
in s[ection] 15(1) of the Charter, we must go beyond bio-
logical differences and examine the impact of the impugned
distinction in its social and economic context to determine
whether it, in fact, perpetuates the undesirable stereotyping
which s[ection] 15(1) aims to eradicate.26°
Looking at the broader context, it is clear that at this point in
history chest searches of male and female prisoners are very different.
This should not be explained, however, by any reference to essential
biological differences. As we have discussed, the meaning and even the
perception of the "difference" is socially constructed.
2. Perpetuation of Disadvantage
The issue in Weatherall was whether there was a constitutional
basis for distinguishing between searches of male penitentiary inmates
when performed by female and male guards. 6' If the Court had con-
sidered the larger context in which the discrimination was alleged,262 it
might have noted that the conduct at issue in this case was widely ac-
cepted when women engaged in "women's work" that involved similar
viewing of unclothed males, such as nursing. A substantive approach
to equality would also recognize the continuing disadvantagement of
women by occupational segregation. 263 Finally, a contextual analysis
would have examined the differential social meaning of cross-gender
surveillance for men and women.
Substantive equality requires women-only guards in women's
penitentiaries, since at this current cultural and historical moment,
women's bodies have been sexualized to a degree that men's bodies
have not; most female prison inmates are the survivors of male sexual
260. Miron [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 490-9 1.
261. Weatherall v. Canada (Att'y Gen.) [1993] 2 S.C.t. 872.
262. The substantive approach to equality we describe here is drawn from the Factum of
the Women'sLegalEducation andAction Fund (LEAF), Weatherall [1993] 2 S.C.R. at
872, reprinted in LEAF EQUALITY AND THE CHARTER 348 (1996) [hereinafter Fac-
tum].
263. But see Amy Bartholomew, Achieving a Place for Women in a Man's World: Or, Femi-
nism with No Class, 6 CJ.W.L. 465, 477 (1993).
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or physical violence;" and, given the prevalence of rape of women by
men, women reasonably fear sexual violence from men. A substantive
equality analysis would have viewed the differing treatment of male
and female prisoners as a positive measure aimed at reducing women's
systemic inequality.
E Symes v. Canada 
265
In Symes, a partner in a law firm challenged Revenue Canada's
decision that her child care expenses were not deductible as business266
expenses. Symes argued that these were expenses incurred for the
purpose of gaining or producing income from business as required
under section 18(1)(a) of the Income TaxAct.267 Revenue Canada con-
sidered the expenses to be personal or living expenses, the deduction
of which was prohibited by section 18(1)(h) of the Act.268 The Court
split along gender lines in determining whether child care expenses
should be deductible as business expenses.269 The men, making up a
majority of the Court, held that there was no discrimination.270
1. The Men
Justice Iacobucci27 held that child care expenses were difficult to
classify as business expenses, but that in any case, there was a complete
legislative response to their treatment given the specific deduction for
"child care expenses" under section 63.272 There was no ambiguity in
the Act, so the Charter could not be used as an interpretative aid.273
264. See Factum, supra note 262, 37(b) (citing CR.ATNG CHOICEs: REPORT OF THE
TASK FORCE ON FEDERALLY SENTENCED WOMEN 106-107 (1990)).
265. Symes v. Canada [1993] 4 S.C.R. 695.
266. Symes [1993] 4 S.C.R. at 706-07.
267. R.S.C. 1952, c.148, as amended and applicable to tax years 1983 to 1985, § 18(1).
268. Symes [1993] 4 S.C.R. at 706.
269. Justices Iacobucci, Cory, Major, La Forest, and Chief Justice Lamer denied Symes's
claim. Justices L'Heureux-Dub6 and McLachlin found that child care expenses
should be deductible. Symes [1993] 4 S.C.R. 695.
270. Symes [1993] 4 S.C.R. at 765.
271. Chief Justice Lamer and Justices La Forest, Sopinka, Gonthier, Cory, and Major
concurring. See Symes [1993] 4 S.C.R. at 765.
272. Symes [1993] 4 S.C.R. at 745-51.
273. Symes [1993] 4 S.C.R. at 752.
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Furthermore, Justice Iacobucci argued that section 63 was not
discriminatory because it did not draw a distinction on the basis of
sex."' Although women disproportionately incurred the social costs of
child care, it had not been shown that women disproportionately paid
child care expenses.275 Justice Iacobucci noted that parents had a joint
legal responsibility to care for children and, therefore, a joint legal ob-
ligation to pay the costs of child care.276 He also emphasized the
importance of "[distinguishing] between effects which are wholly
caused, or are contributed to, by an impugned provision, and those
social circumstances which exist independently of such a provision.
''
7
The social costs of child care were found to exist outside of the Act.
27
Although not expressing an opinion on the point, Justice Iaco-
bucci suggested that:
[a] different subgroup of women with a different evidentiary
focus ... might well be able to demonstrate the adverse ef-
fects required by s[ection] 15(1). For example ... if [it] ...
could be established that women were more likely than men
to head single-parent households ... an adverse effects
analysis involving single mothers might well take a different
course, since child care expenses would thus disproportion-
ately fall upon women.'"
Justice Iacobucci also noted that Symes's equality argument
should have recognized the relevance of parental status.280
2. The Women
Justices L'Heureux-Dubd and McLachlin concluded that Symes
was entitled to deduct her child care costs as a business expense under
the Act pursuant to her section 15 equality rights of the Charter.28 In
their view, the Income Tax Act should be interpreted in a manner
274. Symes [1993] 4 S.C.R. at 765.
275. Symes [1993] 4 S.C.R. at 765.
276. Symes [1993] 4 S.C.R. at 764.
277. Symes [1993] 4 S.C.R. at 764-65.
278. Symes [1993] 4 S.C.R. at 763-65.
279. Symes [1993] 4 S.C.R. at 766-67.
280. Symes [1993] 4 S.C.R. at 767.
281. Symes [1993] 4 S.C.R. at 820.
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consistent with the Charter's equality principles, thus permitting the
deduction.282 Justice L'Heureux-Dub6, pointing out that the
definition of "business expense" had been articulated on the basis of
the needs of businessmen, noted that "when only one sex is involved
in defining the ideas, rules, and values in a particular domain, that
one-sided standpoint comes to be seen as natural, obvious and
general."
3
Accordingly, the dissenting Justices "connected the dots" for Jus-
tice Iacobucci,n4 finding that it was obvious that women pay child
care expenses-it was "part and parcel of a recognition that child care
responsibilities present a significant obstacle for women in the social
and economic domain, that this issue is an equality issue and that the
interpretation of legislation can and must accommodate equality and




According to Justice L'Heureux-Dub6, equality demanded that
Symes have the right to deduct her business expenses even if such ex-
penses were not generally incurred by businessmen. 6 While she
acknowledged the difficulties of subsidizing child care through the tax
system and the disparate treatment of employed persons and business
persons under the Act, she nonetheless pointed out that the "complex
quandary of the disadvantagement of women generally through the
continuing social and economic cost of child care" was not the issue
before the court.27 The issue was the differential treatment of expenses
incurred for the purpose of gaining or producing income from busi-
ness, which advantaged businessmen in relation to businesswomen. 2
Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 pointedly stated that, although single
mothers might more obviously suffer hardship due to child care
expenses than did the married Symes, the latter's rights should still be
protected since "[d]iscrimination cannot be justified by pointing to
other discrimination."2 9 In particular, Justice L'Heureux-Dube noted
the relative privilege of Andrews, a white male lawyer of British
282. Symes [1993] 4 S.C.R. at 819.
283. Symes [1993] 4 S.C.R. at 798.
284. See Philipps and Young, supra note 156, at 242.
285. Symes [1993] 4 S.C.R. at 821.
286. Symes [1993] 4 S.C.R. at 822.
287. Symes [1993] 4 S.C.R. at 823-24.
288. Symes [1993] 4 S.C.R at 825.
289. Symes [1993] 4 S.C.R at 825.
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descent who was found to have suffered discrimination on the basis of
citizenship.20
The fact that Ms. Symes may be a member of a more privi-
leged economic class does not by itself invalidate her claim
under s[ection] 15 of the Charter. She is not to be held re-
sponsible for all possible discriminations in the income tax
system, nor for the fact that other women may suffer disad-
vantages in the marketplace arising from child care. As the
appellant argues, we cannot "hold every woman to the posi-
tion of the most disadvantaged women, apparently in the
name of sex equality."291
The female Justices, and in particular, Justice L'Heureux-Dubd,
emphasized the importance of examining issues in context, since only
then would it become clear that "so-called 'objective truths' may only
be the reality of a select group in society."292 The perspective of the
group suffering discrimination must be central to the equality analy-
sis. In that manner, the experience of both women and men could
shape the definition of business expense.293
G. Commentary: Privileging the Privileged?
Audrey Macklin, writing about the contrasting contextual ap-
proaches to the case-between the trial judge and the Court of Appeal,
also compellingly describes the differences between the Supreme
Court's male and female Justices:
The simplest way to decipher the diverging views ... on the
Charter issue is to imagine the judges peering at Beth Symes
through different pairs of glasses. When [Justices L'Heureux-
Dub6 and McLachlin] looked at her, they saw a business
woman standing next to a businessman. When [the male
Justices] looked at her, they saw . a self-employed,
professional woman standing next to a salaried woman. In
290. Symes [1993] 4 S.C.R. at 825; see also Andrews v. Law Soc'y of B.C. [19891 1 S.C.R.
143.
291. Symes [1993] 4 S.C.R. at 825-26.
292. Symes [1993] 4 S.C.R. at 826.
293. See Symes [1993] 4 S.C.R. at 826-28.
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the former scenario, Symes was disadvantaged by her sex
contrary to section 15 and deserved to have her business
expenses treated the same as. a businessman's. In the latter, she
was privileged by her class and made a mockery of section 15
of the Charter by attempting to use her status as a business
woman to obtain greater benefits than those available to
salaried women.
[An underlying element of Justice Iacobucci's] position is
that it is absurd to grant Symes parity with businessmen if,
in so doing, she is placed in a superior position to other
women. To put it another way, it is preferable that all
women be equally disadvantaged relative to men if the alter-
native is to improve the situation of the best-off women."'
Some feminists supported the majority decision as a victory for
social equality,9 on the theory that success in Symes would have
benefited those who are already privileged by the tax system.1
96
While we agree with Justice L'Heureux-Dubd that the tax system
is not the best means of subsidizing day care, change will only be ef-
fected though legal and extra-legal strategies. It is offensive that
business people cannot deduct "women's costs" like daycare expenses,
but are free to deduct "men's expenses" like fancy cars and golf holi-
days.
297
Symes's arguments were also criticized as being based on the
similarly situated test.298 It was said that more disadvantaged women,
who could not claim to be the "same as" a businessman, would be
denied subsidization of their child care expenses. 299 Again, this critique
is not properly directed at Symes, but at the limitations of the Charter.
Section 15 does not guarantee the means to achieve substantive
294. Audrey Macklin, Symes v. M.N.R.: Where Sex Meets Class, 5 CJ.W.L. 498, 508-09
(1992) (replaced names of Justices to show parallels in the argument).
295. The National Action Committee on the Status of Women described the decision as
.a victory for social equality, not a blow to women." Women's Group Backs Court
Ruling, THE [TORONTO] GLOBE AND MAIL, December 18, 1993, atA5.
296. See Claire F.L. Young, Child Care and the Charter. Privileging the Privileged, 2 REv.
CONSTITUTIONAL STUDIEs 20,24 (1994).
297. We use the quotations around "women's costs" and "men's expenses" to illustrate
that these expenses are gendered, even though men may incur childcare costs and
women may have expenses for golf holidays.
298. See Young, supra note 296, at 30-31.
299. Butsee Symes [1993] 4 S.C.R. at 821-22 (L'Heureux-Dubd, J.).
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equality. It only permits complaints of government action which
infringe substantive equality rights. Although Symes compared her
inability to deduct daycare expenses to men's ability to deduct golf
holidays, this did not invoke the similarly situated test. Rather, it
challenged the court to reflect on the conceptualization of "business
expenses" from the perspective of business women. Symes asked the
court to consider the broader context of disadvantage and the
particular discourses which perpetuate the subordination of women.
In this manner, the court might have recognized that differential
treatment of expenses on the basis of sex contributes to the continuing
inequality of women as a group and ignores the importance of
women's perspectives in articulating legal meanings.
IV. THE (IN)EQUALITY TRILOGY
The decisions in Egan, Miron, and Thibaudeau were all released
on May 25, 1995, and revealed that the Supreme Court of Canada
had dramatically divided as to the meaning of the equality guarantee.
If there had been faint signals since Andrews that the similarly situated
test had not been completely abandoned, the new minority approach
to section 15 of the Charter made it perfectly clear that formal equal-
ity thinking was still alive and well, particularly where it was necessary
to preserve male privilege by upholding the superiority of the hetero-
sexual married family.
In Egan, an elderly gay couple sought recognition as spouses for
the purposes of a low-income seniors benefit. A majority of the Court
recognized discrimination, but justified the exclusion of same-sex300
spouses. In Miron, a majority of the Court held that opposite-sex
common law couples should be considered spouses under automobile
insurance legislation. In these two cases, the minority approach to
section 15 is marked by biological determinism, references to morality
and tradition, deference to majority will, and a clear return to the
similarly situated test.30' The third case, Thibaudeau, concerned the
constitutionality of the inclusion/deduction scheme for child support
payments.0 2 In Thibaudeau, a majority of the Court was unwilling to
conceptualize the custodial parent as a separate person from her ex-
300. Egan v. Canada [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513.
301. Miron v. Trudel [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418.
302. Thibaudeau v. Canada [1995] 2 S.C.R. 627, 665.
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spouse. 03 Instead, the majority focussed on the abstract benefit to the
separated or divorced couple.310 Again, the Court failed to conduct a
substantive equality analysis, becoming confused by comparator
groups and causes of adverse impact.
A. Miron v. Trude3 °'
In 1987, Miron was injured while a passenger in an uninsured
motor vehicle driven by an uninsured driver.06 After the accident, Mi-
ron, no longer able to work and contribute earnings to his family,
made a claim for accident benefits against his female common law
spouse's insurance policy, but was denied on the ground that unmar-
ried couples were not spouses under the policy. 07 Miron argued that
he was a spouse under the terms of the policy and, alternatively, that
the terms of the policy, which were those of the standard automobile
policy prescribed by the Insurance Act, discriminated against him in
violation of section 15(1) of the Charter.30 ' A majority of the Court
agreed that the policy was discriminatory and that the definition of
spouse should be extended to include opposite-sex common law cou-
ples. 09 A minority of the Court, in dissent, introduced a radical new
approach to section 15, relying on tradition, morality, and biology,
and reintroducing the similarly situated test.
1. The Gonthier Dissent
In dissent, Justice Gonthier found that, although "marital status
may constitute an analogous ground of discrimination under s[ection]
15 of the Charter," in this case, the institution of marriage was rele-
vant "to the distinction that was being drawn by the legislation."3 0
There was therefore no discrimination. Justice Gonthier characterized
marriage as:
303. Thibaudeau [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 687-88.
304. Thibaudeau [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 691.
305. Miron [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418.
306. Miron [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 481.
307. Miron [1995] 2 S.C.tR at 481-82.
308. Miron [1995] 2 S.C.RI at 482.
309. Miron [1995] 2 S.C.1L at 510.
310. Miron [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 429 (La Forest, Lamer, and Major JJ. concurring).
1999]
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER 6- LAW
an institution entered into by choice which carries with it
certain benefits and burdens. Among these is the obligation
of mutual support .... Where the legislature draws a dis-
tinction premised on a characteristic relevant to the
institution of marriage, such as these support obligations,
then the distinction is not discriminatory and is therefore
permissible.311
a. Test for Discrimination
Justice Gonthier said that discriminatior analysis involves three
steps. The first step is to determine whether the law has drawn a dis-
tinction between the claimant and others. The second step is to ask if
the distinction results in disadvantage to the claimant's group and not
to others. The third step is to determine whether the distinction is
based on an irrelevant personal characteristic listed in section 15(1) or
an analogous characteristic. 312 This third step comprises two aspects:
"On the first aspect of the third step of the ... analysis, the individ-
ual's membership in a group is an essential condition.""' Although
Justice Gonthier believed that membership in a disadvantaged group
could serve as an indicium of discrimination, he did not find it to be a
necessary precondition to bringing a claim. The second aspect was the
"nature of the personal characteristic and its relevancy to the func-
tional values underlying the law."314 Justice Gonthier found that "the
functional values underlying the law may themselves be discrimina-
tory" when the underlying values are unrelated to any legitimate
315legislative purpose.
Justice Gonthier claimed to recognize the need for "a contextual
approach in order to prevent the s[ection] 15 analysis from becoming
a mechanical and sterile categorization process. "0 16 In particular, the
contextual approach required an inquiry into whether a distinction
311. Miron [1995] 2 S.C.Rt at 429-30.
312. Miron [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 435.
313. Miron [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 436.
314. Miron [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 436.
315. Miron [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 436.
316. Miron [1995] 2 S.C.t. at 437.
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was based on some objective physical or biological reality, or on a
fundamental value, as in Hess and Weatherall
317
b. Relevance of the Distinction
In essence, Justice Gonthier found that an otherwise prejudicial
distinction drawn on a relevant basis is not discriminatory. Although
the "enumerated and analogous grounds" were characteristics com-
monly used to make irrational distinctions, distinctions on the basis of
these characteristics were not necessarily discriminatory since the dis-
tinction might reflect a fundamental reality or value.",,
According to Justice Gonthier, marital status could not be an
analogous ground with respect to the essential, definitional elements
of marriage. Marriage in itself could not be discriminatory because "it
is a matter of choice and a basic institution of society." 319 If a law re-
flects a distinction relevant to functional values which are not
discriminatory, the distinction itself is not discriminatory. Further-
more, the legislature should have an ambit of legitimate legislative
discretion "in defining the attributes of a fundamental social institu-
tion, namely the rights and obligations attached to marriage."
320
c. Addressing the Concerns
Justice Gonthier cautioned that the minority's approach was not
novel:
I should also emphasize that the approach to s[ection] 15 in
these reasons in no way departs from this Court's approach
in Andrews, supra, and in subsequent jurisprudence. My
concern has only been to clarify a qualification which must
be made in the application of the analogous grounds ap-
proach, a qualification which merely calls for a heightened
sensitivity to the nature of the ground in issue in any given
case, and a recognition that a ground which may be the basis
317. Miron [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 438. See discussion of Hess and WeatheralI supra Parts
IIIA.&D.
318. Miron [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 441.
319. Miron [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 442.
320. Miron [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 434.
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of discrimination in one context may be innocuous in an-
other.32'
He claimed that:
[I]f both the larger context and the varieties of context are
kept firmly in mind in assessing the nature of an analogous
or enumerated ground, then there can be no danger that the
purpose of the equality guarantees would somehow be
eclipsed or overlooked in a relevance approach to s[ection]
15. Indeed, a criterion defined in terms of stereotype based
on presumed group characteristics, rather than on the basis
of merit, capacity or circumstances, is but an elaboration of
the concept of relevance. 2
This did not mean that superficial biological differences should
re-emerge as a justification for discrimination. According to Justice
Gonthier, Bliss reminds us that a court must look to the larger context
to "sensibly separate biological differences which are normatively rele-
vant and hence benign, from those which are irrelevant and thus
discriminatory."323
Justice Gonthier also addressed concerns that his approach would
import a justificatory analysis into section 15, stating that:
[I]t is important to clarify the relationship between the re-
quirement of relevance under s[ection] 15(1) of the Charter
and that of reasonableness under s[ection] 1. It should be
emphasized that determining the relevancy of a distinction
does not amount to importing under s[ection] 15(1) the
principles of justification found within s[ection] 1 of the
Charter.
Under the "reasonableness test," a court had to ascertain whether
the impugned distinction was reasonable or fair, taking into account
the purposes, the aims and the effect of the legislation on the person.
Under this test, both the finding of whether a distinction resulted in
321. Miron [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 442.
322. Miron [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 442-43.
323. Miron [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 443.
324. Miron [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 444.
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discrimination and, to a large extent, the justification of that discrimi-
nation were done under section 15 (1).325
Although Justice Gonthier emphasized the separateness of rea-
sonableness, a consideration under section 1, and relevance, a basis for
differential treatment under section 15, 326 he acknowledged that, un-
der his approach, "there may indeed be significant overlap between
the assessment of the functional values of the legislation under
s[ection] 15, and the purpose of the legislation under s[ection] 1.,,327
Still, Justice Gonthier defended his approach as placing no addi-
tional burden on a Charter claimant32 by claiming that the issue of
relevance appeared throughout the Court's section 15 jurisprudence.
Also, the claimant has always had the burden of proving that a Char-
ter-guaranteed right or freedom has been violated.
329
d. Relevance Applied
According to Justice Gonthier, Miron's whole argument rested
upon the premise that his relationship was identical to that of married
couples and carried with it the same consequences. 30 Marriage was a
basic social institution, however, and a fundamental right that was
legitimately fostered through legislation by distinguishing it from
other kinds of relationships.3 3' For Justice Gonthier, "[Marriage] is an
institution, in the maintenance of which in its purity the public is
deeply interested, for it is the foundation of the family and of society,
without which there would be neither civilization nor progress."
332
Furthermore, argued Justice Gonthier, extending all the attributes of
marriage to unmarried couples would interfere directly with the indi-
vidual's freedom to choose whether to enter the institution of
marriage, imposing consequences on cohabitation without any regard
to the will of the parties. 3
325. Miiron [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 444-45.
326. Miron [19951 2 S.C.R. at 444-46.
327. Miron [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 447.
328. Miron [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 446.
329. See Miron [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 446.
330. Miron [1995] 2 S.C.IL at 452.
331. See Miron [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 450.
332. Miron [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 448 (citing Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888)).
333. Miron [1995] 2 S.C.RL at 450.
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Section 15 of the Charter, noted Justice Gonthier, did not require
that common law spouses be covered by all the provisions of the In-
surance Act merely because the Family Law Act imposed support
obligations in particular circumstances on some unmarried couples,
nor would the relationship's economic interdependence gain it auto-
matic section 15 protection. For the purposes of determining the
scope of policy coverage, economic interdependence was only relevant
insofar as it related to the institution of marriage. According to Justice
Gonthier, "unmarried couples are not in a situation identical to mar-
ried spouses with respect to mutual support obligations. "'M
In modern society, unmarried couples were not a distinct group
suffering from stereotypes or prejudice. Since there was no stigma or
stereotyping of unmarried couples as a result of the institution of mar-
riage, the functional value of supporting marriage was not itself
discriminatory.33'
Justice Gonthier felt that it was the responsibility of the legisla-
ture to make social policy choices relating to the status, rights, and
obligations of marriage. 3m The legislature was therefore authorized to
define spousal entitlements, unless the values of society so fundamen-
tally changed as to create a clear consensus that the power of the state
to legislate in relation to marriage should be limited by the courts.!
3
1
2. The McLachlin Majority
Writing for the majority,38 Justice McLachlin found that the
"exclusion of unmarried partners from accident benefits available to
married partners violated the Charters equality guarantees." 331 She
criticized the minority's requirement that claimants prove that they
suffered irrational or unreasonable unequal treatment.mo This re-
quirement, Justice McLachlin argued, would force "the claimant to
lead evidence on state goals."34 Furthermore, the Justice Gonthier
analysis failed to focus on the effect or impact of the distinction in the
334. Miron [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 459-60.
335. Miron [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 455.
336. See Miron [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 463.
337. See Miron [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 461-62, 463-64.
338. Sopinka, Cory, and Iacobucci, JJ. concurring.
339. Miron [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 481.
340. Miron [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 485.
341. Miron [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 485.
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social and economic context of the legislation and in the lives of the
affected individuals.
a. Critique of Justice Gonthier's Approach
Justice McLachlin also suggested that Justice Gonthier employed
circular reasoning in identifying the Legislature's intention as provid-
ing assistance to those couples who are married.m2 For Justice
Gonthier, differential treatment on the ground of marital status is
relevant to the purpose of advancing married couples and fostering the
institution of marriage. The legislation was therefore not discrimina-
tory.3 This begs the question. As Justice McLachlin wrote, "The
focus of the s[ection] 15(1) analysis must remain fixed on the purpose
of the equality guarantees which is to prevent the imposition of limi-
tations, disadvantages or burdens through the stereotypical application
of presumed group characteristics in violation of human dignity and
freedom."A
Justice McLachlin also noted that any "relevance" analysis should
be done under section 1, where the court may weigh the legislative
purpose against the impact of the unequal treatment.35 A claimant
should only have to show that the unequal treatment is based on one
of the grounds expressly mentioned in section 15(1) or some analo-
gous ground, and that the treatment is a "violation of human dignity
and freedom through the imposition of limitations, disadvantages or
burdens through the stereotypical application of presumed group




In applying this test to the situation in Miron, Justice McLachlin
found that the law, in treating Miron and his spouse differently from
342. Miron [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 489.
343. Miron [1995] 2 S.C.1 at 489.
344. Miron [1995] 2 S.C.tR at 489.
345. Miron [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 491.
346. Miron [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 491-92.
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married couples, denied "a person in an unmarried relationship bene-
fits granted a similar person in a married relationship."u4
The characteristic of not having been in a state recognized mar-
riage was held by the Miron majority to constitute a ground of
discrimination within section 15(1).38 It touched the individual's
freedom to live life with the person of one's choosing, in the fashion
of one's choosing-"a matter of defining importance to individu-
als."3 Persons "living in sin" constituted an historically disadvantaged
group who traditionally suffered social inequality and prejudice.
30
Furthermore, persons exercise limited control' over whether they are
married, and distinguishing between cohabiting couples on the basis
of marital status fails to connect with current social values or reali-
ties.35" ' Many of the markers of discrimination were present: the
"violation of dignity and freedom, an historical group disadvantage,
and the danger of stereotypical group-based decision-making."
' 12
Finally, Justice McLachlin noted that marriage could be good
and honourable, and yet still be a source of discrimination. 53 "The
issue was not whether marriage was good, but rather whether it may
be used to deny equal treatment to people on grounds having nothing
to do with their true worth or entitlement."
354
3. Reasons of Justice L'Heureux-Dub6
Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 agreed in the result with Justice
McLachlin, but engaged in a separate section 15 analysis. 55 She noted
that there was a distinction under the legislation, which had the effect
of imposing a burden, obligation, or disadvantage on Miron and Val-
liere that was not imposed on married couples.
56
347. Miron [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 493.
348. Miron [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 497.
349. Miron [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 497.
350. See Miron [1995) 2 S.C.R. at 498.
351. See Miron [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 498-99.
352. Miron [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 499-500.
353. SeeMiron [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 500.
354. Miron [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 501.
355. Miron [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 465.
356. Miron [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 468."
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a. Similarly Situated Test Distinguished
The insurance company argued that Miron and Valliere could
not compare themselves to persons who were married because this
would be returning to the rejected similarly situated test.357 Justice
L'Heureux-Dub6 disagreed. While it was still necessary to draw com-
parisons between groups to discern the differential effect of the
legislation, it was not necessary to compare "the entire collective, het-
erogeneous group of non-married persons against the essentially
homogeneous group of married persons."358 In fact, such an uncritical
comparison of dissimilar groups would undermine the purposes of
section 15 .3" According to Justice L'Heureux-Dub6, comparison was
useful only between groups possessing sufficiently analogous quali-
ties. 60 The appropriate comparison was between married couples and
unmarried couples who were in a relationship analogous to mar-
riage."' Unmarried persons were denied equality simply because they
were not married. 62
b. Discrimination
The last element in Justice L'Heureux-Dub6's section 15 analysis
was a determination of whether the distinction was 'discriminatory'
on the basis that it could either promote or perpetuate "the view that
the individual adversely affected by the distinction [was] less capable,
or less worthy of recognition or value as a human being or as a mem-
ber of Canadian society, equally deserving of concern, respect, and
consideration."
363
Justice L'Heureux-Dube found that unmarried persons suffered
"some disadvantage, disapproval, and marginalization in society." 3" In
a significant number of cases, persons within this group did not have
meaningful control over their circumstances, and the consequences of
excluding unmarried persons from the benefits or protections of the
357. Miron [1995] 2 S.C.R at 466.
358. Miron [1995] 2 S.C.R at 467.
359. See Miron [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 467.
360. Miron [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 467.
361. Miron [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 467-68.
362. See Miron [1995] 2 S.C.R at 468.
363. Miron [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 468.
364. Miron [1995] 2 S.C.I. at 470.
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law would generally be experienced more severely by the dependent365 h lgs
spouse. The legislation was designed to further a very important in-
terest: "protection of family units from potentially disastrous financial
consequences due to the injury of one of their members."
66
Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 therefore concluded that the distinction
had the potential to affect significantly an interest of extremely high
societal value. Furthermore, all couples in a relationship analogous
to marriage were categorically excluded from joint insurance cover-
age. 68 This reasonably could be perceived as "a clear message that
society did not consider this genre of relationship to be worthy of
equal protection." 69 Accordingly, the impugned interest was
"sufficiently pressing, the possible economic consequences to be suffi-
ciently severe, and the manner of exclusion to be sufficiently
complete" to produce significant discriminatory potential.3 70
Considering all these factors together, Justice L'Heureux-Dub6
concluded that the challenged distinction might reasonably perpetuate
the attitude that unmarried persons were "less worthy of recognition
or value as human beings," and was thus in violation of section 15(1)
of the Charter.37
B. Egan v. Canada372
Jim Egan and Jack Nesbit have lived together in a same-sex rela-
tionship since 1948. When Egan became 65 in 1986, he began to
receive old age security and guaranteed income supplements under the
Old. Age Security Act.373 On reaching age 60, Nesbit applied for a
spousal allowance under section 19(1) of the Act, which is available to
spouses between the ages of 60 and 65 whose combined income falls
below a fixed level. 374 His application was rejected because his relation-
ship did not fall within the definition of "spouse" in section 2, which
365. See Miron [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 471-74.
366. Miron [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 475.
367. Miron [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 476.
368. See Miron [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 476.
369. Miron [1995] S.C.R. at 476.
370. Miron [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 477.
371. Miron [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 477.
372. Egan v. Canada [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513.
373. R.S.C. 1985, c. 9.
374. Egan [1995] 2 S.C.R at 578.
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includes a person of the opposite sex who is living with that person,
having lived with that person for at least one year, if the two persons
have publicly represented themselves as husband and wife.375 They
brought an action seeking a declaration that the definition violated
section 15(1) of the Charter on the basis that it discriminated on the
ground of sexual orientation, and furthermore that the definition
should be extended to include "partners in same-sex relationships oth-
erwise akin to a conjugal relationship." 376
A unanimous court agreed that sexual orientation was an analo-
gous ground, but the majority, by upholding a heterosexuals-only
definition of "spouse," failed to give any content to this recognition.
Chief Justice Lamer and Justices La Forest, Gonthier, and Major
found no violation of Egan and Nesbit's equality rights. Justices
Cory, Iacobucci, Sopinka, McLachlin, and L'Heureux-Dube held that
the definition of "spouse" in section 2 of the OldAge Security Act vio-
lated section 15.378 However, Justice Sopinka joined Chief Justice
Lamer, and Justices La Forest, Gonthier, and Major in holding that
any discrimination could be reasonably justified under section L.,
1. The La Forest Minority
For a minority with respect to section 15, Justice La Forest 8°
followed the three-step analysis advocated by Justice Gonthier in
Miron:
1) Does the law draw a distinction between the claimant
and others?
2) Does the distinction result in disadvantage-does the
impugned legislation impose a burden, obligation or
disadvantage on a group of persons to which the claim-
ant belongs which is not imposed on others, or not
provide them with a benefit which it grants others?
375. R.S.C., C.0-9, s.2.
376. Egan [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 578.
377. Egan [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 529.
378. Egan [1995] 2 S.C.t. at 565-68 (L'Heureux-Dub6, J.); Egan [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 572
(Sopinka, J.); Egan [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 604 (Cory & Iacobucci, JJ.); Egan [1995] 2
S.C.R_ at 625 (McLachlin, J.).
379. Egan [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 572.
380. Lamer, C.J., Gonthier, and Major, JJ., concurring.
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3) Is the distinction based on an irrelevant personal char-
acteristic which is either enumerated in section 15(1) or
one analogous thereto?38'
a. Relevance
Justice La Forest advocated a comparative analysis, linked to an
examination of the larger context.382 Relevance must be assessed by
considering "the nature of the personal characteristic and its relevancy
to the functional values underlying the law."383 In particular, Justice La
Forest noted that the Charter was not enacted in a vacuum, but must
be placed in its proper linguistic, philosophic, and historical con-
text.384 This context was described as follows:
The singling out of legally married and common law couples
as the recipients of benefits necessarily excludes all sorts of
other couples living together, whatever reasons these other
couples may have for doing so and whatever their sexual ori-
entation.... [W]hat Parliament clearly had in mind was to
accord support to married couples who were aged and eld-
erly, for the advancement of public policy central to
society.
315
This public policy favouring the relationships of cohabitation of
heterosexual senior citizens was said to be rooted in tradition and bi-
ology. Justice La Forest wrote:
[M]arriage has from time immemorial been firmly grounded
in our legal tradition, one that is itself a reflection of long-
standing philosophical and religious traditions. But its ulti-
mate raison d'tre transcends all of these and is firmly
anchored in the biological and social realities that heterosex-
ual couples have the unique ability to procreate, that most
381. Egan [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 530.
382. Egan [1995] 2 S.C.RI at 530.
383. Egan [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 532 (quoting Miron v. Trudel [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418, 436).
384. Egan [1995] 2 S.C.R at 532. See also Miron [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 436; K. v. Turpin
[1989] 1 S.C.R. 1296, 1331-32; K. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd. [1985] 1 S.C.R 295,
334.
385. Egan [1995] 2 S.C.tR at 535.
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children are the product of these relationships, and that they
are generally cared for and nurtured by those who live in
that relationship. In this sense, marriage is by nature hetero-
sexual. It would be possible to legally define marriage to
include homosexual couples, but this would not change the
biological and social realities that underlie the traditional
marriage.
The relevant comparators were therefore same-sex couples and
other non-procreative familial-type groupings-for example, siblings
or grandparent-grandchild pairs who lived together.
None of the couples excluded from benefits under the Act
are capable of meeting the fundamental social objectives
thereby sought to be promoted by Parliament. These couples
undoubtedly provide mutual support for one another ...
[and may] occasionally adopt or bring up children, but this
is exceptional and in no way affects the general picture ....
[H]omosexuals differ from other excluded couples in that
their relationships include a sexual aspect. But this sexual as-
pect has nothing to do with the social objectives for which
Parliament affords a measure of support to married couples
and those who live in a common law relationship .... [T]he
distinction adopted by... Parliament is relevant here to de-
scribe a fundamental social unit... to which some measure
of support is given.87
Accordingly, the Justice La Forest minority concluded that there
was no discrimination. Senior same-sex couples were relevantly differ-
ent from senior heterosexual couples, because (when they were some
years younger, no doubt) the latter had the potential to procreate.
Justice La Forest added that distinctions based on marital status were
pervasive in both provincial and federal legislation, and that all such
distinctions should not have to be reviewed under the Charter."' The
extent of such a review would interfere with the desirable balance be-
tween legislatures and the judiciary.8 9
386. Egan [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 536.
387. Egan [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 538-39.
388. Egan [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 539.
389. See Egan [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 539.
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2. The Cory/Iacobucci Majority
The section 15 majority held that section 2 of the Old Age Secu-
rity Act violated the equality guarantee.39 Justices Cory and
Iacobucci 9' supported the traditional Andrews test, described as fol-
lows:
1) Determine whether, owing to a distinction created by
the questioned law, a claimant's right to equality has
been denied. During this first step, the inquiry should
focus upon whether the challenged law has drawn a dis-
tinction between the claimant and others, based on
personal characteristics.
2) Determine whether the distinction created by the law
results in discrimination by considering the following:
(a) whether the equality right is denied on the basis of
a personal characteristic which is either enumerated
in section 15(1) or which is analogous to those
enumerated, and
(b) whether that distinction has the effect on the claim-
ant of imposing a burden, obligation or disadvantage
not imposed upon others or of withholding or lim-
iting access to benefits or advantages which are
available to others. This assessment should be con-
ducted against the larger social, political and legal
context. The analytical separation between section
15(1) and section 1 is essential, because the govern-
ment has to bear the onus of justifying its
discriminatory legislation."2
According to Justice Cory, there was direct discrimination in de-
nying gay and lesbian common law couples the benefit of the spousal
390. Egan [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 604.
391. Sopinka J., concurring; McLachlin J., in substantial agreement, stating that she would
follow her reasons in Miron. In those reasons, all references to spouses were gender
neutral. Accordingly, some speculate that she believes that all benefits associated with
marriage should also be extended to same-sex couples. Time will tell.... See our dis-
cussion of M. v. H., injia.
392. Egan [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 584.
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allowance available to heterosexual common law couples!9 In addi-
tion to being denied the equal economic benefit of the law, the couple
was denied the opportunity to be publicly recognized as spouses, an
interest of potentially tremendous importance.9 4 In summary:
The legislation denies homosexual couples equal benefit of
the law ... not on the basis of merit or need, but solely on
the basis of sexual orientation. The definition of "spouse" as
someone of the opposite sex reinforces the stereotype that
homosexuals cannot and do not form lasting, caring, mutu-
ally supportive relationships with economic interdependence
in the same manner as heterosexual couples. The appellants'
relationship vividly demonstrates the error of that approach.
The discriminatory impact cannot be deemed to be trivial
when the legislation reinforces prejudicial attitudes based on
such faulty stereotypes. 93
Justice Cory strongly criticized the reasoning of Justice La Forest,
describing his analysis as circular and noting the absurdity of relying
on the capacity to procreate as "relevant" when the spousal allowance
was provided to couples regardless of whether they actually had any
children. 6 Quite simply, "procreation ha[d] nothing to do with the
qualifications to receive the benefit."39'
3. Justice L'Heureux-Dube's Approach to Section 15
Justice L'Heureux-Dube took a unique approach to section 15,
arguing that the "grounds" of the distinction would not be dispositive
of the question of whether discrimination exists. 3" Rather, the court
would focus on the social context of the distinction. While her
approach still followed the basic outline of the Andrews model,399
Justice UHeureux-Dube adopted an effects-based approach to
393. Egan [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 587.
394. See Egan [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 594.
395. Egan [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 604.
396. Egan [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 607.
397. Thibaudeau v. Canada [1995] 2 S.C.Rt 627, 701 (Cory & acobucci, JJ.,
concurring).
398. Egan [1995] 2 S.C.R at 548-52.
399. See Egan [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 552.
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discrimination. As her starting point, she advocated a return to the
fundamental purpose of section 15(1):
Disagreement, no matter how small, at the foundational
level of establishing the right's purpose will only magnify
over time in terms of how that right is applied... I believe
that this phenomenon is beginning to manifest itself in the
divergent approaches to section 15 taken in recent cases be-
fore this Court, of which this case, Miron v. Trudel, and
Thibaudeau v.- Canada, are no exception. The emergence of
these differences suggests to me that we may not necessarily
be operating with the same underlying purpose in mind. For
section 15 jurisprudence to continue to dvelop along prin-
cipled lines, I believe that two things are necessary: (1) we
must revisit the fundamental purpose of section 15; and (2)
we must seek out a means by which to give full effect to this
fundamental purp6se.40o
For Justice L'Heureux-Dub6, the fundamental purpose of section
15 was to guarantee equality "without discrimination," which in-
cluded the important purpose of preventing or reducing distinctions
which might worsen the circumstances of those who had already suf-
fered marginalization or historical disadvantage.01 She described
"discrimination" as follows:
A distinction is discriminatory within the meaning of
s[ection] 15 where it is capable of either promoting or per-
petuating the view that the individual adversely affected by
this distinction is less capable, or less worthy of recognition
or value as a human being or as a member of Canadian soci-
ety, equally deserving of concern, respect, and
consideration.
402
A subjective-objective standard-the reasonably held view of one
who is possessed of similar characteristics, under similar
circumstances, and who is dispassionate and fully apprised of the
circumstances-should be applied to determine whether there is a
400. Egan [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 541.
401. See Egan [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 542.
402. Egan [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 552-53.
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discriminatory impact."' Justice L'Heureux-Dube noted "that groups
that are more socially vulnerable experience the adverse effects of
legislative distinctions more vividly." 01 Judges must have an
awareness of, and sensitivity to, the realities of those experiencing the
distinction, in order to evaluate the impact of the distinction on
members of the affected group.45 'Where the interest affected is
fundamental or where the distinction has serious consequences, the
impugned distinction will be more likely to have a discriminatory
impact even with respect to groups in an advantaged position in
society. 0 6
Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 listed other criteria for identifying dis-
crimination, as had been identified in Andrews.
* whether the impugned distinction is based upon fun-
damental attributes that are generally considered t o be
essential to our popular conception of 'personhood' or
'humanness';
* whether the adversely affected group is already a victim
of historical disadvantage;
* whether this distinction is reasonably capable of aggra-
vating or perpetuating that disadvantage;
" whether the person is a member of a "discrete and insu-
lar minority," lacking in political power and thus
vulnerable to having his or her interests overlooked;
" whether group members are currently vulnerable to
stereotyping, social prejudice and/or marginalization;
and
* whether this distinction exposes them to the reasonable
possibility of future vulnerability of this kind.0 7
However, the absence or presence of some of these factors would' not
be determinative of the analysis.0 8
Justice L'Heureux-Dube found that gay and lesbian couples were
denied the equal benefit of the law on the basis of sexual
403. See Egan [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 553.
404. Egan [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 553.
405. See Egan [1995] 2 S.C.t. at 563.
406. See Egan [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 556.
407. Egan [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 554-55.
408. See Egan [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 557.
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orientation. °9 Considering the nature of the group and the interest
affected, the distinction was discriminatory. Justice L'Heureux-Dub
recognized that "same-sex couples are a highly socially vulnerable
group, in that they have suffered considerable historical disadvantage,
stereotyping, marginalization, and stigmatization within Canadian
society.""4O The denial of spousal recognition for benefits purposes
affected gay and lesbian individuals who were also elderly and poor.
The interest was quite fundamental; "the rights claimants were
directly and completely excluded, as a couple, from any entitlement to
a basic shared standard of living for elderly persons cohabiting in a
relationship analogous to marriage."41" ' Justice L'Heureux-Dub noted:
Given the marginalized position of homosexuals in society,
the metamessage that flows almost inevitably from excluding
same-sex couples from such an important social institution is
essentially that society considers such relationships to be less
worthy of respect, concern and consideration than relation-
ships involving members of the opposite sex. This
fundamental interest is therefore severely and palpably af-
fected by the impugned distinction
12
The distinction was therefore reasonably capable of being discrimina-
tory, and thus violated section 15 of the Charter.13
C. Thibaudeau v. Canada1
14
Thibaudeau was awarded custody of her two minor children and
child support of $1,150 a month from her ex-husband. Section
56(1)(b) of the Income Tax Act ("ITA") required a separated or di-
vorced parent to include child support in income, and section 60(b)
of the ITA allowed a parent who had paid such amounts to deduct
them from income.45 Thibaudeau challenged the constitutionality of
section 56(1)(b). She argued that by imposing a tax burden on money
409. Egan [1995] 2 S.C.R at 565.
410. Egan [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 566-67.
411. Egan [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 567.
412. Egan [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 567.
413. See Egan [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 567-68.
414. Thibaudeau v. Canada [1995] 2 S.C.R. 627.
415. S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 63.
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which she was to use exclusively for the benefit of her children, section
56(1)(b) infringed her right to equality.4 16 A majority of the Court,
once again splitting along gender lines, held that there was no dis-
crimination.
1. The Men: The Post-Divorce Family Unit
For a majority, Justice Gonthier41 8 held that the impugned provi-
sions of the ITA neither imposed a burden nor withheld a benefit so
as to attract the application of section 15(1) of the Charter.49 He in-
sisted that the inclusion/deduction system was designed to increase the
available resources that could be used for the benefit of the children
and that the system did confer such a benefit in most cases. 20 A com-
parison of non-separated couples against separated or divorced parents
showed that, on the whole, separated or divorced parents derived a
benefit from inclusion/deduction: the tax burden of the couple was
reduced. 2'
Justices Cory and Iacobucci422 wrote separate reasons, rejecting
Justice Gonthier's approach to section 15. They noted that the
Gonthier/La Forest approach imports the justificatory analysis which
properly belongs under section 1 of the Charter, "it focuses narrowly
on the ground of distinction and.., omits an analysis of the discrimi-
natory impact of the impugned distinction;" it "permits proof of
relevance, standing alone, to negate a finding of discrimination;" and
it invites circular reasoning.'2'
Like Justice Gonthier, however, Justices Cory and Iacobucci con-
cluded that:
[I]f anything, the legislation in question confers a benefit on
the post-divorce 'family unit.' . . . The fact that one member
of the unit might derive a greater benefit from the legislation
416. Thibaudeau [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 665.
417. Thibaudeau [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 641.
418. Justices La Forest, Sopinka, Iacobucci, and Cory concurred; Chief Justice Lamer and
Justice Major did not hear the case.
419. Thibaudeau [1995] 2 S.C.Rt at 692 (Gonthier, J.); see also Thibaudeau [1995] 2
S.C.R at 641 (Sopinka, J.).
420. Thibaudeau [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 678-79.
421. Thibaudeau [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 691.
422. Justice Sopinka concurred. Thibaudeau [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 641 (Sopinka, J.).
423. Thibaudeau [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 700-01.
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than the other does not, in and of itself, trigger a s[ection]
15 violation, nor does it lead to a finding that the distinction
in any way amounts to a denial of equal benefit or protec-
tion of the law.4
Justices Cory and Iacobucci felt that the family courts' ability to
gross up child support awards to account for taxes was a satisfactory
means to ensure equality.2 5 Any disproportionate displacement of the
tax liability between the former spouses was the result not of the ITA,
but of the family court, which "provides avenues to revisit support
orders that failed to take into account the tax consequences of the
payments." 42 There was no additional burden on divorced or sepa-
rated parents traceable to the ITA, and accordingly, no violation of
section 15 .
2. The Women: Recognizing Women's Separate Personhood
428
In contrast, Justices McLachlin and L'Heureux-Dub6 found that
the inclusion/deduction scheme violated section 15(1) of the Char-
ter.42 In their view, the appropriate unit of analysis was not the post-
divorce family unit; such an approach would conceal the unequal ef-
fect on the parties to the unit. Instead, the Justices argued, "the effects
on separated or divorced custodial parents should be compared with
the effects on separated or divorced non-custodial parents."
430
Both Justices found that the family law regime could not rectify
the inequality created by the deduction/inclusion scheme.43' Often,
the courts either failed to consider tax impact or calculated an insuffi-
424. Thibaudeau [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 702.
425. Thibaudeau [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 703.
426. Thibaudeau [1995] 2 S.C.Rt at 703.
427. Thibaudeau [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 703.
428. For a discussion of the failure to recognize legal personhood, see KATHLEEN A. LA-
HEY, ARE WE "PERSONS" YET: LAW AND SEXuALrIrY IN CANADA (forthcoming Aug.
1999), and Kathleen A. Lahey, Legal "Persons" and the Charter of Rights: Gender,
Race, and Sexuality in Canada, 77 CAN. B. Rv. 402 (1998).
429. Thibaudeau [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 725 (Mctachlin, J.); Thibaudeau [1995] 2 S.C.R at
661 (L'Heueux-Dubd, J.).
430. Thibaudeau [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 644-45 (L'Heureux-Dub, J.); Thibaudeau [1995] 2
S.C.R. at 715-17 (McLachlin, J.).
431. Thibaudeau [1995] 2 S.C.Rt at 718-20 (McLachlin, J.); Thibaudeau [1995] 2 S.C.R.
at 649-50 (L'Heureux-Dubd, J.).
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cient adjustment. Judges exercised very wide discretionary power in
the assessment process.432 To ensure a constant and complete "gross-
up," the custodial parent would be required to make frequent appli-
cations for variation of the original support order and would bear all
the attendant psychological and economic costs of variation. The
custodial parent might hesitate to pursue variation, not wanting to
antagonize the non-custodial parent. Moreover, the government's own
figures indicated that the inclusion/deduction regime was a net detri-
ment to the "post-divorce family unit" in 29 percent of all cases,
because "the marginal tax rate of the payor was lower than that of the
recipient.",
33
Being a separated or divorced custodial parent "involves the indi-
vidual's freedom to form family relationships," and "touches on
matters intrinsically human, personal, and relational."4m Separated or
divorced custodial parents are a discrete and insular minority, having
been historically subject to disadvantageous treatment, and they con-
tinue to face economic, social, and personal difficulties not faced by
non-custodial parents or those in two-parent families.4 3 Another con-
sideration was that most separated or divorced custodial parents are
women, already members of a disadvantaged group. 436 The status of
separated or divorced custodial parent therefore constituted an analo-
gous ground of discrimination. It could "give rise to adverse
distinctions on the basis of immutable personal characteristics, rather
than on the merit and actual circumstances of the particular individ-
ual.)
438
A distinction based on an enumerated or analogous ground was
likely to produce an infringement of section 15(1) of the Charter,
except in "rare cases."4 9 Here, the differential treatment had the effect
of disadvantaging separated or divorced custodial parents, based not
on merit or individuality, but solely and arbitrarily by reference to
432. See Thibaudeau [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 719 (McLachlin, J.).
433. Thibaudeau [1995] 2 S.C.R at 717 (McLachlin, J.); Thibaudeau [1995] 2 S.C.R. at
650 (L'Heureux-Dub, J.).
434. Thibaudeau [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 722 (McLachlin, J.).
435. See Thibaudeau [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 722-23 (McLachlin, J.).
436. See Thibaudeau [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 657-58 (L'Heureux-Dubd, J.); Thibaudeau
[1995] 2 S.C.R. at 724 (McLlachlin, J.).
437. See Thibaudeau [1995] 2 S.C.RL at 724-25 (McLachlin, J.).
438. Thibaudeau [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 724 (McLachlin, J.); Thibaudeau [1995] 2 S.C.R. at
657-59 (L'Heureux-Dub6, J).
439. Thibaudeau [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 725 (McLachlin, J.).
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membership in a group.4 ° The inclusion/deduction regime was
contrary to section 15 and was not justified under section L"'
D. Commentary: Responses to the Trilogy
1. Competing Analyses of Discrimination:
Formal or Substantive Equality
In her solitary effort to highlight the impact of the differential
treatment on the equality rights claimant, Justice L'Heureux-Dub6
ventured away from the enumerated and analogous grounds approach
altogether, stating her desire to begin a dialogue about the purpose of
section 15 and the meaning of discrimination. Nobody was willing to
join in her discussion."4 In fact, the rest of the Court regressed to pre-
Andrews reasoning. The majority adopted an increasingly individual-
ized approach, focused on irrational stereotypes rather than the
protection of vulnerable minorities.
A sizeable minority of the court, Chief Justice Lamer and Justices
La Forest, Gonthier, and Major,44 3 were strongly deferential within
section 15, holding that there can be no discrimination by legislatures
when defining the limits of fundamental social institutions such as
marriage and the family.4 " Furthermore, the minority focussed en-
tirely on the purpose of the legislation rather than on its effect on the
disadvantaged group. The legislative purpose was defined with refer-
ence to the reason for exclusion, supporting legislation on the basis of
tradition and social consensus. These Justices clearly prefer a formal
approach to equality, at least when faced with a challenge to the
dominance of married heterosexual couples. They have reintroduced
the similarly situated test with a new name, the "relevantly different"
440. See Thibaudeau [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 725 (McLachlin, J.).
441. The scheme did not impair the custodial parent's equality rights as little as possible,
and its deleterious effects outweighed its salutary effects. See Thibaudeau [1995] 2
S.C.R. at 725-33 (McLachlin, J.).
442. See Egan v. Canada [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513, 541 (L'Heureux-Dubd, J.); Dianne Poth-
ier, MAider, Mayday: Section 15 of the Charter in Distress, 6 NAT'L J. CONST. L. 295,
306 (1995).
443. We will refer to the reasoning of this group as the "Gonthier/La Forest" approach as
these are the authors of the reasons in Egan, [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 513, and in Miron v.
Trudel [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418.
444. See Egan [1995] 2 S.C.1R at 561 (La Forest, J.).
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test.445 Despite their strong assertions to the contrary, this "amounts to
a very dramatic reversal back toward the approach rejected by the Su-
preme Court in Andrews.
2. Misapplication of the Similarly Situated Test
Even supporters of a formal approach to equality have criticized
the results in Egan and Miron. They suggest that the difficulty was not
in the general approach, but simply that the similarly situated test was
misapplied."7 Under the "correct" application of the formal equality
445. For an illustration of how dearly Egan is an application of the similarly situated test,
compare the approach in Andrews v. Ontario (Ministry of Health) [1988] 9 C.H.RRt
D/5089, a decision which expressly followed that test. In that case, Karen Andrews
was denied Ontario Hospital Insurance Plan (OHIP) coverage for her lesbian partner
and their two children because OHIP defined a spouse as a person of the opposite
sex. In response to Andrews's claim that this infringed her equality rights under the
Charter, Justice McRae held that same-sex couples were not similarly situated to op-
posite-sex couples. He wrote: "Heterosexual couples procreate and raise children.
They marry or are potential marriage partners and most importantly they have the le-
gal obligations of support for their children whether born in wedlock or out and for
their spouses pursuant to the Family Law Act. A same-sex partner does not and can-
not have these obligations." Andrews [1988] 9 C.H.RtR. at D/5091 (citation
omitted).
446. Black and Smith, supra note 49, at 14-35; see also Hester Lessard et aL, Developments
in Constitutional Law: The 1994-95 Term, 7 Sup. CT. L. Rnv. 81 (1996), in which
the authors concur that the Gonthier/La Forest analysis is a strong rejection of earlier
jurisprudence and in particular the previous focus on the "contextualized individual."
They state: "I]his test bears no conceptual link to the enumerated or analogous
grounds approach [in Andrews] and the pre-existing group context of disadvantage
that approach required." Lessard et aL, supra at 91; see also Leon E. Trakman, Section
15: Equality? Where?, 6 CONST. FoRurm 112, 114(1995) ("In this new trilogy, despite
assertions to the contrary, Lamer CJ., La Forest, Gonthier and Major JJ. have varied
from Andrews."). In fact, the minority approach may be even more narrow than the
similarly situated test rejected in Andrews. In Miron [1995] 2 S.C.Rt at 460-61, Jus-
tice Gonthier held that there was no discrimination because "unmarried couples were
not in a situation identical to married spouses with respect to mutual support obliga-
tions."
447. See Beatty, supra note 166, at 362-63:
The judgments of the La Forest-Gonthier coalition ... provide textbook
examples of one of the most common mistakes that judges make in apply-
ing the [formal] equality principle. In both cases, these four judges tested
the relevance of the classification of 'married' (opposite sex) couples
'literally,' against itself, rather than, as one is supposed to do, in terms of
the overarching objectives of welfare and security that these legislative re-
gimes were designed to secure.
See also Tussman and tenBroek, supra note 159, at 345-46.
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model, the legislation would have been found discriminatory, because
the impugned provisions denied benefits to same-sex couples that
were provided to others who are similarly situated. For the purposes
of the legislation, same-sex spouses should have been adjudged in ex-
actly the same position as heterosexual couples because of the similar
functional values underlying the relationships. The sexual orientation
of the claimants would have been an irrelevant distinction.44
3. Critique of the Gonthier/La Forest Approach
In our view, the Gonthier/La Forest test, with its formalistic con-
ceptual approach, invites discrimination and cannot be applied in a
more "correct" manner under section 15. "While appearing to infuse
equal protection doctrine with objective rationality, certainty and
fairness, the similarly situated test provides a doctrinal mask for what
ultimately depends on the values and biases of judges."449 Accordingly,
the test rightly has been condemned, by a majority of the Supreme
Court, by lower courts, and by academics.5
a. Not Reflective of the Language and Jurisprudence Defining the
Section 15 Test
The question of relevance openly brings section 1 issues into sec-
tion 15, in the same manner as the similarly situated test rejected by the
court in Andrews.45' As Justice L'Heureux Dub6 wrote, "I believe that it
is more accurate and more desirable to treat relevance as, in fact, ajusti-
fication for distinctions that have a discriminatory impact on persons or
groups, to be considered under s[ection] 1 of the Charter."452
While Justice Gonthier admitted that "the assessment of the
functional values of the legislation under s[ection] 15 and the purpose
448. See Beatty, supra note 166, at 362.
449. Sheppard, supra note 155, at 220.
450. See Brad Berg, Fumbling Towards Equaliy: Promise andPerilin Egan, 5 NJ.C.L. 263
(1995); Bruce Ryder, Egan v. Canada. Equality Deferred, Again, C.L.E.L.J. 101
(1996); Smith and Black, supra note 49, at 14-36; Trakman, supra note 446, at 112;
Robert Wintemute, Discrimination Against Same Sex Couples: Sections 15(1) and 1 of
the Charter: Egan v. Canada, 76 CAN. BAR Ray. 682 (1995).
451. See discussion supra at Part ILD.2.
452. Egan v. Canada [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 513, 548 (L'Heureux-Dubd, J.); see also Miron v.
Trudel [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418, 491; Thibaudeau v. Canada [1995] 2 S.C.R. 627, 700.
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of the legislation under s[ection] 1" overlap using his approach, he
countered that the rights claimant always had the onus of proving dis-
crimination.'53 This is misleading. Although the claimant had the onus
of proving a disadvantaging distinction at law on the basis of an enu-
merated or analogous ground of discrimination, the claimant did not
have to establish the purpose of the legislation or prove that the differ-
ential treatment was irrelevant to the law's purpose.
In Egan, for example, the analysis mandated by Andrews would
have required the rights claimant to show differential treatment with a
disadvantaging impact. The government would have to demonstrate
that the objective of the rights limitation, and of the legislation as a
whole, was pressing and substantial; that there was a rational connec-
tion between limiting the spousal benefit to heterosexual senior
couples and promoting the overarching purposes of the law; that the
infringement was a reasoned, minimal impairment of the equality
rights of a vulnerable group; and finally, that the objectives of the leg-
islation were proportionate to the adverse effects of the rights
violation. Even if the differential treatment had some relationship to
the purpose of the legislation, it would have been much more difficult
to uphold the law under this kind of scrutiny. Extending the Old Age
Security Act benefits to same-sex spouses would not have threatened
the stability and integrity of traditional family units, and the exclusion
had the effect of significantly impairing the rights of gay men and les-
bians.' 5'
Indeed, the Supreme Court has consistently avoided placing in-
ternal limitations on Charter rights,455 particularly since, as "between
the rights claimant and the government, the government is clearly in
the superior position to characterize properly the purpose of its own
legislation.""56 Justice La Forest once recognized that the relevance of a
453. Miron [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 447.
454. See Beatty, supra note 166, at 372.
455. See Egan [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 548 (citing Andrews v. Law Soc'y of B.C. 1 [1989]
S.C.R. 143, 178); see also Miron [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 486 (McLachlin, J., concurring)
("It is significant that where the Charter seeks to narrow rights by concepts like rea-
sonableness, it does so expressly, as in s[ection] 8 and s[ection] 11(b). Section 15(1)
does not contain this sort of limitation.").
456. Egan [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 547; see also Miron [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 485 (McLachlin, J.,
concurring) ("To require the daimant to prove that the unequal treatment suffered is
irrational or unreasonable or founded on irrelevant considerations would be to re-
quire the claimant to lead evidence on state goals, and often to put proof of
discrimination beyond the reach of the ordinary person."); Thibaudeau [1995] 2
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distinction should be considered under section 1. 4" For example, in
Andrews, Justice La Forest noted that being a non-citizen might be
"relevant" to some legislative benefits. 58 He specifically said, however,
that this should only be considered under section 1.451
In short, the assessment of relevance to the functional values of
the legislation must be left to the section 1 stage of analysis, where the
onus is on the government and where the court has developed the
Oakes test"0 for making such assessments and evaluations. Such an
approach is consistent with the structure of the Charter and pre-
trilogy equality jurisprudence.
b. A New and Meaningless "Formula"
It -has been widely recognized that the similarly situated test is
tautological. 61 It does not contribute to determining the appropriate
comparators, and it may be used to support any objective, including a
discriminatory purpose. 62 "To label reasoning as circular suggests it is
unhelpful, but possibly benign. The Gonthier/La Forest reliance on
S.C.R. at 700 (Cory & Iacobucci, JJ., concurring)(noting that this approach "places
an additional and erroneous onus upon the claimant").
457. Justice La Forest noted that citizenship "bears an attenuated sense' of relevance ....
That is not to say that no legislative conditioning of benefits... on the basis of citi-
zenship is acceptable, merely that legislation purporting to do so" requires
justification. "I agree with McIntyre J. that any such justification must befbund under
section 1 of the Charter, essentially because, in matters involving infringements of fun-
damental rights, it is entirely appropriate that government sustain the
constitutionality of its conduct." (emphasis added). Andrews v. Law Soc'y of B.C.
[1989] 1 S.C.R. 43, 197.
Similarly, in McKinney v. University of Guelph [1990] 3 S.C.R. 229, 279, Justice
La Forest dismissed the argument that a mandatory retirement policy was not dis-
criminatory simply because it was motivated by relevant "administrative, institutional
and socio-economic considerations." This was irrelevant because the Charter protects
against treatment which has a discriminatory effect. See also Wintemute, supra note
450.
458. Andrews [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 197.
459. Andrews [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 197.
460. Regina v. Oakes [1986] 26 D.L.R. (4th) 200.
461. See Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARv. L. Ray. 537 (1982).
462. See, BRODSKY AND DAY, supra note 72, at 160 ("Mhe most important flaw in the
similarly situate[d] test is that there is no fundamental truth to it. It does not assist
judges to identify and address the real equality issues; rather, it keeps them away from




relevance is anything but benign; it validates government action anti-
thetical to equality." 63
The relevance test is merely an overlay for judicial discretion
which invites discriminatory thinking. In particular, a court can define
the purpose of legislation and the comparator groups in a manner to
defeat or support a claim of discrimination. David Lepofsky and Hart
Schwartz note that a "court wishing to uphold the law can define the
law's purpose tautologically to fit closely the classes delineated in it. A
court wishing to strike down the law can define the law's purpose to
justify a finding of similar situation amorig differently treated
classes."4"
Egan is a perfect example of an "unfortunate alignment of judi-
cial and legislative prejudice" in defining the objective of the
legislation and the relevant comparators.165 The Courts can define the
purpose of the statute so as to exclude same-sex couples and could
therefore claim that same-sex couples were equivalent to the non-
spousal relationships of roommates. 66 Sexual orientation was relevant
to the provision of spousal benefits because of the "biological and so-
cial realities that heterosexual couples have the unique ability to
procreate" and the fact that "marriage is by nature heterosexual." 67
While Justice La Forest admitted that some gay men and lesbians
bring up children, he insisted that child-rearing in the lesbian and gay
community "is exceptional and in no way affects the general pic-
ture," 168 but cited no evidence for this (incorrect) assertion.4 69 Almost
463. Pothier, supra note 442, at 310.
464. M. David Lepofsky and Hart Schwartz, An Erroneous Approach to the Charter's
Equality Guarantee: P. v. Ertel, 1988 67 CAN. B. Ra¢. 115, 123 ,(1988); see also
Sheppard, supra note 155, at 220 ("mhe definition of a law's purpose can always be
formulated so as to correspond rationally to the legislative classification." (citation
omitted)).
465. Lessard et aL, supra note 446, at 94.
466. See Miron v. Trudel [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418, 488-90(McLachlan, J., concurring); Thi-
baudeau v. Canada [1995] 2 S.C.R. 627, 701 (Cory & Iacobucci, JJ., concurring);
Trakman, supra note 446, at 117; Westen, supra note 461, at 537.
467. Egan v. Canada [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513, 536. As Pothier remarks in supra note 442, at
n. 54: "Implicit in the majority judgments in both Mossop and Egan was that rela-
tionship issues are in the highest resistance category as regards gay and lesbian rights."
468. Egan [1995] 2 S.C.R at 538.
469. We note that such a generalized characterization of an already disadvantaged group,
without evidentiary basis, might aptly be defined as stereotype or prejudice. Turning
to the facts, there is substantial evidence that it is common for lesbians and gay men
to rear children. In fact, the lesbian community is said to have recently witnessed a
"lesbian baby boom." See KATH WESTON, Fu~nLiEs WE CHOOSE: LasBiaNs, GAYS,
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absurdly, the Old Age Security benefits legislation at issue had abso-
lutely nothing to do with procreation or marriage.7 It was a benefit
programme for low income heterosexual, cohabitating seniors, and
neither marriage nor procreative capacity were eligibility require-
471ments.
Some members of the Court also employed circular reasoning in
Miron. For example, Justice Gonthier wrote that "the functional value
of the benefits is not to provide support for all family units living in a
state of financial interdependence, but rather, the Legislature's inten-
tion was to assist those couples who are married."472 Such a circular
approach fails to address discrimination. As Justice McLachlin sug-
gests:
This illustrates the aridity of relying on the formal test of
logical relevance as proof of non-discrimination under
s[ection] 15(1). The only way to break out of the logical cir-
cle is to examine the actual impact of the distinction on
members of the targeted group. This, as I understand it, is
the lesson of the early decisions of this Court under section15 (1).4 73
KINSHIP ch. 7 (1991); see also Canada (Att'y Gen.) v. Mossop [1993] 1 S.C.R 554,
627-28 (L'Heureux-Dub6, J., dissenting); Re K [1995] 23 O.R. (3d) 679 (Prov.
Div); Kate Hill, Mothers by Insemination: Interviews, in PonTics OF THE HART: A
LESBIAN PARETcING ANTHOLOGY 111-19, (Sandra Pollack & Jeanne Vaughn eds.,
1987); Katherine Arnup, We are Family: Lesbian Mothers in Canada, RESOURCES FOR
FEMINIST RES. 101 (1993); Dorothy Atcheson, Semen Envy, OUT, Oct. 1995, at
116; Paula L. Ettelbrick, Who is a Parent?: The Need to Develop a Lesbian Conscious
Family Law, 10 N.Y.L. SH. J. HUM. RTS. 513 (1993); Brad Gooch, My Two Dads,
OUT, Feb. 1996, at 90.
470. SeeEgan [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 588 (Cory & Iacobucci, JJ., dissenting).
471. The purposes of these laws were described, more reasonably, as the alleviation of
poverty among elderly households in Egan [1995] 2 S.C.R at 535, 606-09 (Cory &
Iacobucci, JJ., dissenting), and the reduction of economic dislocation and hardship in
Miron [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 503.
472. Miron [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 461.
473. Miron [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 488-89; see also BRODSY & DAY, supra note 72, at 156-57
(commenting on tautology in judicial decisions):
[C]lasses are defined and the comparison made within the logic of the leg-
islation itself, no perspective is brought to the analysis other than that of
the challenged law. For the applicant, this means that there is no way to




c. A Majoritarian View of Equality Rather Than a Focus on Effects
The similarly situated test is organized around similarities and
differences between rights claimants and current rights holders. Ac-
cordingly, the sameness approach requires that rights claimants
conform to a standard defined by the members of dominant social474 ,, ,,
groups. Bliss illustrates that, if there is no norm against which to
set a standard for the treatment of a disadvantaged group, a court is
likely to find no discrimination, only "difference." 475 In this manner,
courts can deny equality to those who are the most 'different' and
therefore the most vulnerable. As Catherine MacKinnon writes " to
require that one be the same as those who set the standard-those
which one is already socially defined as different from-simply means
that sex equality is designed never to be achieved.
4 76
The reasoning of formal equality transforms "problems of ine-
quality, domination and subordination into problems of irrational
classification."4' 7  Discrimination is not about "sameness" and
"difference," "irrational," or "irrelevant" classifications. It is about op-
pression. MacKinnon explains:
If gender were merely a question of difference, sex inequality
would be a problem of mere sexism, of mistaken differentia-
tion, of inaccurate categorization of individuals. This is what
the difference approach thinks it is and is therefore sensitive
to. But if gender is an inequality first, constructed as a so-
cially relevant differentiation in order to keep that inequality
in place, then sex inequality questions are questions of sys-
tematic dominance, of male supremacy, which is not at all
abstract and is anything but a mistake.
78
,Because discrimination is an issue of imposed marginalization
and disadvantage, rather than irrational characterization, it is crucial
to consider the effect or impact of the distinction on the lives of the
individuals it touches! 9 Although a distinction may be relevant to the
474. See Sheppard, supra note 155, at 212.
475. Bliss v. Attorney Gen. [1979] D.L.R. (3d) 417.
476. CATHARNE A. MACKINNON, FainmisM UNMODIFIED 44 (1987)
477. Sheppard, supra note 155, at 220; see also BRODSKY DAY, supra note 72, at 147-49.
478. MAcKmNON, supra note 476, at 42.
479. See Miron v. Trudel [1995] 2 S.C.R 418, 488.
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goals and purposes of the legislation, such relevance does not end the
inquiry into its discriminatory effect. 80 "If section 15 is about recog-
nizing the equal worth and dignity of each human being, it seems
counter-productive to say that this sense of equal worth has not been
impugned merely because the legislative distinction is relevant to some
legitimate legislative purpose. ""'
Although the Egan minority recognized that lesbians and gay
men form a disadvantaged group, it failed to analyze the effects of the
legislation in a social, historical, and political context of homophobia
and lesbophobia. Furthermore, there was no recognition that the
privileging of heterosexuality-that is, heterosexism-directly func-
tions to subordinate lesbians and gay men.82
Despite Justice Gonthier's claim that his is a "contextual ap-
proach," he situates his analysis in the context of an oppressive
majority. His perspective accepts the superiority of the heterosexual,
married family unit; it celebrates the same oppressive context of tradi-
tional values and biological realities that equality theory is asked to
challenge. Although Justice Gonthier seems to agree that "superficial
biological differences" should not justify discrimination, he claims
that a court must look to the larger context to "sensibly separate bio-
logical differences which are normatively relevant and hence benign,
from those which are irrelevant and thus discriminatory."483
Justice Gonthier seems to suggest that biological differences relate
to some universal set of values or standards which are harmless and
cannot be discriminatory. Although the precise content of these uni-
versal, quasi-biological values are undefined, we do know that they
support marriage as a permissibly privileged, fundamental, inherently
heterosexual institution. Accordingly, the universal standards elevate
heterosexual sexual intercourse within marriage to an ultimate con-
stitutional value, seemingly unchallengeable by notions of equality,
liberty, or freedom of conscience. As discussed earlier, the use of bio-
logical differences leads the court back into the similarly situated
480. SeeEganv. Canada [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513, 546-47.
481. Egan [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 546-47; see also Sheppard, supra note 155, at 213.
482. See Patricia A. Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories, in FEMINIs'r
LEGAL THEORY 263 (Katharine T. Bartlett & Rosanne Kennedy, eds., 1991); Lessard,
supra note 446, at 91.
483. Miron [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 443. But see Judith Butler, Contingent Foundations: Femi-
nism and the Question of Postmodernism, in FEMINiSTS THEoizE THE PomncIAL 3,
15-16 (Judith Butler & Joan W. Scott eds., 1992) ("Identity categories are never
merely descriptions, but always normative, and as such, exclusionary..).
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test,484  and authorizes the discrimination which itself creates
"biological difference."
Further, the Gonthier/La Forest approach in Egan and Miron
openly permits legislatures to privilege certain family forms on the
basis of particular moral and religious teachings.4 85 Justice La Forest
puts it bluntly: "Suffice it to say that marriage has from time imme-
morial been firmly grounded in our legal tradition, one that is itself a
reflection of long standing philosophical and religious traditions."
48 6
A reliance on tradition to justify discrimination allows for a
"judicial parade of the same sort of prejudice that plagues the legisla-
tion in the first place."487 The Charter was meant to subject basic
premises to strict examination. It was not meant to authorize dis-
criminatory government action because such discrimination is
grounded in tradition. The extensive history and pervasiveness of dis-
crimination is not a reason for deference to the legislature. It is a call
to judicial action.
Finally, the Gonthier/La Forest approach supports an ambit of
"legislative social policy choices relating to the status rights, and obli-
gations of marriage, a basic institution of our society intimately
related to its fundamental values. 4 9 Justice La Forest adds that dis-
tinctions based on marriage pervade both provincial and federal
legislation and that all such distinctions should not have to be re-
viewed under section 1.490
This approach allows bigoted views to prevail over respect for the
equal dignity of persons, without even a judicial recognition of the
existence of discrimination.491 The test supports a complete abdication
of responsibility for minority rights, contrary to the very purpose of
section 15. Leon Trakman states that it is on "account of the tendency
of government to overrepresent popular interests that the section
484. See Philipps & Young, supra note 156, at 256.
485. We have discussed the problems inherent in the reliance on tradition to justify dis-
crimination in Part I.
486. Egan [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 536.
487. Lessard et aL, supra note 446, at 94.
488. See BRODSKY & DAY, supra note 72, at 160-65 (suggesting that the reliance on tradi-
tion does not subject the purported purposes to scrutiny, but takes them as given.
This is especially problematic if the purposes themselves are based on history, biol-
ogy, or moral standards).
489. Miron v. Trudel [1995] 2 S.C.tR 418, 463-64 (Gonthier, J., dissenting).
490. SeeEganv. Canada [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513, 539.
491. See Trakman, supra note 446, at 121.
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15(1) guarantee of equality is a necessary counterbalance. It is in rec-
ognizing that courts are bound to offset the government's
underinclusion of unpopular values that section 15(1) is so vital to a
free and democratic society.
'A92
V. RECENT DECISIONS
In the wake of the divided Court of the trilogy, there has been a
string of unanimous decisions on equality issues. The most recent de-
cisions, Eldridge, Vriend, and Law, are particularly promising.
However, the Court's new tendency to "agree to disagree" leaves many
of the major issues of the trilogy unresolved.
A. Benner v. Canada (Secretary of State)493
Benner, born in the United States to a Canadian mother and an
American father, applied for Canadian citizenship. The Citizenship
Act provided that persons born abroad before February 15, 1977,
would be granted citizenship on application if born of a Canadian
father, but would be required to undergo a security check and to
swear an oath if born of a Canadian mother. During Benner's security
check, the Registrar of Citizenship discovered that he had been
charged with several criminal offences. The Registrar advised that he
was prohibited from acquiring citizenship and his application was re-
jected. Benner applied for an order requiring the Registrar to grant
him'citizenship without swearing an oath or being subject to a security
check on the basis that the differential requirements for children of
Canadian mothers as against Canadian fathers were discriminatory.
For the Court, Justice Iacobucci reviewed the different ap-
proaches to section 15 and applied the test of Justices Cory and
McLachlin, noting, however, that "the result [would be] the same no
matter which test was applied." 4 Under the Gothier/La Forest ap-
proach, the values of personal safety, nation-building, and national
security underlying the Citizenship Act would not be advanced by dif-
ferential treatment based on the gender of Canadian parent of a
492. Trakman, supra note 446, at 121.
493. Benner v. Canada [1997] 1 S.C.R. 358.
494. Benner [1997] 1 S.C.R. at 393.
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citizenship applicant.'95 "Whether one's mother or father was Cana-
dian is entirely irrelevant to the quality of one's candidacy for
Canadian citizenship."496
Under Justices Cory, McLachlin, and Iacobucci's test, the im-
pugned provisions of the Citizenship Act expressly disadvantaged
children born abroad to Canadian mothers versus Canadian fathers. 97
This differential treatment constituted clear discrimination. The Gov-
ernment argued that the preference for applicants with Canadian
mothers over those with Canadian fathers was a product of historical
legislative circumstance, not of discriminatory stereotypical thinking,
so there could be no discrimination. Justice Iacobucci rejected this
argument. Parliament's decision to maintain a discriminatory denial
of equal treatment did not make the continued denial any less dis-
criminatory. 98 The legislation continued to suggest that children of
Canadian mothers may be more dangerous than those of Canadian
fathers. Justice Iacobucci concluded that "the impugned provisions of
the Citizenship Act [were] indeed discriminatory and violate[d] section
15 of the Charter."49
B. Eaton v. Brant County Board of Education
5
1
The Education Amendment Act required all school boards to pro-
vide special education programs and services for pupils with
intellectual disabilities, and prescribed a system of Special Education
Identification Placement and Review Committees (IPRCs) and rights
of appeal. 0 ' In accordance with this process, the IPRC, after consulta-
don with her teacher assistants and parents, determined that Emily
Eaton should be placed in a special education class. The Ontario Spe-
cial Education Tribunal (the "Tribunal") confirmed the placement,
contrary to the wishes of Emily's parents.
The issue was whether the decision contravened the equality pro-
visions of section 15(1) of the Charter. With all Justices concurring,
Justice Sopinka concluded that the decision of the Tribunal was based
495. See Benner [1997] 1 S.C.R. at 393.
496. Benner [1997] 1 S.C.R. at 393.
497. See Benner [1997] 1 S.C.R at 394.
498. See Benner [1997] 1 S.C.R. at 396.
499. Benner [1997] 1 S.C.R. at 403.
500. Eaton v. Brant Cty. Bd. of Educ. [1997] 1 S.C.R. 241.
501. See Eaton [1997] 1 S.C.R. at 252-54..
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on what was in the best interests of the child and that no violation of
section 15(1) occurred in the circumstances. 02
Justice Sopinka noted that, while there was no unanimity in the
application of section 15,503 the case could be resolved based on the
following principles, on which there was agreement. To find a viola-
tion of section 15:
1) The claimant has to establish that the impugned provi-
sion creates a distinction on a prohibited or analogous
ground which withholds an advantage or benefit from,
or imposes a disadvantage or burden on, the claimant.
2) The claimant also has to show that the denial constitutes
discrimination. That is:
3) The claimant has to show that the denial rests on one of
the grounds enumerated in section 15(1) or an analo-
gous ground,
4) that the unequal treatment is based on the stereotypical
application of presumed group or personal characteris-
tics,
5) "[F]urthermore, if the law distinguishes on an enumer-
ated or analogous ground but does not have the effect of
imposing a real disadvantage in the social and political
context of the claim, it may similarly be found not to
violate section 15."' °
Justice Sopinka noted that, to ensure equal treatment of persons
with disabilities, it would often be necessary to take into account the
personal characteristics of individual disabled persons."' The purpose
of section 15 of the Charter was not only to prevent discrimination by
the attribution of untrue, stereotypical characteristics based on im-
mutable conditions. It was also intended to ameliorate the position of
groups within Canadian society who had suffered disadvantage by ex-
clusion from mainstream society.06
502. See Eaton [1997] 1 S.C.R. at 279.
503. See Eaton [1997] 1 S.C.R. at 270.
504. Eaton [1997] 1 S.C.R. at 270-71 (quoting Miron v. Trudel [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418,
487).
505. Eaton [1997] 1 S.C.R. at 272.
506. See Eaton [1997] 1 S.C.R. at 272.
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Here, discrimination lay in the failure to make reasonable ac-
commodations, constructing society along able-bodied standards. 07 It
was therbfore necessary to recognize the individual actual characteris-
tics of persons with disabilities."8 Disability was different from other
enumerated grounds such as race or sex because there was individual
variation with respect to disability."9 Depending upon the person and
the particular disability, integration in schooling could be either a
benefit or a burden.
There was differential treatment.10 The Tribunal, however, con-
sidered Emily's special needs to fashion a placement that would enable
her to benefit most from an educational program. The Tribunal
found, based on Emily's three years of experience in a regular class,
that in her circumstances, integration had "the counter-productive
effect of isolating her, of segregating her in the theoretically integrated
setting".5" The best possible placement was in the special class. Thus,
this decision could not have the effect of disadvantaging her.
5 12
The Court of Appeal had held "that the Tribunal's reasoning in-
fringed [section] 15(1) because the Charter mandate[d] a presumption
in favour of integration. This presumption is displaced if the parents
consent to a segregated placement."" Justice Sopinka found that a
test focused on the best interests of the child should not be encum-
bered by a presumption because this would likely "render proceedings
more technical and adversarial."" 4 Moreover, a decision might "be
made by default rather than on the merits as to what is in the best in-
terests of the child."
515
Justice Sopinka concluded that the placement of Emily was not
discriminatory1 6 and that both the Tribunal's order and its reasoning
conformed with section 15(1) of the Charter.
517
507. See Eaton [1997] 1 S.C.R at 272.
508. See Eaton [1997] 1 S.C.R. at 272.
509. See Eaton [1997] 1 S.C.R. at 273.
510. See Eaton [1997] 1 S.C.R at 274.
511. Eaton [1997] 1 S.C.R. at 275.
512. Eaton [1997] 1 S.C.R. at 277.
513. Eaton [1997] 1 S.C.R. at 278.
514. Eaton [1997] 1 S.C.R. at 278.
515. Eaton [1997] 1 S.C.R. at 278-79.
516. Eaton [1997] 1 S.C.R. at 279.
517. See Eaton [19971 1 S.C.R. at 279.
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C Commentary: Healing the Divide
In Eaton, Justice Sopinka understated the deep divisions on sec-
tion 15 after the trilogy, noting that "there has not been unanimity in
the judgments of the Court with respect to all the principles relating
to the application of [section] 15 of the Charter."518 Still, Eaton was
resolved on the basis of undisputed principles. The unanimous Court
stated that the claimant must show "that the unequal treatment is
based on the stereotypical application of presumed group or personal
characteristics."" If the law did not have the effect of imposing a real
disadvantage in the social and political context of the claim, it might
not violate section 15.
In fact, Justice Sopinka's actual application of the test did not re-
flect his definition of discrimination as the attribution of untrue,
stereotypical characteristics based on immutable conditions. He noted
that section 15 was also intended "to ameliorate the position of groups
within Canadian society who have suffered disadvantage by exclusion
from mainstream society."
5 20
Although discrimination on the basis of disability forced Justice
Sopinka to move away from the liberal individual, irrational stereo-
type model of discrimination, he did not succeed in fully developing
an analysis of contextualized disadvantage from the perspective of the
rights claimant. This was illustrated in his articulation of the test and
reasoning for the court. Disability was described as a "real" difference
that must be accommodated, rather than life experiences worthy of
equal respect which have been constructed as "disability" from an
ableist perspective. 52 There was no movement beyond determinism,
toward the space for freedom that would allow for substantive
change.
522
518. Eaton [1997] 1 S.C.R. at 270.
519. Eaton [1997] 1 S.C.R at 270 (quoting Miron v. Trudel [1995] 2 S.C.R 418, 485).
520. Eaton [1997] 1 S.C.R. at 272.
521. See Eaton [1997] 1 S.C.R. at 272.
522. See generally Vicky D'Aoust, Competency, Autonomy, and Choice: On Being a Lesbian
and Having Disabilities, 7 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 564 (1994).
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D. Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General)"za
The provincial government of British Columbia failed to provide
funding for sign language interpreters for deaf patients when they
received medical services. Eldridge alleged that this violated section
15(1) of the Charter. Deaf persons would receive lower quality
medical services than hearing persons because of the communication
barrier. The Supreme Court of Canada unanimously concluded that
the failure to pay for interpreters infringed upon the right to equal
benefit of the law without discrimination based on physical
disability.
5 21
1. Purpose of Section 15
Justice La Forest commenced his section 15 analysis by noting
that the provision was to be interpreted in a generous and purposive
manner.2 Section 15 was to serve two distinct but related purposes:
"[flirst, it expresse[d] a commitment ... to the equal worth and hu-
man dignity of all persons;" 526 second, it was "to rectify and prevent
discrimination against particular groups 'suffering social, political and
legal disadvantage in our society."" 27
2. Disadvantaged Groups
While there might be discrimination against a member of a more
advantaged group, historical disadvantage is an important indicium of
discrimination.'2s An examination of "the larger social, political, and
523. Eldridge v. British Columbia (Att'y Gen.) [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624.
524. Eldridge [1997 3 S.C.R. at 682.
525. Eldridge [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 666.
526. Eldridge [1997] 3 S.C.R at 667 ("As McIntyre J. remarked in Andrews, [section]
15(1) 'entails the promotion of a society in which all are secure in the knowledge that
they are recognized at law as human beings equally deserving of concern, respect and
consideration.'" (quoting Andrews v. Law Soc'y of B. C. [1989] 1 S.C.R 143, 171)).
527. Eldridge [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 667 (quoting R. v. Turpin [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1296, 1333).
528. See Eldridge [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 667; see also Egan v. Canada [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513,
554-55 (L'Heureux-Dub6, J., dissenting); Miron v. Trudel [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418,
436 (Gonthier, J., dissenting).
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legal context" showed people with disabilities were clearly subject to
exclusion and marginalization. 29
3. Section 15 Test
Justice La Forest noted that:
[w]hile this court has not adopted a uniform approach to
[section] 15(1), there is broad agreement on the general
analytic framework. A person claiming a violation of section
15(1) must first establish that because of a distinction drawn
between the claimant and others, the claimant has been de-
nied "equal protection" or "equal benefit" of the law.
Secondly, the claimant must show that the denial constitutes
discrimination on the basis of one of the enumerated
grounds listed in [section] 15(1) or one analogous thereto."'
Justice La Forest described the two approaches to discrimination.
On one view, discrimination must be "based on an irrelevant personal
characteristic."5 3' In such cases, section 15(1) would not be infringed
unless the distinguished personal characteristic was irrelevant to the
functional values underlying the law, provided that those values were
not themselves discriminatory.
Other members of the Court suggested that relevance was only
one element of the test for discrimination." 2 As in Benner, either of
the two approaches produced the same result." 3 The distinction was
based on a personal characteristic that was irrelevant to the functional
values of promoting health and preventing and treating illness and
disease.
529. Ekdridge [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 668-69 (quoting Turpin [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 1331).
530. Eldridge [1997 3 S.C.R. at 669 (citations omitted).
531. Eldridge (1997] 3 S.C.R. at 669.
532. See Eldridge [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 670.




Eldridge had been denied the "equal benefit of the law without
discrimination."5 Although there was no unequal treatment on the
face of the Legislation as between deaf and hearing persons, the failure
to fund sign language interpretation meant that deaf persons were de-
nied the full benefit of medical services.53'
Justice La Forest noted the Charter offered protection against ad-
verse effects discrimination. The Charter "was intended to ensure a
measure of substantive, and not merely formal, equality."536 Accord-
ingly, it was not necessary to show a discriminatory purpose or
intention to prove a section 15(1) violation. 37
5. Adverse Effects
Justice La Forest wrote that legislation was discriminatory when it
had the effect of denying a person the equal benefit of law.' 38 As Jus-
tice McIntyre stated in Andrews, "[t]o approach the ideal of full
equality before and under the law.., the main consideration must be
the impact of the law on the individual or the group concerned."'39
True equality required the affirmation of differences.'4"
[The purpose of [section] 15(1) of the Charter is not only to
prevent discrimination by the attribution of stereotypical
characteristics to individuals, but also to ameliorate the po-
sition of groups within Canadian society who have suffered
disadvantage by exclusion from mainstream society as has
been the case with disabled persons."'
534. Eldridge [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 670.
535. SeeEldridge [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 670.
536. Eldridge [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 671.
537. See Eldridge [1997]3 S.C.R. at 671.
538. Eldridge [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 671.
539. Andrews v. Law Soc'y of B. C. [1989 1 S.C.R. 143, 165.
540. SeeAndrews [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 169.
541. Eaton v. Brant Cty. Bd. Of Educ. [1997] 1 S.C.R. 241,272; see also Eldridge [1997]
3 S.C.R. at 673.
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6. Legislative Inaction
The Government argued that section 15(1) did not oblige gov-
ernments to implement programs to alleviate disadvantages that
existed independently of state action. Instead, governments should be
entitled to provide benefits to the general population without ensur-
ing that disadvantaged members of society have the resources to take
full advantage of those benefits.
According to Justice La Forest, this was "a thin and impoverished
vision of [section] 15(1).,,112 Although [section] 15(1) of the Charter
may or may not require proactive efforts by the state to remedy sys-
temic inequality, once the government offered a benefit, it was
required to provide the benefit without discrimination.543
In many circumstances, this will require governments to take
positive action, for example by extending the scope of a
benefit to a previously excluded class of persons.... Moreo-
ver, it has been suggested that, in taking this sort of positive
action, the government should not be the source of further
inequality.... If we accept the concept of adverse effect dis-
crimination, it seems inevitable, at least at the [section]
15(1) stage of analysis, that the government will be required
to take special measures to ensure that disadvantaged groups
are able to benefit equally from government services.5
4
7. Relationship Between Section 15 & Section 1
If there were policy reasons in favour of limiting the govern-
ment's responsibility to ameliorate disadvantage in the provision of
benefits and services, those policies should be considered under sec-
tion 1 of the Charter. Accordingly, the failure of the Medical Services
Commission and hospitals to provide sign language interpretation
where necessary for effective communication constituted a prima facie
542. Eldridge [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 678.
543. See Eldridge [1997] 3 S.C.R at 678; Thibaudeau v. Canada [1995] 2 S.C.tR 627,
655; Miron v. Trudel [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418, 418; Native Women's Assn. of Can. v.
Canada [1994] 3 S.C.R. 627, 655; Haig v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer) [1993]
2 S.C.R. 995, 1041-42; see also Tftreault-Gadouryv. Canada [1991] 2 S.C.R. 22.
544. Eldridge [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 678-680.
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violation of the [section] 15(1). "This failure denie[d] [deaf persons]
the equal benefit of the law and discriminates against them in com-
parison with hearing persons.545
E. Vriend v. Alberta
546
Vriend v. Alberta involved a gay man who was fired from his job
as a laboratory coordinator because of his sexual orientation. His
complaint to the Alberta Human Rights Commission was rejected
because sexual orientation was not expressly a ground of discrimina-
tion under the Individual's Rights Protection Act (_PA). 4  The
comprehensive provincial human rights statute protected against dis-
crimination on the basis of "race, religious beliefs, colour, gender,
physical disability, marital status, age, mental disability, ancestry and
place of origin" in a wide range of areas, including employment.548 At
the Alberta Court of Appeal, Justice McClung issued a majority
judgment which characterized homosexuality as an immoral sexual
aberration that was legitimately excluded from human rights protec-
tion.549
In April 1998, a unanimous 5 ° Supreme Court of Canada, over-
ruling Justice McClung, read in protection against discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation into the IRPA."' Yet again, the Court
did not reconcile the different approaches to section 15, stating that
any differences in approach would not affect the result.
Justice Cory held that the IRPA created a "distinction between
homosexuals, on one hand, and other disadvantaged groups which are
545. Eldridge [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 682.
546. Vriend v. Alberta [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493.
547. Individual's Rights Protection Act, R.S.A. 1980 ch. 1-2.
548. See Vriend [1998] 1 S.C.R. at 507-08.
549. See Re Vriend v. Alberta [1996] 132 D.L.R. (4th) 595, 609, 611; Vriend [1998] 1
S.C.R. at 507-08. Justice McClung was later reprimanded for his discriminatory
comments.
550. The Court was unanimous except with respect to remedy. On that issue, Justice Ma-
jor dissented; he would have declared the sections denying protection to gays and
lesbians unconstitutional but would have granted a declaration of invalidity, sus-
pended for a period of one year. "Reading in" was inadvisable since it was clear that
the Legislature was opposed to including sexual orientation as a prohibited ground of
discrimination. The Legislature might prefer no human rights act over one that in-
cluded sexual orientation as a prohibited ground of discrimination or it might want to
invoke the notwithstanding clause.
551. Vriend [1998] 1 S.C.R. at 578.
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protected under the Act, on the other."112 It also created a "second dis-
tinction ... a more fundamental one ... between homosexuals and
heterosexuals."553 Given the social reality of discrimination against
gays and lesbians, the exclusion of sexual orientation protections
clearly had a negative impact on gays and lesbians as opposed to het-
erosexuals.554 Therefore, the IRPA denied substantive equality to gays
and lesbians, excluding them from the government's statement of
policy against discrimination, and denying them access to the reme-
dial procedures established by the Act. Justice Cory observed:
It is easy to say that everyone who is just like "us" is entitled
to equality. Everyone finds it more difficult to say that those
who are "different" from us in some way should have the
same equality rights that we enjoy. Yet so soon as we say any
enumerated or analogous group is less deserving and un-
worthy of equal protection and benefit of the law all
minorities and all of Canadian society are demeaned.55'
The Court held that the absence of a remedy for sexual orienta-
tion discrimination had "dire and demeaning consequences for those
affected."" 6 It could reasonably be inferred that the failure to provide
human rights protection condoned and even encouraged discrimina-
tion against gays and lesbians.57 Justice Cory wrote:
The exclusion sends a message to all Albertans that it is
permissible, and perhaps even acceptable, to discriminate
against individuals on the basis of their sexual orientation.
The effect of that message on gays and lesbians is one whose
significance cannot be underestimated. As a practical matter,
it tells them that they have no protection from discrimina-
tion on the basis of their sexual orientation. Deprived of any
legal redress they must accept and live in constant fear of
discrimination....
552. Vriend [1998] 1 S.C.. at 541.
553. Vriend [1998] 1 S.C.R. at 541.
554. See Vriend [1998] 1 S.C.R. at 543-44.
555. Vriend [1998] 1 S.C.R at 536.
556. Vrend [1998] 1 S.C.R. at 549.
557. See Vriend [1998] 1 S.C.R. at 550.
[Vol. 6:261
FOUNDATIONS FOR (15)1
Perhaps most important is the psychological harm which
may ensue from this state of affairs. Fear of discrimination
will logically lead to concealment of true identity and this
must be harmful to personal confidence and self-esteem.
Compounding that effect is the implicit message conveyed
by the exclusion, that gays and lesbians, unlike other indi-
viduals, are not worthy of protection. This is clearly an
example of a distinction which demeans the individual and
strengthens and perpetrates the view that gays and lesbians
are less worthy of protection as individuals in Canada's soci-
ety. The potential harm to the dignity and perceived worth
of gay and lesbian individuals constitutes a particularly cruel
form of discrimination.558
All of the Justices recognized that the failure to include protec-
tion on the basis of sexual orientation under the human rights statute
was discrimination that could not be justified under section 1 of the
Charter. It was a dramatic departure from Egan.59 In his section 1
analysis, Justice Iacobucci wrote:
[G]roups that have historically been the target of discrimi-
nation cannot be expected to wait patiently for the
protection of their human dignity and equal rights while
governments move toward reform one step at a time. If the
infringement of the rights and freedoms of these groups is
permitted to persist while governments fail to pursue equal-
ity diligently, then the guarantees of the Charter will be
reduced to little more than empty words.560
558. Vriend [1998] 1 S.C.R. at 551.
559. As discussed in supra Part IV.B., four of the nine justices (La Forest, Major, Gonth-
ier, JJ. and Lamer, C.J.) advocated a new approach to section 15(1) in Egan. A finding
of discrimination would require that a distinction be irrelevant to the purposes of the
legislation. Egan [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 526-40. Under section 1, they were joined by
Justice Sopinka in upholding the opposite-sex definition of spouse under the OldAge
Security Act. Egan [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 572-57. Although Viend represents an im-
portant, unanimous, and progressive result in favour of equality for Canadian lesbians
and gay men, it is politically easier to provide protection under human rights legisla-
tion than to amend the definition of spouse. The true test of the Court will be M. v.
H., discussed infra Part VIA.
560. Vriend [1998] 1 S.C.R. at 559-60.
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a. Commentary: Reason to Hope?
Eldridge and Vriend return the Court to a more generous and
purposive interpretation of section 15 which is focussed on amelio-
rating the situation of disadvantaged groups and ensuring the human
dignity of all persons. In considering an instance of adverse effects dis-
crimination, the Eldridge court had to highlight the impact of the
legislation on the rights claimants in order to find discrimination.56' In
Vriend, the human rights statute failed to include sexual orientation as
a protected ground. The discrimination was only apparent in exam-
ining the larger social context. It then became clear that the exclusion
of sexual orientation protections had a negative impact on gays and
lesbians. By focussing on effects, the Court was able to recognize that
disability and sexual orientation discrimination were not pre-existing
disadvantages for which the Government had no responsibility. In-
stead, the inequality was perpetuated by the state's failure to give
equal consideration to a group of citizens.56 Further, the government
had a responsibility to "ameliorate disadvantage in the provision of
benefits and services" and any limitations on this obligation were to be
considered under section 1 of the Charter.563
These are very progressive decisions in contrast to the trilogy. Ac-
cording to Eldridge and Vriend, the government is required to act in a
manner that does not have the effect of disadvantaging groups experi-
encing pre-existing inequality. It remains to be seen, however, whether
the court has truly embraced a substantive equality analysis.
561. Eldridge v. British Columbia [1997] 3 S.C.tR 624.
562. Vriend [1998] 1 S.C.R_ at 493.
563. Vriend [1998] 1 S.C.R. at 493.
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VI. THE FUTURE OF SECTION 15(I) OF THE CHARTER
A. Law v. Canada
On March 25, 1999, as we were editing this paper for publica-
tion, the Supreme Court of Canada released Law v. Canada (Minister
of Employment and Immigration).56 Nancy Law was denied survivor's
benefits under the Canadian Pension Plan,565 because she was thirty
years old and without dependent children or a disability. The unani-
mous Court held that there was no discrimination, because the
differential treatment did not "reflect or promote the notion that
[those excluded from the benefit scheme] are less capable or less de-
serving of concern, respect and consideration.... Given the
contemporary and historical context of the differential treatment and
those affected by it, the legislation [did] not stereotype, exclude, or
devalue adults under 45 ."
In Law, Canada's highest court was finally able to provide
assistance in defining discrimination under the Charter.567 In effect,
the Court recognized that it was necessary to "revisit the fundamental
purpose of s[ection] 15 [and] seek out a means by which to give full
effect to this fundamental purpose."568 Justice Iacobucci reviewed
Andrews 5" and subsequent decisions, concluding that the aim of
section 15 is to:
prevent the violation of essential human dignity and freedom
through the imposition of disadvantage, stereotyping, or po-
litical or social prejudice, and to promote a society in which
all persons enjoy equal recognition at law as human beings
or as members of Canadian society, equally capable of and
equally deserving of concern, respect and consideration. 570
564. Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) [1999] S.C.J. No. 12
(QL).
565. Canada Pension Plan, R.S.C., ch. C-8, §§ 44()(d), 58 (1985).
566. Law [1999] S.CJ. No. 12 (QL).
567. Law [1999] S.CJ. No. 12 (QL).
568. Egan v. Canada [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513, 541.
569. Andrews v. Law Soc'y of B.C. [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143.
570. Law [1999] S.CJ. No. 12 (QL).
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The Court again stated that equality is a comparative concept. It
is necessary to consider the purpose and effect of the legislation and
"biological, historical, and sociological similarities or dissimilarities" 7'
to locate the appropriate comparator." Importantly, however, the
perspective of the rights claimant will suggest the appropriate com-
parator, and will determine whether the impugned law has a
detrimental effect on the claimant's dignity.573 It is a subjective-
objective assessment. A discrimination claim may involve more than
one ground simultaneously.7' i
Pre-existing disadvantage is "probably the most compelling factor
favouring a conclusion that differential treatment imposed by legisla-
tion is truly discriminatory."' 7' Historic disadvantage is not, however,
a necessary pre-condition to proving discrimination 76 In determining
whether the claimant's dignity has been violated, another factor to be
assessed is the relationship between the ground of discrimination and
the nature of the differential treatment. In some cases, differential
treatment may reflect the claimant's actual needs, capacities, or cir-
cumstances, and so it may not be discriminatory." Still, differences
must be recognized in a manner that respects a person's value as a
human beihg and member of Canadian society:
The focus must always remain upon the central question of
whether, viewed from the perspective of the claimant, the
differential treatment imposed by the legislation has the ef-
fect of violating human dignity. The fact that the impugned
legislation may achieve a valid social purpose for one group
of individuals cannot function to deny an equality claim
where the effects of the legislation upon another person or
group conflict with the purpose of the s[ection] 15(1) guar-
antee.
57 8
Where legislation has an ameliorative purpose or effect for a more
disadvantaged person or group in society, this "will likely not violate
571. Law [1999] S.CJ. No. 12 (QL).
572. See Law [1999] S.C.J. No. 12 (QL).
573. See Law [1999] S.CJ. No. 12 (QL).
574. See Law [1999] S.CJ. No. 12 (QL).
575. Law [1999] S.CJ. No. 12 (QL).
576. See Law [1999] S.CJ. No, 12 (QL).
577. See Law [1999] S.CJ. No. 12 (QL).
578. Law [1999] S.CJ. No. 12 (QL).
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the human dignity of more advantaged individuals."5 79 At the same
time, "[u]nderindusive ameliorative legislation that excludes from its
scope the members of an historically disadvantaged group will rarely
escape the charge of discrimination."80 A further contextual factor is
the nature and scope of the interest affected by the legislation. The
court must evaluate "the constitutional and societal significance at-
tributed to the interest or interests adversely affected by the
legislation.""8 '
Referring to Andrews, Justice Iacobucci reiterated that section 15
and section 1 must be kept analytically distinct. In contrast to the mi-
nority's approach in the trilogy, reasonableness and justification are
not to be dealt with under section 15. "It is for the citizen to establish
that his or her Charter right has been infringed and for the state to
justify the infringement."
582
Justice Iacobucci held that a three-step approach is appropriate
for the assessment of equality claims. The claimant must establish
differential treatment, the presence of enumerated or analogous
grounds, and discrimination which brings into play the purpose of
section 15(1).53 He then explored an alternative approach under
which the definition of "substantive inequality" is "discrimination."
584
He rejected this methodology because: I
[T]here may be cases where a law which applies identically
to all fails to take into account the claimant's different traits
or circumstances, yet does not infringe the claimant's human
dignity in so doing. In such cases, there could be said to be
substantively differential treatment between the claimant and
others, because the law has a meaningfully different effect
upon the claimant, without there being discrimination for
the purpose of s [ection] 15 (1).515
579. Law [1999) S.CJ. No. 12 (QL).
580. Law [1999] S.CJ. No. 12 (QL); see also Vriend v. Alberta [1998) 1 S.C.R. 493.
581. Law [1999] S.CJ. No. 12 (QL).
582. Law [1999] S.CJ. No. 12 (QL) (quoting Andrews v. Law Soc'y of B.C. [1989] 1
S.C.R. 143, 178).
583. Law [1999] S.CJ. No. 12 (QL).
584. Law [1999] S.C.J. No. 12 (QL).
585. Law [1999] S.CJ. No. 12 (QL).
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B. M.v. H
5 86
M. v. H. will test the Court's commitment to giving substance to
the Charte's guarantees for gays and lesbians. When M. and H. sepa-
rated, after a ten year relationship, M. had no home,587 no access to
her capital,58 and was shut out of her joint business and cut off from
its income.589 She had $5.64 in her bank account. If she had been in
an opposite sex relationship, she would have had immediate reme-
dies-not just to support, but a forum for the resolution of all issues,
a forum that governs the breakdown of intimate relationships with
courtesy and civility.
Instead, the next five and a half years were consumed by
aggressive, costly, and intensely personal litigation. For more than
four years into the proceedings, H. refused to provide any
documentary disclosure. 90 Rather than a mandated early settlement
586. M. v. H. [1996] 132 D.L.R. (4th) 538, (Ont. Gen. Div.) aff'd (1999), 171 D.L.R.
(4th) 577. Further information about the case, including a copy of our Supreme
Court of Canada factum and a statement by "M," is available at the McMillan Binch
website at <http://www.mcbinch.com/>.
587. H. changed the locks to the city home (title to which was held by H. alone) and the
joint country property, days after the separation. M. v. H. [1996] 132 D.L.R. (4th)
at 545.
588. Most notably, M. had no access to her one-half interest in the country property,
worth about $85,000 at the time of the property trial (and eventual settlement).
Apart from the obvious disadvantage that M. suffered as a result of being denied ac-
cess to her capital for almost six years, the property also dedined in value over that
period.
589. The parties started a jointly-owned advertising business in 1980, shortly after com-
mencing cohabitation. H. had the majority of client contact, and M. assisted with
day-to-day operations. Although M. was never paid for her services, H. drew $6,500
per month (net) out of the business, and the parties shared this income in the usual
way. H shut down the joint business at separation, but she continued to perform the
same work for the same clientele, and her lifestyle remained unchanged after separa-
tion.
590. In Ontario, Rule 70.04 provides that a spouse who has been served with a Financial
Statement must file his or her own Financial Statement within 30 days, whether or
not that spouse intends to defend the proceeding. Similar provisions exist across the
country. Since the introduction of mandatory Financial Statements, courts have con-
sistently articulated the principle that former spouses will face serious cost
consequences if they fail to provide full and true financial disclosure. See Heron v.
Heron [1987] .9 R.F.L. (3d) 41 (Ont. H.C.), rev'g 59 O.R. (2d) 666 (Master); leave
to appeal to Ont. Div. Ct. refused 19 C.P.C. (2d) 218n. These rules must be applied
to same sex couples. In M. v. H., we had thirteen motions over disclosure issues.
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conference, " ' there were 65 months of litigation in which M.'s debt
increased by more than $30,000. M. brought three unsuccessful
motions for partition and sale of the country property and was unable
to borrow against her interest in it. In her forties, she left a ten year
relationship with some clothing and personal items, without any
furniture at all, " 2 and moved into shared accommodation with
university students.
In the lower courts, the opposite-sex definition of "spouse" for
the purpose of spousal support under the Ontario Family Law Act was
ruled to be unconstitutional. "3 Same-sex spouses were "read-in" to
remedy the legislation. An appeal was heard by the Supreme Court of
Canada on March 18, 1998.
M. v. H. can be distinguished from Egan, where the legislation
would have been found unconstitutional but for Justice Sopinka up-
holding the violation of section 15 under section 1. Justice Sopinka
showed deference to the legislature because of the "novelty" and per-
vasiveness of the discrimination and public cost involved in providing
the benefit. M. v. H. involves only private funds; and it has been three
years since Egan. More broadly, however, M. v. H. asks for a reconsid-
eration of the Egan decision. With the retirement of Justice La Forest
and the sudden death of Justice Sopinka, the composition of the
bench has changed significantly. After the progressive result in Vriend,
we hoped that a majority of Justices would be committed to giving
effect to equality for gay men and lesbians where it is closest to the
heart-the family.
1. Commentary: More Than a Great Idea in the Abstract?
Law is a very exciting decision for substantive equality rights. The
full Court has approved aspects of L'Heureux-Dube's unique and very
591. Case Management Rules in Toronto require that parties in family disputes must at-
tend a case conference with a judge before bringing any interim motion, except in the
case of dire emergency.
592. Just imagine the amount of mutually-acquired property she left behind after ten
years of living together, running joint businesses, and building a country home-
couches, cookbooks, and rubber boots. The parties never divided any household
contents; the final settlement was a cash payment only.
593. M. v. H. [1996] 132 D.L.R. (4th) 538.
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progressive approach to section 15 (1).5 4 Perhaps most promising is
the focus on adopting the perspective of the rights claimant in equal-
ity analysis, the emphasis on considering the effects of differential
treatment on the rights claimant, and the professed commitment to
substantive equality.
Still, the decision retains many of the same problems that have
threatened equality analysis since Andrews-the very problems dis-
cussed at length in this paper. While the minority's "relevance" step
was not expressly accepted as a guideline in assessing equality claims,
the Court also failed to explicitly condemn it. Indeed, the Court con-
tinued to advocate a three-step comparative approach that may invite
a formal equality analysis.
The first step of Justice Iacobucci's three-step test focuses on dif-
ferential treatment or the drawing of a distinction on the face of the
legislation. It requires comparison between 'analogous' groups. To
determine the relevant sameness or difference of comparator groups,
the Court may turn to a consideration of the purpose of the legisla-
tion. This was the approach taken by the minority in Egan. By
defining the purpose of the legislation in relation to heterosexual pro-
creation, sexual orientation was a relevant difference in determining
entitlement to Old Age Security benefits. Citing Weatherall, Justice
Iacobucci affirms that differential treatment may be required because
of actual biological and historical differences. As we have discussed,
biology and history serve as a means to authorize discrimination. Dis-
crimination has a long history and so-called biological realities are
socially constructed as a means of hierarchy and oppression. It is the
role of equality analysis to interrogate "biology" and "history," not
reinforce their discriminatory potential.
Justice Iacobucci touched on an alternative approach to the sec-
tion 15 analysis. He stated that it is possible to understand the third
step, determining whether there is discrimination, as "really being a
restatement of the requirement that there be substantive rather than
merely formal inequality."" 5 In his articulation of a "substantive ine-
594. See discussion supra Part IV.B.3. The Court accepted important elements of
L'Heureux-Dub6's contextual, effects-focussed, substantive equality approach. It
adopted a subjective-objective standard to determine whether there is a discrimina-
tory impact, and it noted the importance of the nature and scope of the interest
affected by the legislation.




quality" approach, the third step of the test would be eliminated. Jus-
tice Iacobucci rejects such a two-step test, because he fails to recognize
a distinction between the "substantively differential treatment" he
terms a "substantive inequality" approach and the substantive equality
analysis we would support.' 9'
In a substantive equality analysis, a group is situated in the larger
social, historical, and political context to determine whether members
are likely to experience disadvantage, stereotyping, prejudice, and vul-
nerability in our society. The equality rights analysis then requires no
further comparisons. Simply put, when treatment at law furthers a
group's pre-existing inequality, by compounding and reinforcing the
members' disadvantage and vulnerability and denying their human
dignity, it furthers and promotes substantive inequality or discrimina-
tion. The proper application of a substantive equality test avoids the
first step, with its focus on sameness and difference, and directly ad-
dresses the central problem: defining discrimination.
In contrast, the three-step test often gets side-tracked on the first
step: finding a distinction. As Justice Iacobucci suggests, adverse ef-
fects discrimination does not neatly fit the traditional three-step test
since there is no distinction on the face of the legislation.59 When the
first step is to find a distinction, the Court's discrimination analysis is
necessarily comparative, with all the attendant problems of establish-
ing "relevant" similarities and differences. Justice Iacobucci states that
the court must. consider the purpose of legislation under section 15
and "biological, historical, and sociological similarities or dissimilari-
ties" of groups claiming equality to current rights-holders.599 This
invites the reasoning of the minority in Egan and Miron.600
The Court's consistent focus on the perspective of the rights
claimant may help to prevent a regression to formal equality reason-
ing, by encouraging the Court to recognize a more appropriate
comparator. Still, the Law decision was written purely in the abstract:
those denied the benefit were not victims of stereotyping or prejudice;
they had no history of vulnerability; their exclusion was not a threat to
596. See discussion supra Part IV.B.3 and Law [1999] S.C.J. No. 12 (QL).
597. Law [1999] S.C.J. No. 12 (QL).
598. Note that Justice lacobucci does modify the traditional treatment of the first step so
as to address adverse effects discrimination. He includes substantively differential
treatment and not merely distinctions of the face of legislation as part of the first step.
599. Law [1999] S.C.J. No. 12 (QL).
600. See discussion supra Part IVA.
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their human dignity.601 The Court had no need to actually "pivot the
centre" and appreciate the experience of a vulnerable group. 2
M. v. H. is about choosing a formal or substantive approach to
equality. The court may interpret the purpose of the legislation in a
circular fashion to legitimate the exclusion of gays and lesbians or it
may interpret the object of the law in a broad and purposive manner
that allows the equality issues before the court to be addressed. The
Court may get lost in the search to find comparator groups and it may
prevent analysis by disregarding the particular context of disadvantage.
The case has been marked in the lower courts by formal equality's
sameness-difference debates and corresponding arguments about anti-
assimilationist viewpoints. Appeals to formal equality's unhappy com-
panions of tradition, biology, democracy, deference, and morality
continue to threaten to pull the attention away from where it be-
longs--on the disadvantage and subordination of gays and lesbians
and the Charters promise of substantive equality.
VII. AFTERWORD:
THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA'S DECISION IN M v. H.
As we were completing the final edits of this Article, the Supreme
Court of Canada released its decision in M. v. H. An 8-1 majority of
the court, applying the section 15 test articulated in Law, concluded
that Ontario's Family Law Act discriminated on the basis of sexual
orientation by excluding same sex couples from the definition of
spouse for the purposes of spousal support.6 3 In an opening sum-
mary, Justices Cory and Iacobucci wrote for the majority:
The crux of the issue is that this differential treatment dis-
criminates in a substantive sense by violating the human
601. Law [1999] S.CJ. No. 12 (QL) (holding that there was no discrimination because
Nancy Law could not demonstrate that either the "purpose or effect of the impugned
legislative provisions violate[d] her human dignity").
602. See discussion supra note 26.
603. Spousal support (alimony) has been available to unmarried opposite sex couples in
Ontario since 1978. .[See Family Law Reform Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 2] Although
the number of years required for cohabitation varies, all Canadian provinces except
Qudbec have similar legislation. Generally, unmarried heterosexual spouses are
granted many of the same benefits and responsibilities as married couples. See also
Miron v. Trude discussed supra Part IV A, establishing that differential treatment
between unmarried opposite-sex cohabitants and married spouses is unconstitutional.
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dignity of individuals in same sex relationships.... In the
present appeal, several factors are important to consider.
First, individuals in same sex relationships face significant
pre-existing disadvantage and vulnerability, which is exacer-
bated by the impugned legislation. Second, the legislation at
issue fails to take into account the claimant's actual situa-
tion. Third, there is no compelling argument that the
ameliorative purpose of the legislation does anything to
lessen the charge of discrimination in this case. Fourth, the
nature of the interest affected is fundamental, namely the
ability to meet basic financial needs following the break-
down of a relationship characterized by intimacy and
economic dependence. The exclusion of same-sex partners
from the benefits of the spousal support scheme implies that
they are judged to be incapable of forming intimate relation-
ships of economic interdependence, without regard to their
actual circumstances. Taking these factors into account, it is
clear that the human dignity of individuals in same-sex rela-
tionships is violated by the definition of "spouse" in
s [ection] 29 of the FLA. °'
Canada's highest court held that the infringement of gays' and
lesbians' equality rights was not justified under section 1605 and the
appropriate remedy was to declare section 29 of the FLA of no force
and effect, and to suspend the application of the declaration for a pe-
riod of six months.60 6 Finally, the Court suggested that the legislature
ought to address the rights of same-sex spouses in a more comprehen-
sive fashion rather than burden private litigants and the public purse
with piecemeal court reform.07
M. v. H. is a huge achievement for gays and lesbians and for all
those who believe in equality and justice. The crisis over section 15
which culminated in the trilogy of Miron, Egan and Thibeaudeau in-
spired us to write this paper,0 8 and forced us to reconsider first
604. M. v. H., SCC decision, 3.
605. M. v. H., SCC decision at 117.
606. M. v. H., SCC decision at 145.
607. M. v. H., SCC decision at 147. For a discussion of the immediate political reaction
to the decision, see Martha McCarthy and Joanna Radbord, Reflections on the Impact
of M. v. H., MONEY & FAM. LAw (forthcoming August 1999).
608. Discussed supra, Part IV.
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principles and to reflect anew on the meaning and purpose of section
15. The result in M. v. H. confirms that the Court has also funda-
mentally. revisited its analysis and changed its perspective. Our highest
court has embraced a clear and convincing commitment to substantive
equality for all Canadians. t
